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RAFIQ AHMAD

Editor

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The Law of the Sea: A Suggestive Study for Bangladesh

M. HABIBUR RAHMAN

1. INTRODUCTION

Bangladesh participated actively in the proceedings of the "Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea" (UNCLOS III). The Conference faced claims and counter-claims of states raised individually, regionally and through different groupings. Bangladesh is a coastal state bordering on the Bay of Bengal. The configuration of its coast is concave whereas that of the adjoining neighbours Burma and India is convex. In extending the sea zones such as the 200-nautical mile (n.m.) Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and the continental shelf/margin measured from baselines, Bangladesh is facing problems of overlapping with the similar zones of its neighbours. Practically speaking, Bangladesh is a geographically disadvantaged state.¹ But it is not enlisted in the UN Chart of the geographically disadvantaged states. As a state of this category, if Bangladesh wants to exercise the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea² (LOS Convention), the country needs to be embodied in the UN Chart.

The present approach is to be acquainted with the practices of Bangladesh on sea matters. Attempts will be made for an analytical study taking account of the convention provisions and state practices concerned. In so doing, suggestions will be made to help safeguard

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the interests of the country. It will also discuss the consequent effects of the suggestions and finally, remarks on the whole of this study will be drawn. In all respects, the study will centre on academic interests.

2. BANGLADESH PRACTICES ON SEA MATTERS

Bangladesh was called East Pakistan before it became independent in 1971. In sea matters the country followed its predecessor, Pakistan.³ The country emerged as an independent state while the Seabed Committee⁴ was quite in progress with its functioning on the regime of the seas. From the inception of UNCLOS III Bangladesh took part in all sessions of the Conference. By this time, a number of states enacted laws on the regime of the seas in the light of their needs and the then achievements of the LOS Conference. Bangladesh equally provided provisions for dealing with sea matters in its Territorial Waters and Maritime Zones Act, 1974.⁵ It was assumed that the Act would enable the country to safeguard its interests. As time passed, the country accordingly adopted LOS provisions by various circulars.

2.1. Baselines

Bangladesh is a land of rivers. The coast of the country is zigzag, indented, broken and irregular. The rivers of Bangladesh flowing from the highest mountain—the Himalayas carry down to the coastal bay a colossal discharge in the form of muds, silts, sands and the like. The bay adjoining the country is a zone of tidal bores and storms. In consequences, the coast has been unstable and the coastal bay shoaling. The coastal bay is not navigable other than to small boats.⁶ With the passage of time, different formations such as mud island, reef, deltas and low-tide elevations are surfacing in the bay. Subsequently, Bangladesh and the neighbours are passing through claims and counter-claims one against another. Specifically speaking, dispute arose between Bangladesh and India in 1974 on the ownership of an island formed in the estuary of the border river—Haribhanga.⁷ As the coastal bay is shoaling, the necessity of lying baselines in consideration of under-water situations comes into question.

Taking account of the circumstances Bangladesh has delineated baselines by depth of waters. That means the baselines of the country have been fixed at 10 fathoms contour line. By geographical coordinates of longitude and latitude the locations of the contour line have been specified in the chart concerned.⁸ The distance of these lines varies from 10 to 16 miles from the coast of the country.

2.2. Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone

The territorial sea of Bangladesh extends to 12 n.m. from its baselines. The country is complying with the LOS Convention on the matters of the territorial sea. The contiguous zone of the country spreads up to 6 n.m. beyond the outer limit of the territorial sea.⁹ Though the LOS Convention has enabled the coastal state to prescribe a 24 n.m. contiguous zone but Bangladesh is following 18 n.m. zone extending from the baselines.

2.3. Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and Continental Shelf

The exclusive economic zone of Bangladesh stretches out to 200 n.m. from the baselines of the country. Virtually, the EEZ extends to 188 n.m. beyond the territorial sea.¹⁰ So far, the country is abiding by the LOS Convention idealizing with the EEZ.

The continental shelf of the country is "the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast of Bangladesh but beyond the limits of the territorial waters up to the outer limits of the continental margin bordering on the ocean basin and abyssal floor. . .".¹¹ The regime of the continental shelf within 200 n.m. sea zone merges in the EEZ. In the existence of the EEZ the continental shelf is to be concerned with the seabed and subsoil beyond 200 n.m. zone measured from baselines. From a juridical point of view, the regime of the continental shelf is considered to deal with the seabed and subsoil between the outer boundary of the EEZ and the boundary between the continental margin and the abyssal floor.

3. OBJECTIVE ANALYSIS

In general every enactment is aimed at safeguarding the interests

of the country concerned. The TW & MZ Act accordingly should be assumed as securing the interests of Bangladesh.

The baselines provided on depth method normally appears to have benefited the country. Because by such baselines it is not difficult to extend internal waters to 16 miles from the coasts. Where it is not difficult to illustrate the cases of having an extended zone of the coastal sea within the regime of internal waters, the depth method adopted by Bangladesh for delineating baselines does not then amount to illegality.¹² The concave configuration of the coast, peculiar topographical situations of the coastal bay and the overwhelming dependence of the coastal population on sea resources and the ecological needs have compelled the country to substantiate a part of the coastal sea as internal waters.

As a practical consideration, the baselines so delineated do not result in bringing an extended zone of the coastal bay within the internal jurisdiction of Bangladesh. The baselines have made the coastal bay between the mainland and islands internal waters over which the country can exercise full authority. If the baselines were not delineated by depth method it is doubted whether the country would not proceed taking steps to safeguard interests in the zone of the coastal bay.

By now, the coastal states have prescribed 12 n.m. territorial sea. A coastal state which is exercising 12 n.m. territorial sea appears to be complying with the convention provisions.¹³ According to the LOS Convention every coastal state is entitled to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 n.m. measured from baselines. It clarifies that the 12 n.m. limit is the maximum breadth for the territorial sea. But practices show that quite a number of coastal states are exercising territorial sea exceeding 12 n.m. If the 12 n.m. territorial sea is binding then the coastal states with the territorial sea exceeding this limit seem to have been overriding the convention provisions. If a coastal state establishes territorial sea less than 12 n.m. this state will mean to be complying with the LOS Convention.

But at the present time no coastal state is seen to prescribe the territorial sea less than 12 n.m. The 12 n.m. territorial sea is in practice as the minimum limit among the coastal states. Among a number of coastal states particularly the Latin American states the 200-mile limit was in practice as the breadth of the territorial sea and as for the limit of exercising jurisdiction over the seabed and subsoil of the coastal sea.

The underwater situation of these countries is extremely peculiar. Along the Atlantic coasts—Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay have a large extent of continental shelves whereas their neighbours to west, such as Chile, Ecuador, and Peru in the Pacific coasts are lacking in the same. Existence of the shelves thus caused the Atlantic coast countries to extend their jurisdiction over a large extent of the shallow seas.¹⁴ The offshore seas of the Pacific coast countries drop sharply down the great ocean depth. They are rich in nitrates, phosphates and other resources. But these seas geologically have no shelf. Anyway, in order to lay claims to these resources these countries adopted the 200-mile sea zone.¹⁵ The reasons which led to the Latin American countries to have adopted the 200-mile zone appear to be identical and unique in the concept of each country's peculiar situation.

The countries like Argentina (1966), Brazil (1970), Ecuador (1966), El Salvador (1966), Guinea (1965), Panama (1967), Sierra Leone (1971), Somalia (1972), and Uruguay (1969) have been exercising the 200 n.m. territorial sea before the emergence of UNCLOS III. The countries such as Benin (1976), Cameroon (1974), Colombia (1975), Congo (1977), Ghana (1977), Liberia (1977), and Peru (1978) are seen to have been exercising the 200 n.m. territorial sea since UNCLOS III was in progress with its functioning.¹⁶ In addition to these states, several states have been following the territorial sea exceeding the conventional 12 n.m. limit.

At present the recognition of 200 n.m. zone in the law of the sea is not questioned. What difficulties the coastal states have to face for designing 200 n.m. territorial sea more than the difficulties they

had to face before the 200 n.m. zone internationally came into being as the EEZ. It is then noticeable that if the coastal states attempt to prescribe the territorial sea extending to 200 n.m. they may not feel so difficult as had to feel earlier. In the existence of the 200 n.m. EEZ it may not be unusual for the coastal states to proceed for extending the 12 n.m. territorial sea to 200 n.m. Though necessity knows no law but theorising law to that end will be welcoming. In the circumstances, if the coastal state raises pleas to validate the steps taken for meeting the needs, such stops cannot be treated illegal.

The contiguous zone conventionally first time was adopted in the TS & CZ Convention.¹⁷ It enabled the coastal states to prescribe 12-mile contiguous zone¹⁸ measuring from baselines. But in the presence of 12 n.m. territorial sea the 12 n.m. contiguous zone has no effect. As a result, while UNCLOS III introduced 12 n.m. territorial sea the contiguous zone came into being with 24 n.m. limit. The aspect of the contiguous zone is to prevent infringement of customs, sanitation and immigration regulations of the coastal states. The point to take into account is that if the infringement of the regulations is committed in the territory or the territorial sea of the coastal state, then punishment can be made effective. If the infringement of the regulations takes place in the contiguous zone, no punishment can be effected.

But at present the regime of the EEZ has provided for the coastal state sovereign rights to explore and exploit the resources, both living and non-living of the zone. Consequently, this state will not tolerate infringement of its interests in the resources of the EEZ. In this context, it will not be viable if it is said that the coastal state will be entitled to punish if the infringement is committed in its territory or the territorial sea. As the coastal state has sovereign rights over the resources of the EEZ, such a proposition cannot be made effective. From this point of view, the regime of the contiguous zone is becoming inapplicable.

The LOS Convention has not provided provisions for the delimitation of the contiguous zone between states the coasts of which

are opposite or adjacent to each other. There are provisions for the delimitation of the territorial sea and the EEZ. The actual extent of the contiguous zone is the extent beyond the territorial sea. Conventionally, the exact limit of the contiguous zone is 12 n.m. beyond the territorial sea. But the exact extent of the EEZ is 188 n.m. beyond the 12 n.m. territorial sea. The provisions in relation to the delimitation of the EEZ between opposite or adjacent states are applicable to the extent of 188 n.m.

If the coastal states have one boundary for the 12 n.m. contiguous zone beyond 12 n.m. territorial sea and another boundary for the EEZ, it will not be convenient for practical purposes. Questions arise as to the delimitation of the contiguous zone between opposite and adjacent states subject to the principle applicable to the territorial sea. That is to say, the territorial sea and the contiguous zone should be delimited by the same principle. But the regime of the territorial sea is applicable up to its breadth. From the point of the LOS Convention, the regime of the territorial sea is to be concerned with the 12 n.m. measuring from the baselines of the coastal state. Beyond this limit there is no application of the territorial sea.

In view of this, it is necessary for the coastal states to apply the boundary of the EEZ to be the boundary of the contiguous zone. In the existence of 200 n.m., EEZ coastal states are taking little interest in the contiguous zone. There should then be an assumption that the contiguous zone is in a position to bid goodbye from the law of the sea.

The continental shelf came into being not on the basis that the seabed beyond territorial sea is *res nullius* or *res communis*. If the seabed would be *res nullius*, it could be available for the taking. And, if the seabed would be *res communis*, it could be subjected to national appropriation or sovereignty.²⁰ Neither of the two bases was effective to the emergence of the continental shelf. What brought the continental shelf into being is that it is the underwater continuation of the coastal state. Though the shelf is the continuation of the

coastal state, it exists underneath the sea. That is why, the continental shelf and the land territory of the coastal state cannot equally be considered.

The wider sea zones that enable the coastal states to exercise jurisdiction over the resources are the EEZ and the continental shelf. In the 200 n.m. EEZ, the coastal state is entitled to explore and exploit the living and non-living resources of the zone and the seabed and subsoil thereof as well. The economic zone comprises the regime of fishing and the continental shelf. If the EEZ and the continental shelf are separately considered, then the regime of the EEZ deals with the fishing only. But in effect, the continental shelf in 200 n.m. sea zone subsumes in the EEZ. That means, the regime of the continental shelf is practically forcible in the seabed and subsoil beyond 200 n.m. EEZ. The coastal state whose continental shelf does not extend beyond 200 n.m. is not required to deal with the continental shelf regime.

From this point of view, the expression 'continental shelf' in the days to come will lose its entity. Whenever there will arise questions of jurisdiction over the seabed and the subsoil beyond the territorial sea the coastal states will simply apply the EEZ doctrine. Be that as it may, the notion 'continental shelf' may exist among the coastal states whose shelves or margins extend beyond 200 n.m. EEZ. Specifically speaking, the term 'continental margin' will rather be familiar than the 'continental shelf'.

In point of fact, the notion 'exclusive economic zone' is attaching much more importance than the 'continental shelf/margin'. That is to say, the 'exclusive economic zone' is replacing the 'continental shelf' particularly to the coastal states whose shelves do not stretch out exceeding 200 n.m. from the baselines.

As regards the continental shelf, the right of the coastal state is concerned with the natural resources. In other words, the coastal state is entitled to exercise over the continental shelf sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources.²¹ The rights of the coastal state are exclusive "in the sense that if this

state does not explore the continental shelf or exploit its natural resources, no one may undertake these activities, or make a claim to the continental shelf, without the express consent of the coastal state.²²

The legal regime of the continental shelf is governed by international customary law and for the practices to it by the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, 1958. Both international customary law and the Continental Shelf Convention confer upon the coastal state sovereign and exclusive rights for purposes of exploration and exploitation of the natural resources of the continental shelf.

As a matter of fact, the coastal state can exercise sovereign rights over all the resources of the EEZ. Neither the Continental Shelf Convention nor the LOS Convention can specify whether the coastal state is entitled to assert claims to the continental shelf or the EEZ as belonging to its territory. Anyway, several coastal states have enacted the continental shelf as belonging to its territory. The situation can be illustrated. In the year, 1950 Pakistan declared the continental shelf extended to one hundred fathom contour into the open sea to be included in its territory.²³ The Korean proclamation specified the continental shelf to be treated as a part of its territory.²⁴

Full sovereignty over the continental shelf is claimed explicitly in some proclamations, such as these of Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua and Peru. The same applies to the Brazillian Decree of 1950, which declares the incorporation in the national territory of that part of the seabed which corresponds to that territory. Apart from this, Argentina, Brazil, El Salvador, and Peru are exercising 200 n.m. territorial sea.

As mentioned, sixteen states are known to this author to have been exercising 200 n.m. territorial sea.²⁵ The states such as Chile, Costa Rica, Honduras, Korea and Pakistan are not claiming 200 n.m. territorial sea but are claiming the continental shelf as a sovereign part of the land territory. From this observation, it is feared, how long the 200 n.m. EEZ will be in practice in its entirety. It will not

be surprising it, with the passage of time, coastal states come to regard the 200 n.m. EEZ as territorial sea.

Generally speaking, the continental shelf within the 200 n.m. EEZ cannot be regarded as belonging to the territory of the coastal state. But while the 200 n.m. sea zone is treated as the territorial sea, it is then immaterial to bear in mind that the continental shelf lying in this zone is a part of the coastal state. In fact, the regime of the continental shelf for the states who are claiming 200 n.m. territorial sea can be applicable if there exists either the shelf, slope or the rise beyond this zone.

In this regard if the LOS Convention is applicable then the coastal state will have to determine the outer limit of the continental margin subject to Article 76 of this Convention. But as a practical consideration, the fixation of baselines for measuring the outer limit of the continental margin, practically, will not be an easy task. This will result in an excessive claim for the coastal state to the continental margin.

According to the LOS Convention the continental shelf is to be considered as the 'natural prolongation' of the coastal state. This criterion has resulted in conflicts among the states as to the delimitation of the continental shelf lying in the coastal sea. While in the *North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969* the continental shelf was regarded as 'natural prolongation', the United States began to assert claims to the shelf lying in the Gulf of Maine as its 'natural prolongation'.²⁶ In the Aegean Sea the *Greek-Turkey*, conflict appears to be centre upon the assumption of claiming the continental shelf as 'natural prolongation' one against another.²⁷ Iceland and Norway seem to have passed through conflict equally. In order to settle the conflict, the two countries referred it to the Conciliation Commission. It has been revealed by the Conciliation Commission that "geologically Jan Mayen Ridge is a microcontinent that predates both Jan Mayen and Iceland which is composed of volcanics"; therefore, the ridge is not considered a "natural geological prolongation of either Jan Mayen or Iceland".²⁸

Anyway, it is not possible to come to the point that in the application of 'natural prolongation' criterion for the continental shelf, there will arise no conflict between the states. Irrespective of any circumstances, the important point as to the tendency of the coastal state is that it wants to exercise jurisdiction over a wider extent of the coastal sea.

Before the emergence of the continental shelf doctrine, the coastal state was entitled to safeguard its interests in the territorial sea. But, from the economic point of view, the coastal state can safeguard its interests in the EEZ and the continental shelf better than in the territorial sea ; according to the LOS Convention, the coastal state is entitled to exercise sovereign rights over the resources in the EEZ and the continental shelf. In this regard, no state can overlap the coastal state's claims ²⁹

The rights of the coastal state over the continental shelf do not depend on occupation, effective or national.³⁰ But, if an island which has surfaced in the continental shelf were occupied by a foreign state, that state would have sovereign rights under the regime of the continental shelf. The coastal state could not claim such rights unless the island was acquired by 'occupation'. For such islands, it seems that the 'occupation' criterion is applicable in the regime of the continental shelf.³¹

The LOS Convention has adopted provisions for the regime of islands.³² Whose is the island if it is formed in the EEZ or on the continental shelf ? Neither the regime of the EEZ, nor of the continental shelf, nor of the islands can give answer to this question. If the coastal state is only entitled to ownership of islands which emerge in the territorial sea, then islands emerging in the EEZ or on the continental shelf will be as if they were in the high seas. No state then can claim islands which have so emerged unless it can occupy them effectively. It signifies that the position of the coastal state concerned is equal to that of any other state.

But how far would it be possible for the coastal state to face the challenge by 'occupation' ? The standpoint for the coastal state to

adopt may be that the island falls within the boundary of its EEZ or the continental shelf/margin. But, if that state fails to sustain claims by 'occupation', its plea may not be effective without specific LOS Convention provisions. Since the LOS Convention has no provisions dealing specifically with the ownership of new-born islands, therefore, a state may proceed by 'occupation' to the ownership of the island even though it lies in the EEZ or the continental shelf/margin of another state.

It seems that, if an island emerges in the EEZ or the continental shelf/margin, in order to own the island the coastal state may not have an incontrovertible argument that the island belongs to it. That means that the coastal state will have to proceed with the claim to the island by 'occupation' as well. Otherwise the coastal state will have to face the other state's claims to the island by 'occupation'.

If there are maritime zone boundaries between coastal states and if an island emerges at or near the boundary of the EEZ or the continental shelf/margin, problems will arise as to the delimitation of the maritime zones for the island. Naturally, the other state will raise the plea that the island has no maritime zones.

What then will happen to the territorial sea of this island? If the island is entitled to the territorial sea, the coastal state will be required to delimit the maritime zones as adjacent or opposite state. If it is not entitled to the EEZ and the continental shelf, the sea boundary of the island will be the boundary of the territorial sea for the coastal state and the boundary of the EEZ or the continental shelf for the other state.

It clarifies that if an island emerges at or near the boundary of the EEZ or the continental shelf/margin, different maritime zones may be defined in the absence of geographical constraints. In other words, if the EEZ or the continental shelf/margin from this island does not overlap the similar zones of other states, it will not give rise to litigation about maritime boundaries.

Where a circle shaped island with 7-mile radius can own about

133533 square miles EEZ, it is unquestioned that not only the coastal state but also the other states will be serious over its ownership.³³ If the continental shelf/margin extends exceeding 200 n.m. the more of its area will fall within the jurisdiction of the state for the island concerned. It will give rise to this state to explore the continental shelf/margin and exploit its natural resources. If the resources of the EEZ or the continental shelf/margin of the island are attractive it can seldom be said that the other states will not proceed for acquiring the island by occupation. In this case, the coastal state cannot avoid facing the foreign state. The fact is that the LOS Convention fails to decide the status of a new born island which has surfaced beyond the territorial sea.

4. CONFLICTING ISSUES

As a adjacent coastal state Bangladesh is required to delimit with Burma and India each and every sea zone starting from the end of the land boundary to the outer edge of the continental margin. There is no agreed sea boundary between Bangladesh and its neighbours. Bangladesh is a part of the Ganges-Brahmaputra plain. It sustains excessive flooding by storm surges. Moreover the plain is subject to tectonic activity and small recent faults are formed, some of them producing basins in the coastal bay. The cumulative effects of monsoon rainfall, cyclonic storms and tidal surges have contributed to a continuous process of erosion and shoaling. As time passes, land formations of different components with the identity of islands are surfacing in the estuaries and the coastal bay.

The Bay of Bengal is the main source of fishery resources for Bangladesh. The country has few mineral resources, although some natural gas has been produced, and there are the beginnings of steel and oil resources.³⁴ The existing mineral resources can seldom meet the needs of its teeming millions. The country produces salt from the bay waters. The bay is the only channel linking Bangladesh with other countries, and Bangladesh's trade and commerce depend solely on these routes. Thus, the entire country is the hinterland of

the Bay of Bengal and the importance of the bay to Bangladesh is unquestioned.

Bangladesh has no agreed sea boundary with the neighbours. The delimitation of maritime boundaries creates a conflict between Bangladesh and its neighbours. Disagreement arose mainly with India when the Bangladesh Government in 1974 signed contracts to share production with six oil companies granting them oil and natural gas exploration rights in its territorial waters in the Bay of Bengal. Thus, the Bangladesh line moved toward the south from the edge of its land boundary, while the Indian line took a southeasterly direction, thus creating an angle within which lie thousands of square miles of the bay claimed by each country as its economic zone. This overlapping has become a critical problem between the two neighbouring countries. Thus the delimitation of maritime boundaries is an all-important matter for Bangladesh and India, and their areas of authority in the seas—for example, the territorial sea, EEZs, and the continental shelf—will depend on how it is resolved.

Although negotiations have been going on since 1974, Bangladesh and India have not been able to settle the delimitation problem, mainly because of the concave nature of the Bangladesh coast. Bangladesh's position is that no rigid principle can be applied in the present case and that the basic guideline is equity. India on the other hand, applies the principle of 'equidistance' in delimiting the boundary, ignoring the physical features of the coast.

Bangladesh and India have fallen in conflict over the ownership of a new-born island in the estuary of the Haribhanga River on the border between the two countries. The boundary between Bangladesh and India in this area is the midstream of the main channel of the Haribhanga. The island, formed in the estuary of the border river Haribhanga and the Bangladesh internal river Raimangal, most probably after the cyclone and tidal bore of 1970, is new terrain, rising initially as a low-tide elevation.³⁵ The island is a U-shaped formation with the eastern arm elongated toward the north. In 1978 its approximate area at low tide was about two square miles, but

this may have increased. It was uninhabited at that time, though fishermen from the Bangladesh mainland were observed on the island during the dry season. The island in Bangladesh is known as South Talpatty whereas in India as New Moore/Purbasha.³⁶ Bangladesh claims to this island on the assumption that the midstream of the border river Haribhanga flows to the west of the island, while India claims it on the assumption that the midstream flows to the east of the island.

In spite of a series of negotiations Bangladesh and India have still not been successful to settle the dispute on the island. Claims and counter-claims are going on its ownership between the countries. Important is the fact that each country is claiming the island as its lying in the territorial sea. As regards this island, whatever be the problem, will be settled while the actual flow of the midstream—the boundary of the territorial sea will be settled. There seems to be no doubt that the conflict between Bangladesh and India over the newly emerged island is concerned with matters of fact rather than of law.

As an adjacent state Bangladesh faces the delimitation of sea zones with India extending from the coast of the latter's mainland—the states of West Bengal and Orissa. Moreover, with respect to the continental shelf/margin, the country requires to fix the boundary with India as an opposite state taking into account the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. The situation also arises with Sri Lanka. India is in an advantageous position because of the convex configuration of its coast. When it comes to delimiting the continental shelf/margin with Bangladesh, the Andaman and Nicobar Islands also place India in a favourable position.

As to the delimitation of sea zones particularly the continental shelf/margin between Bangladesh and Burma, interests arising from the Andaman and Nicobar Islands must be taken into account. Owing to these islands Bangladesh will have to fix the boundary at a four-point junction measured from the Bangladesh coast, the coast of India's mainland, the coast of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.

and the coast of Sri Lanka. It is also true that the boundary of the continental shelf/margin will have to be fixed at a tri-junction measured from the coast of Bangladesh, Burma and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.³⁷ Unquestionably, the delimitation of sea boundaries poses a perennial problem to Bangladesh and the neighbours. In order to avoid conflicts arising from the sea, its bed and subsoil within national jurisdiction it is inevitable for these countries to settle the delimitation problems.

5. DEFINITIVE SUGGESTIONS

There are problems for Bangladesh to delineate the sea zones extending from its coast to the outer edge of the continental shelf/margin. In addition, the country faces the problems of the delimitation of the sea zones with Burma, India and to some extent with Sri Lanka as well. Despite the problems the country is required to safeguard its interests in the sea zones. In so doing, care should be taken that no violation of the principles of international law and custom and the principles which are unquestionably in practice takes place. This requires to be followed in the case of each and every sea zone.

5.1. Baselines

The baselines fixed on depth method may present an assumption to others that the purpose of Bangladesh is to substantiate the internal waters unscrupulously extended from its coast. As stated, the peculiarity to the coastal configuration and to the underwater situation of the coastal bay adjoining Bangladesh knows no bound. The geographical, geological, geomorphological, ecological and topographical situations practically have compelled the country to prescribe baselines on depth of waters. The baselines determined by 10 fathom contour line do not exceed 16 miles from the coast of the country. The coastal islands fall between the baselines so drawn and the coast of its mainland. These baselines have not affected the concavity of the configuration of the coast. That is to say, the configuration of the baselines is also concave. There is then no ground for the counterpart to raise the plea that Bangladesh has lost propounding

the principle of equity to be effected in the delimitation of sea zones between them. Where the coasts are of different configurations the country with concave coast has a ground to plea for equitable principle against the country with convex coast which wants equi-distance principle to be applied in the delimitation.

Since the coastal sea is shoaling, it is therefore a duty for Bangladesh to maintain the sea routes in the internal waters between the baselines and the coast in good order for navigation of seagoing vessels to and from its ports. In the cases if it is followed, then the baselines drawn on depth method would not amount to an illegality.

The function of law is to meet necessities by the provisions applicable for general purposes. If the provisions cannot rationally be applicable the situation should specially be considered without giving undue benefit to one against its counterpart. The application of law may be exhausted but the scope of natural justice is open-ended. If the dream of law, equity and good conscience is to promote justice the baselines drawn on depth method cannot be treated as giving undue benefit in the form of internal waters to the country concerned. In view of this, the depth method baselines would not only be applicable to Bangladesh but also in like situations to others for meeting the necessities inevitable.

5.2. Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone

Bangladesh's 12 n.m. territorial sea expresses that the country is complying with the LOS Convention provisions.³⁸ Though the 12 n.m. limit is the maximum limit for the territorial sea, no country is adopting the territorial sea less than this limit. More than 80 coastal states are claiming a territorial sea of 12 n.m. but the states exercising the territorial sea exceeding this limit are not taking interests in adjusting it to 12 n.m. limit.³⁹ The maximum limit of the territorial sea in practice is 200 n.m. measuring from baselines.

Except the right of innocent passage to the vessels of foreign states the coastal state can exercise its full authority in the territorial sea, its bed and subsoil. Though the territorial sea is treated as a

sovereign part of the coastal state, it has restrictions on the alienation of this sea. The territorial sea can alone not be alienated. If a part of the coastal state is alienated, the territorial sea concerned will automatically be treated as such.

By treaty commitments the territorial sea can be made applicable to other states. But it depends purely on the willingness of the coastal state. The rights and obligations of the coastal state and the foreign states in the territorial sea do not depend on its breadth. In other words, what rights and obligations are concerned for the coastal state and the foreign states in a narrow territorial sea the same will be concerned in the extended territorial sea. An island emerged in the territorial sea—narrow or extended will belong to the coastal state. The coastal state will not be required to prove the legal validity for its ownership by occupation.

There is no scope for others to raise pleas against the coastal state on the ownership of an island emerged in an extended like the 200 n.m. territorial sea. It is immaterial on the ownership of the island for the coastal state whether it emerges in the 12 n.m. or in the 200 n.m. territorial sea. Coastal state's claims to this island cannot be challenged.

In the 200 n.m. sea zone if an island rises, the coastal state will undoubtedly feel the necessity of claiming it as its part. In order to get the island, the coastal state will not fall back to declare the 200 n.m. zone as the territorial sea. As regards an island rising in the 200 n.m. sea zone adjoining to two coastal states one being stronger and the other weaker, the latter state cannot face the former state if occupation is the criterion for its acquisition. For the purpose of achieving the island it would be favourable for the weaker state to regard the 200 n.m. zone as the territorial sea. The object of the weaker state for doing this will be to claim the ownership of the island by legal means. That is to say, the weaker coastal state will aim at the doctrine of the territorial sea on the ownership of the island. The doctrine to this end will be that the island rising in the territorial sea belongs to the coastal state.

If there is a feeling for the LOS Convention, then states should comply with its provisions. The LOS Convention cannot restrain these states who have already been exercising the territorial sea exceeding 12 n.m. So far, fourteen states have ratified the LOS Convention.⁴⁰ Out of these states Benin and Ghana have been claiming a 200 n.m. territorial sea and Senegal, 150 n.m. Though they have ratified the Convention, they have not been required to adjust the territorial sea to 12 n.m. How can then a weaker coastal state be regarded as infringing the LOS Convention if it prescribes a 200 n.m. territorial sea for securing interests there against the stronger neighbour. It will not be unreal a weaker coastal state designs 200 n.m. territorial sea in order to oust the alien states for asserting claims to an island there.

At this stage, attention is to be given to the Bangladesh case. Compared to India, Bangladesh is a small and weak state. It is not possible for Bangladesh to face India if it wants to step in sea matters against the former state. Questions may arise as to why India will override Bangladesh's interests in the seas. If not, it will be all right for fostering friendly and neighbourly relations between them. If Bangladesh requires facing India against its attempts of acquiring islands in the sea zone outside 12 n.m. territorial sea but within 200 n.m. EEZ or the continental shelf, it will not be possible for this small, weak and poor state to get the counterpart out. The country cannot but to claim the islands as belonging to its territory. Unquestionably, it is necessary for Bangladesh to enact the territorial sea extending to 200 n.m. from baselines.

The 6 n.m. contiguous zone beyond 12 n.m. territorial sea reveals that Bangladesh is entitled to extend more 6 n.m. zone adjoining its 18 n.m. contiguous zone measuring from its baselines. This will make the contiguous zone as extending to 24 n.m. from the baselines. If this is followed the country, then, can be regarded as complying with the LOS Convention provision.

The country adopted the contiguous zone not only for the purpose of controlling the infringement of its customs, fiscal,

immigration or sanitary regulations but also for the security of the territory or the territorial sea. It is noticeable that the LOS Convention has not embodied the term 'security' but the states who adopted the contiguous zone almost embodied this term. If 'security' is the purpose for the contiguous zone, the purpose will greatly be served in the 12 n.m. zone than in the 6 n.m. zone beyond the territorial sea.

It is a question why Bangladesh has not been exercising 12 n.m. contiguous zone beyond its 12 n.m. territorial sea. The adoption of 6 n.m. contiguous zone except the 12 n.m. extent beyond 12 n.m. territorial sea in Bangladesh's TW & MZ Act expressed a mistake and weakness of the country. It may be argued that a narrow zone that is, 6 n.m. contiguous zone beyond the territorial sea would be enough for the country to exercise customs, fiscal, immigration, sanitary and security matters. But greater is the contiguous zone greater will be the scope for security of the coastal state. It signifies that the 6 n.m. contiguous zone should be changed to 12 n.m. zone beyond the territorial sea. This is required to be followed if Bangladesh follows the 12 n.m. territorial sea.

But, it has already been mentioned that as a small and weak state Bangladesh would not be able to challenge its big and strong neighbours. Therefore, the country should deem that it has no alternative but to extend the territorial sea to 200 n.m. from its baselines. If the country adopts 200 n.m. territorial sea the contiguous zone doctrine will have no effect to Bangladesh. Pursuant to the 200 n.m. territorial sea it will be required for the contiguous zone to bid goodbye from Bangladesh.

5.3. EEZ and Continental Shelf

The EEZ and the continental shelf are practically concerned with resource jurisdiction. There are no provisions in the LOS Convention enabling the coastal states to appropriate the EEZ and the continental shelf. The Convention has not provided provisions prohibitory to the appropriation of the EEZ and the continental shelf by the coastal state. As a result, the coastal state cannot be made

obliged to restrain from appropriating the EEZ and the continental shelf.

As far as the continental shelf is concerned, several coastal states enacted the shelf as belonging to the land territory.⁴¹ Bangladesh enacted the continental shelf equally. In plain words, the continental shelf/margin extending from the mainland and the islands belongs to Bangladesh.⁴² From this point of view, an island surfaced in the shelf/margin would belong to Bangladesh. But this plea cannot be treated unquestioned.

Though the Continental Shelf Convention or the LOS Convention has not stated whether it is possible for the coastal state to assert claims to the EEZ or the continental shelf as belonging to its territory, but by implication,⁴³ it seems that the coastal state may exercise sovereign rights over the resources only. In other words, neither the Continental Shelf Convention nor the LOS Convention has given authority to the coastal state to regard the EEZ for the continental shelf as part of its sovereign territory. On the other hand, the Convention has not adopted any specific provisions against the assertion of claims to the EEZ and the continental shelf as belonging to the territory of the coastal state. Failure to make specific provision leads to the assumption that measures, if taken by the coastal state to assert claims to the EEZ and the continental shelf as belonging to its territory, will not be a violation of the Convention.

If an island emerged in the EEZ or the continental shelf and it is challenged by a foreign state for asserting claims to it by occupation the coastal state's plea based on the EEZ or the continental shelf doctrine will not be effective. By enactment the continental shelf can be declared as belonging to the coastal state but conventionally it will not be forcible to the acquisition of the island in the EEZ or the continental shelf.

However, it would not then be rational to substantiate the claims of a foreign state over islands formed in the EEZ or the continental shelf against the coastal state. If the 'occupation' criterion is the deciding factor, the ownership of the islands would be subject to

physical force. It would therefore be easy for the big and strong state to assert claims to such islands by physical force against its small and weak neighbour.⁴⁴

Without reservation, Bangladesh must be serious in asserting claims to the islands emerged and to be emerging in the EEZ or the continental shelf not by force but by the norms of state practice and the principles of international law, justice and good conscience. The 200 n.m. territorial sea can in no way be treated as infringing the legal norms to the regime of the coastal seas.

The EEZ will not be applicable to the coastal states exercising 200 n.m. territorial sea.⁴⁵ The regime of islands enshrined in the LOS Convention⁴⁶ cannot ascertain the legal status of new-born islands in the EEZ or the continental shelf/margin. The LOS Convention provisions dealing with the regime for islands cannot enable the coastal state to substantiate claims to the island without occupying it effectively. If the LOS Convention cannot be made binding, then it may not pose any problem for a coastal state to regard the 200-mile zone as the territorial sea. From this point of view, the coastal states which are particularly incapable of facing the challenge from stronger states will call the maritime zone in which such an island exists the territorial sea. The purpose of this is to acquire the island. This may also be applicable against another state which is not a neighbour either as adjacent or opposite to the coastal state.

But if the other state is a neighbour as adjacent or opposite to the coastal state, problems will arise out of the acquisition of the island. If both of these states assert claims to the island based on the regime of the territorial sea, settlement of the dispute will fall to be decided by delimitation of the territorial sea between them.

6. CONSEQUENCES OF SUGGESTIONS

As per suggestions, the maritime jurisdiction for Bangladesh will be applicable to baselines, territorial sea and the continental shelf/margin. Owing to the suggested 200 n.m. territorial sea the country will not be entitled to the contiguous zone and the EEZ. The regime

of the contiguous zone and the EEZ will subsume in the 200 n.m. territorial sea. In order to strengthen legal rights to acquire islands in 200 n.m. zone against the foreign states particularly against its big and strong neighbours, if Bangladesh prescribes 200 n.m. territorial sea the neighbours may not keep themselves indifferent from adopting the territorial sea extending to 200 n.m. from baselines. It will entail no problem complicated to the assertion of claims to the islands. Because no one of the states will be entitled to claim the islands within another territorial sea.

The 200 n.m. territorial sea of the coastal state will reflect on the counterparts not to proceed to acquire islands there. The reason will be that an attempt to acquire the islands in the territorial sea will amount to an intrusion on the sovereign part of the coastal state. But the delimitation of 200 n.m. sea zone whether in the form of the territorial sea on the EEZ between Bangladesh and its adjoining neighbours—Burma and India cannot at all be avoided. Wider is the extent of sea zones greater will be the extent of topographic variations. This results in little scope to enforce equidistance principle in the delimitation. But the coastal states concerned are free to delimit the sea zones by agreement between them. If they succeed by agreement in delimiting the sea zones peacefully, no question contrary to the principle applied in the delimitation can be taken into account.

The 200 n.m. EEZ is a new innovation of the LOS Convention. The Convention has internationally first time brought the 200 n.m. zone into being. Before this Convention, there was no practice internationally enforced on the delimitation of the 200 n.m. zone between states with coasts opposite or adjacent to each other. It is, therefore to express the view that coastal states should have no objection to effect the delimitation of 200 n.m. sea zone whether, territorial sea or EEZ between opposite or adjacent states by the LOS Convention provision on the EEZ concerned.⁴⁷ From this viewpoint, it would not be wise for Bangladesh and its neighbours to disregard the proposition made to the delimitation of 200 n.m. zone in the form of

territorial sea or EEZ. Whether the 200 n.m. zone be the territorial sea or the EEZ, Bangladesh and its neighbours should abide by the LOS Convention provision applicable to the delimitation of the EEZ between opposite or adjacent coastal states.⁴⁸

The EEZ deals with the regime of the continental shelf and the fishing zone within 200 n.m. measured from baselines.⁴⁹ The regime of the continental shelf is aimed at the exploration of the shelf and the exploitation of its natural resources. This right of the coastal state to the continental shelf is not unqualified in the sense that the coastal state has sovereign right for the shelf and for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its resources. In effect, no state can override the coastal state as to the exploring of the shelf and the exploiting of its natural resources. Whether the 200 n.m. zone would be the EEZ or the territorial sea the coastal state cannot be asked about its right to the natural resources.

But there is a scope for other states like the land-locked and the geographically disadvantaged states⁵⁰ of the subregion or region to participate in the surplus of the allowable catch of the living resources in the EEZ.⁵¹ But in the case of a coastal state whose economy is overwhelmingly dependent on the exploitation of the living resources of its EEZ, those states cannot participate although there is any surplus of the allowable catch. That means, the economic criterion can be treated as the deciding factor for the coastal state to exclude other states to participate in the exploitation of the living resources.

Obviously, such a criterion enables the poor developing coastal state to strengthen its economy from the resources of the EEZ. It may be pointed out that by such a criterion only the poor developing coastal state can exclude all other states even the land-locked and the geographically disadvantaged states to participate in the exploitation of these resources.⁵² That is to say, the surplus of the allowable catch can only enable other states to take part in the exploitation of the living resources provided that the economy of the coastal state concerned does not overwhelmingly depend on the resources of its EEZ.

Bangladesh is a least developed country.⁵³ In sea matters, the country faces problems as a geographically disadvantaged state. In the coastal bay of Bangladesh and India, questions for Bhutan and Nepal may arise for their participation in the surplus of the living resources of the EEZ. If Bhutan and Nepal want to proceed for this purpose, they cannot do it without concessions by India because these land-locked states are bordered with India, on whom depends their right of transit to and from the territory. If these states want to use the ports of Bangladesh, they will have to request India, which in the present case can be treated as a transit state. But questions arise as to the feasibility of such rights for Bhutan and Nepal.

If Bhutan and Nepal lay claims for the exploration and exploitation of the living resources being the surplus of allowable catch in the EEZ of Bangladesh, they will not be able to succeed, because Bangladesh can overrule their plea on the fact that it is a least developed country as well as a coastal state with special geographical characteristics.⁵⁴ The country can also add that it depends overwhelmingly on the living resources of the coastal sea. Ultimately, there is no chance for Bhutan and Nepal for the claims to the living resources of the EEZ of Bangladesh. Whether Bangladesh would call 200 n.m. zone the EEZ or the territorial sea there will arise no claim for these land-locked states. That is to say, the 200 n.m. EEZ if prescribed by Bangladesh as the territorial sea will not affect these states.

If the present 12 n.m. territorial sea of Bangladesh is extended to 200 n.m. the area relating to the passage will be increased. The states, particularly the Marine Powers, may raise protest against it. But Bangladesh will not be the first of its kind to extend 200 n.m. territorial sea. It will, therefore, not be a problem for Bangladesh to overcome the plea of the states which want to infringe the rights of passage in this sea.

7. SETTLEMENT OF MARITIME DISPUTES

The 200 n.m. zone has made quite a number of coastal states

neighbours to one another.⁵⁵ Problems are arising out of the delimitation of this zone between the coastal states. The LOS Convention has introduced certain machineries for the settlement of maritime disputes.⁵⁶ As regards the settlement of disputes, practices show that states do not take interest in accepting third party settlement. Every state wants disputes to be settled peacefully, but in so doing it avoids directly or indirectly to abide by the third party settlement.

It may be fully understandable that a group of states which may believe that their interest, views and legal approach represent a minority in position in the international community should be reluctant to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of an international tribunal. It is equally natural that the states which have recently become independent are passing through internal political, economic and social changes should hesitate to accept compulsory jurisdiction which they are apt to regard as a possible embarrassment in the completion of their national and social revolutions. If, however, these attitudes are perpetual beyond a certain stage, they weaken seriously the whole principle of third party judgment which is an essential element in any satisfactory legal order.

The fact that the states which appear to have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, their acceptance is not unconditional. Their allegiance to the Court is conditional in the sense that they are not unequivocal in accepting the jurisdiction. Subject to the right of addition, amendment, withdrawal and reciprocity, states accept the jurisdiction of the Court. There are states which at all do not prefer to place them under the jurisdiction of the Court.⁵⁷ States both developed and developing are afraid of coming under an obligation of the Court on accepting its compulsory jurisdiction.⁵⁸

In regard to the settlement of maritime disputes the above tendency of a number of states is identical. States, for example, Canada (1970), Philippines (1971), El Salvador (1973), India (1974), New Zealand (1976), and Norway (1976) declared their acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court with exceptions to sea

matters dealing with the internal waters, historic bays, gulfs, archipelagic waters, territorial sea, contiguous zone, EEZ, continental shelf/margin and the airspace.⁵⁹

Bangladesh has still not accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. This negative attitude of the country toward the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice is not an uncommon or extraordinary event. The settlement of disputes machineries under the LOS Convention are facing similar problems. In point of fact, the deep seabed mining under the common heritage principle and the settlement of disputes provisions have mainly caused to the states, particularly to the industrialised states, not to accept the LOS Convention.⁶⁰

Since islands are emerging in the maritime zones, it can be assumed that with the passage of time Bangladesh and India will have to face much more complicated problems as to the settlement of maritime boundary disputes. If Bangladesh and India fail to settle the disputes, it may be required for the United Nations to take measures for the settlement of disputes in order to maintain international peace and security. But questions arise whether the matter will come to the notice of the United Nations. According to India's notification, disputes arising out of the maritime territory will be treated as lying in the internal jurisdiction of India.⁶¹ It signifies that no third-party settlement can be made effective so long India does not consent to it or is compelled to do the same. Then the question of the third-party settlement will arise when the situation results in the breach of international peace and security.⁶² If so, the situation will be subjected to the purview of the United Nations.

Whatever be the problem as to the settlement of maritime disputes, there are difficulties for the small and weak country like Bangladesh to bring the matter to the notice of the United Nations against its big and strong counterpart like India. If the maritime between Bangladesh and India is not settled, it may draw the attention of other states wh's a big and strong state, it is India whom these states will normally blame. The reason is that there is a moral

obligation of the states in disputes to take initiatives for the settlement of the dispute. This will also be applicable to Bangladesh and India for settling the maritime boundary dispute. If it is released that a proposal of joint survey is declined, the state declining such survey will be assumed as creating bar for the settlement of the dispute.⁶³

In the TW & MZ Act there are no provisions for the delimitation of sea zones between Bangladesh and its neighbours. Bangladesh has signed the LOS Convention but not yet ratified. At the present stage, it would not be wise for the country to ratify the Convention. It is necessary for the country not to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. If it is required to accept the jurisdiction the law of the sea matters arising from the sea zones within national jurisdiction should be treated as exceptions. Turning to the suggestions, it can be laid down that acceptance of the third party settlement for Bangladesh is subject to exceptions to the internal waters, territorial sea and the continental shelf/margin and the air-space related. Matters relating to such sea zones and airspace would be treated as lying within the internal jurisdiction of the country.

But the peaceful settlement of dispute depends on the good will of the parties to it. Short of this, it is not possible to settle the dispute peacefully. If the parties themselves settle the dispute peacefully, there will be no scope to raise a question on the validity of the procedures and the machineries used.

In any dispute, the fundamentals must relate to its settlement peacefully. Conforming with this proposition, it would be appreciating if Bangladesh and the neighbours take steps to settle the maritime dispute bilaterally. If they fail, there should be no reservation for settling it by third party machinery.

8. CONCLUDING REMARKS

As a small and weak state, Bangladesh cannot face its big, and strong neighbours. It would also not be capable of facing the other foreign states on the acquisition of islands emerged and to be emerging

in the sea zones within national jurisdiction. If the islands outside 12 n.m. territorial sea are *res nullius*, the position of Bangladesh would be equal to that of any other state.⁶⁴ Though the islands would exist in the EEZ of Bangladesh, there would be no problem for example to India to occupy the same. Without doubt, Bangladesh will be helpless in case of such occupation.

Since the northern Bay of Bengal adjoining Bangladesh, Burma, India and Sri Lanka is becoming a domain of land formations, for example, islands as emerging, every state will be serious to claim the ownership of the same. If this is the case, how then can small and weak Bangladesh face the big and strong counterparts? If an island near the boundary of the territorial sea, but within the EEZ, is occupied by India, would it be possible for Bangladesh to exercise the EEZ surrounding the island? There is nothing to be surprising that India's plea in respect of this island would be to delimit the territorial sea with Bangladesh. The 12 n.m. territorial sea of this island would overlap the similar zone of Bangladesh. That is to say, the boundary of the territorial sea between this island and Bangladesh will encroach its 12 n.m. territorial sea prescribed before the island came into being.

It is apparent that Bangladesh will have to lose the maritime jurisdiction concerning even with the 12 n.m. territorial sea. Undoubtedly, it is required for Bangladesh to be legally protected as to the assertion of its claims to such an island. This leads to the country that it has no alternative but to prescribe a 200 n.m. territorial sea.

Bangladesh and India are passing through conflicts over ownership of the island—South Talpatty/New Moore/Purbasha. Each of the two countries is claiming the island as lying in its own territorial sea.⁶⁵ Since the island is in the territorial sea, no question of occupation arises. This situation has made the two countries not to declare to have the island acquired. If the island would rise beyond the territorial sea, the situation would perhaps be different. Because there would be no problem for India to acquire the island by

occupation. Taking this into account, what then will be the position of Bangladesh as to asserting claims to the island rising in its EEZ. Certainly, without effective occupation, Bangladesh's protest against India's occupation of the island will be fruitless.

Whereas Bangladesh is suffering from the scourge of over population, the islands in the 200 n.m. territorial sea may to some extent meet the need of the country to rehabilitate its population.⁶⁶ Since the foreign states will not be able to assert claims to the islands in the territorial sea, there will be no problem for Bangladesh to rehabilitate the population in the islands rising in its 200 n.m. territorial sea. Nevertheless, it does not mean that the 200 n.m. territorial sea will at all not attribute problems to Bangladesh on the ownership of the islands. Practically speaking, Bangladesh should not be careless about the ownership of the islands though lying in its territorial sea. Because of its carelessness, it will not be difficult for the foreign state to acquire such islands by 'dereliction' criterion on the authority of which a state can acquire territory of another state if the later state abandons it.⁶⁷

The territorial waters and Maritime Zones Act, 1974 is not adequate to protect the interests of Bangladesh. The shortage of the Act is more acute than its defect. In the interests of the country suggestions mainly made in this study can be summed up such as for (i) enacting 200 n.m. territorial sea ; (ii) reservation to ratify the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982, before enacting the territorial sea ; (iii) enacting provisions on the settlement of maritime disputes ; and (iv) accepting the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice excepting the internal jurisdiction of the country on matters arising from internal waters, territorial sea, continental shelf/margin and airspace thereof. From end to end, Bangladesh should be watchful to its neighbours about their stand on sea matters.

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30. Note 21 above.
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32. Article 121.
33. Note 31 above, p. 371 at n. 14.
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35. Ibid., p. 1308.

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40. E.g., Bahamas, Belize, Cuba, Egypt, Fiji (the first to ratify), Zambia, Shana, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Mexico, Philippines, Senegal, Zambia and the United Nations Council for Namibia. *United Nations Press Release*, ESA/508 of 10 December, 1984, p. 2.

41. E.g., Australia (1955), Bahamas (1948), Chile (1947), Costa Rica (1948), Honduras (1950), Jamaica (1948), Korea (1952), Mexico (1945), Nicaragua (1950), Pakistan (1950), and the British Protected Arab Sheikdoms (1949). Note 31 above p. 373.

42. TW & MZ Act, Sec. 7.

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45. Note 25 above.

46. Article 121.

47. Article 74.

48. Ibid.

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56. Every state is free to its choice of (a) the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea established in accordance with Annex. VI, (b) the International Court of Justice, (c) an arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VII, (d) a special arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VIII, for one or more of the categories of disputes specified therein. LOS Convention, Articles 53-91, 279-299 and M. Habibur Rahman, "The Law of the Sea and Settlement of Maritime Disputes", *BISS Journal*, 1984, Vol. V, No. 1, pp. 69-96.

57. *Ibid.*, pp. 82, 83.

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59. *ICJ Yrh*, 1975-76, Vol. XXX, p. 62 ; 1979-80, Vol. XXXIV, pp. 54, 59, 63, 75-76.

60. Part XI & Part XV.

61. *ICJ Yrh*, 1975-76, p. 62.

62. UN Charter, Article 37.

63. Bangladesh proposed a joint survey to dispel any misgivings about the actual location and rightful ownership of the island with the aim of peacefully settling the problem between the two neighbouring countries. But no positive steps have been taken by India to this proposal. Note 6 above, p. 1309.

64. Note 31 above, p. 372.

65. Note 6 above, 1309.

66. With a population nearly 100 million squeezed into about 55,598 square miles, Bangladesh is one of the most densely populated countries of the world. It is the second most densely populated nation in the world after Singapore. The Bangladesh economy has been described as an 'International Basket Case'. By all accepted criteria it is one of the poorest countries of the world. Foreign aid has kept the country running. Pursuant to these circumstances, there arises no question as to the rehabilitation of its population in the islands emerging in the maritime zones. George Thomas Kurian, *Encyclopaedia of the Third World*, 1979, Vol. I, Mansell-London, p. 110.

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Devolution of British Authority in India : A New Approach to the Study of Indian Muslim Crisis in the Late Nineteen Thirties

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Indian Muslims were confronted with the worst crisis of their political life in India by the late nineteen thirties, and for a number of reasons. Firstly, there was the communal problem, the perennial source of trouble in Indian politics. It highlighted the contrast and incompatibility between the two major communities of India, the Muslims and Hindus, and created "exasperation, bitterness and hostility."¹ Secondly, the system of representative government introduced by the British in India, was inherently biased in favour of the Hindu majority community. There was no way the Muslim could share power equally in the system.² Thirdly, the rather ill-conceived and ominous role of the Indian National Congress in the national politics showed to the Muslims, particularly in 1937-39 years, that it was essentially a Hindu body³ and could never safeguard their rights and interests. Finally, the process of devolution of British authority in India itself, which gained momentum in the war years, and exacerbated Muslim anxieties and apprehensions regarding their fate in a system inherently pitted against them, and which was perceived to be in the hands of a community hardly responsive to their particular interests.

While much has been said about the first three afore-mentioned factors contributing to the Indian Muslim crisis of the late nineteen thirties, namely, the communal problem, the inadequacy of the

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British system of representative government, and the unimaginative, and indiscreet role of the Congress viz-a-viz the Muslims, very little attention so far has been paid to the distressful impact of the devolutionary process. Many writers have failed to notice it altogether. Some have recognized it but only in passing, without making a serious, systematic effort to discuss it in its broad historical context.⁴ This neglect is hardly warranted. In the opinion of the present author, the devolution of British authority in India had much to do with Muslim predicament of the late nineteen thirties. For, how else could one explain the rapidity and intensity with which Indian Muslims were devising schemes to cope with the Hindu-dominated India minus the British,⁵ leading ultimately to the demand for the partition of India in March 1940 as the only viable solution of the problem? The purpose of this paper is indeed to address itself to this neglected area of interest, to show how and why it contributed to the growth of the Indian Muslim crisis in late nineteen thirties.

Devolution of British authority in India needs to be understood at two levels : the first pertains to the declining ability of the British to use coercive power and the increasing erosion of their legitimacy to rule India ; and second, and perhaps more significant, reflects the Muslim desire to be free as much from the British rule as from the Hindu domination. The Muslims were not willing to exchange the British raj with the Hindu rule. This exchange, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, who had returned from his self-imposed exile in London in the early thirties to save the Muslims from the impending disaster,⁶ feared, would present India "with worst disaster that has ever taken place . . ."⁷

The British rule in India began and clearly rested on their physical strength and resources to continue to hold India. Although the Uprising of 1857 was successfully put down with substantial help from 'loyal' Indian troops, including the recently conquered Sikhs, the main burden of the task was carried out by a formidable body of regular British troops and officers.⁸ The British in fact not only encouraged the maintenance of an 'irresistable force of British

troops' after the Uprising but also encouraged the formation for a strong, efficient bureaucracy to maintain law and order and to keep Indians at bay on the frontier of the raj.⁹ In order to help them to perform their task they were provided with various Acts and Regulations to produce "immediate and most salutary results."¹⁰ Thus various coercive measures were resorted to as early as 1908 to stop, what the Government called "the saturnalia of lawlessness"¹¹ of the terrorists in Bengal and Punjab. Regulation III of 1818, which empowered the government to intern a person without trial for any length of time was used in the Punjab to check rebellious activities of the restless sections of the population. But, the most clear manifestation of the British intent to put down challenge to their authority by the use of force was reflected in the Defence of India Act, 1915, followed by the Rowlatt Act in 1919, which armed the government with special powers to deal with disturbing situations.¹²

That these regulations were meant for use was soon demonstrated at Jalianwala Bagh in Amritsar in 1919, where not only terror was let loose on a peaceful public meeting but martial law was also brought into force—for the first time after the Uprising of 1857—to prevent 'the boiling wrath' of the local people from spreading to other areas of the Punjab.¹³ The tragedy of Amritsar not only made India "mad with pity, grief and horror"¹⁴ but also left no one in doubt that it was a clear instance of "the love of arbitrary power."¹⁵ Again in the wake of disturbances in Muslim areas of Malabar the British government responded by equipping military authorities there with "power to impose the death sentence on rebels after conviction by a court martial."¹⁶ The result was that more than 20,000 Moplahs were prosecuted, over 12,000 were convicted, and over 8,000 were imprisoned for a situation which even Michael O' Dwyer, the Lieutenant Governor of Punjab during the Amritsar massacre was willing to admit, "might have been averted."¹⁷

Though the British authorities pursued a policy of patient restraint in the Khilafat-Non-Cooperation-Movement of 1920-22,¹⁸ they could not continue their cautious policy for long. During the

Civil Disobedience Movement of 1930 they did not hesitate to take repressive measures leading to large scale massive arrests, and "violence, physical outrage, shooting and beating up, punitive expeditions, collective fines on villages and seizure of lands."¹⁹ With the issuance of ten special ordinances, the use of military and the local application of martial law orders, British rule proved to be nothing short of a 'civil martial law'.²⁰ The 'Quit India' movement of 1942 was suppressed even more severely. Though martial law was not declared, the actions taken by civilian officials were "no less severe than would have been taken under martial law, . . ."²¹ Not only the British Government allowed the officials to carry on their extraordinary authority but indeed protected them with Revolutionary Movement Ordinance, Special Criminal Courts Ordinance, and the indemnity acts passed by the governments of various provinces subsequently to indemnify the acts exceeding authority.²²

It was this resort to the frequent use of arbitrary powers which prompted many a politician to describe British conception of ruling India as "the police conception of the State."²³ These politicians did not approve of Indian violence, and were indeed happy to know that in the end "the belief in terrorism was dying down,"²⁴ but they could not help notice the stark contrast between the values of the British professed in England and practiced in India.²⁵ This explained why Jinnah, for instance, could not condone "the imposition of draconian measures" in India.²⁶ In his letter to the Viceroy in which Jinnah tendered his resignation from the Imperial Legislative Council as a mark of protest against the passing of the Rowlatt Bill in 1919, wrote :

"The passage of the Rowlatt Bill by the Government of India, and the assent given to it by your Excellency as Governor General against the will of the people, has severely shaken the trust reposed by them in British justice. . . . Neither the unanimous opinion of the non-official Indian members nor the entire public opinion and feeling outside has met with the least respect. The Government of India and Your Excellency, however, have thought it fit to place on the

statute-book a measure admittedly abnoxious and decidedly coercive at a time of peace, thereby substituting the executive for the judicial. . . . The fundamental principles of justice have been uprooted, and the constitutional rights of the people have been violated at a time when there is no real danger to the State by an overfretful and incompetent bureaucracy which is neither responsible to the people nor in touch with real public opinion and their sole plea is that the powers when they are assumed will not be abused. . . . In my opinion, a Government that passes or sanctions such a law in time of peace forfeits its claim to be called a civilised Government ”²⁷

Ironically enough, Rowlatt Bill was passed in an era characterised by ‘new angle of vision’, reflecting, according to Reginald Coupland, British appreciation of India’s contribution to the war efforts.²⁸ But during the World War II years when the Indian support itself was suspect in the British eyes, draconian measures were given freer rein to make sure that India was never physically wrested from the hands of the British. The most important evidence of the British outrage was the enactment of the Revolutionary Movement Ordinance, mentioned above, which armed the Government of India with powers to deal with the situation with full might. In the wake of the failure of the Cripps Mission of 1942 extremely severe measures were increasingly adopted to ‘crush’ Indian challenge by the overwhelming military force available in India. Even though the British Government pledged that after the war they would help India “devise the framework of the new constitution,”²⁹ it was more to emphasize Britain’s continuing hold over India than to proclaim India’s free destiny. As Ernest Bevin, Minister of Labour and National Service in the War Cabinet described to Amery, the Secretary of State for India :

“I must confess that leaving the settlement of the Indian problem untill after the war fills me with alarm. . . We made certain definite promises in the last war and practically a

quarter of a century has gone, and though there has been an extension of self-government, we have not, in my view, 'delivered the goods' in a broad and generous way. It is quite understandable that neither Muslim nor Hindu places much confidence in our 'after war promises.' It seems to me that the time to take action to establish Dominion status is now—to develop or improvise the form of Government to carry us through the war but to remove from all doubt the question of Indian freedom at the end of war. I firmly believe that a bold step now would rally Indian opinion behind us."³⁰

The war, however, changed the whole situation. The British emerged exhausted out of the exercise. Ravages of war left deep scars on their economy, faced as it was with unprecedented and numerous problems of post-war reconstruction. This put severe strain on British dispensation in India. The difficulty was already apparent in the war years. As John Gallagher and Anil Seal described it at some length :

"Nodding plumes and gleaning lances were no longer enough. Once the world-wide scale of British commitments in the face of international pressures had become plain, then it would have to be the Indian army which provided much of the imperial mobile reserve. That meant that this army had to be dragged out of the Old Curiosity Shop, modernized and mechanized. This had political implications. The better the Indian army, the higher the cost. Who was going to pay for them? Even the obsolescent army was costing more than half the budget of the Government of India. Now the Generals wanted more . . . so this is what it came to. In the interests of imperial defence and security the Indian army was to cost more. But in the interest of Indian political security, most of the additional cost was to fall on Britain . . . for the first time since the eighteenth century, it was the British taxpayer who would have to pay for it. Here, then, would be a way of testing his will for empire."³¹

The British, however, were keen "to pull resources out of India, not to put them into it." They could not agree to make India "a burden on the British taxpayer . . ." ³² To complicate the matters further, the British structure of administration in India began to disintegrate fast. The British found it excessively difficult to run the administrative machine.³³ As Mountbatten, the last Viceroy of India, told Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre during interviews in 1971-73 :

"We had stopped recruiting for the Indian Civil Service in 1939. We'd stopped recruiting for the Indian Police. The people carrying on included a lot of people who were past retirement age. They were running it extremely competently—but supposing Churchill had come back, and given a decision that we were not going to discuss anything for 25 years, I don't know if we could have restored that machine that we had. It had run completely down."³⁴

The extent to which British rule in India had come to suffer during the war years could also be gauged from the fact that the British were now willing to envisage a 'National Government,' in association with the Indians which would deal with all matters except Defence, and a declaration of Dominion status, immediately after the war, carrying with it if desired the right to "secede."³⁵ This was, of course, Churchill's response not only to the situation in India but also to the demands of the Allied powers, America in particular.³⁶ By 1945 Britain was willing to terminate its rule. Wavell even proposed a 'Breakdown Plan' to meet any "dangerous and disadvantageous situation out of the final act." The British were left with little choice but to devise a scheme of calculated withdrawal. Military and Police, the ultimate guarantee of British presence in India, could no longer be trusted.³⁷ In 1929, Lord Birkenhead had claimed in the Parliament : "what man in this house can say that he can see in a generation, in two generations, in a hundred years, any prospect that the people of India will be in a position to assume control of the Army, the Navy, the Civil Service, and to have a

Governor General who will be responsible to the Indian Government and not to any authority in this country?"³⁸ In November 1942, Churchill had publicly boasted: "We intend to remain the effective rulers of India for a long and indefinite period . . . We mean to hold our own. I have not become the King's First Minister in order to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire . . . Here we are, and here we stand, a veritable rock of salvation in this drifting world."³⁹ The stark reality in 1947 was that the British could no longer hold India. The power and the will to perpetuate their rule through coercion was lost.

But the second World War alone did not terminate the British rule. This was also due to the fact that the British had increasingly lost the legitimacy to rule India. The British had come up with a number of constitutional reforms, from 1858 Act to 1935 Act, to associate the Indians in their system of government, and thus to legitimize their rule through the consent of the governed. But these measures had reached the end of their tether by the war years. The British were not willing to go beyond what they had given to the Indians in the 1935 Act.

The inevitable result was that the given constitutional framework did not satisfy the Indian aspirations. The Indians found the constitution hopelessly ineffective to furnish even a semblance of responsible self-government. "Responsible government, as far as we can define it," declared Jinnah, "was that the will of the legislature which is responsible to the electorates, must prevail over the Executive, . . ."⁴⁰ The Act of 1935 had made the British Parliament supreme over the Indian matters, at least in three respects. Firstly, there was a 'dyarchy' at the centre. Foreign affairs and defence were to be the exclusive responsibility of the Governor-General responsible to the Secretary of State. Secondly, all the 'safeguards' in the constitution, and there were quite a few of them, were placed in the hands of the Governor-General. This was "a novel constitutional device," showing to the Indians all the more "that India would not attain Dominion Status by the Act of 1935." And lastly, the federation, if it came into being, would be subservient to the Parliament.

It would be subject to refusal of assent or to reservation by the Governor-General, acting under the control of the Secretary of the State, responsible only to the Parliament.⁴¹ Thus, the ultimate goal of self-government by the Indians was a far cry under the 1935 Act. The only thing worthwhile that came out of it was the 'provincial autonomy.' But for the Indians, "the key to their problem lay at the centre and not in the provinces."⁴² Without responsibility at the centre, they knew fully well, India could never be self-governing. The Act had thus no appeal for the Indians. In a speech on the Report of the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Indian Constitutional Reforms in the Legislative Assembly on 7th February, 1935, Jinnah lamented the absence of responsibility in these words :

"Here there are 98 per cent safeguards and two per cent of responsibility ! . . . Now, next what we find about the safeguards ? I am not going into the various clauses of the Statute. I will give only a short summary to the House in two sentences. Reserve Bank, Currency, Exchange—nothing doing. Railway Board—nothing doing, mortgaged to the hilt. What is left ? Fiscal Autonomy Convention (Laughter). Next, What is left ? Defence, External Affairs—reserved ; Finance—it is already mortgaged to the hilt, our Budget, and the little that may be here, what do we find ? Special responsibility of the Governor-General ! His powers as to the interference in legislation, his extraordinary powers, his special responsibility. Sir, what do they leave us ? What will this legislature do ? . . . it is humiliating, it is intolerable . . . "

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But the British could not agree to compromise on their ultimate right to govern India. They did not contemplate the loss of the Indian dominion. As Lord Zetland, the Secretary of State for India, 1935-40, made it abundantly clear when he stated :

"But there is also our own position in India to be taken into account. After all we framed the constitution as it stands in the Act of 1935, because we thought that was the best

way—given the political position of both countries—of maintaining British influence in India. It is no part of our policy, I take it to expedite in India constitutional changes for their own sake, or gratuitously to hurry over the handing over of control to Indian hands at any pace faster than we regard at best calculated on a longer view, to hold India to the Empire.⁴⁴

And yet, paradoxically enough, each constitutional advance proved to be a major step towards the devolution of British authority in India. With the introduction of these reforms “a chink appeared in the armour of autocracy ; for however restricted the franchise, electoral institutions offered to the opponents of the Imperial system an opportunity to secure by organization what they could not achieve by deputation.”⁴⁵ The British provided the Indians an opportunity to govern themselves, especially in the provinces where executive was largely made responsible to the legislatures. This responsibility was a significant factor in the process of the devolution of British authority in India. Indian opinion, shaped and encouraged by these reform Acts, came to have a predominant influence on the administration of the country in the coming years. Britain was forced to reconcile to the idea that self-government must be accepted, not as some distant goal but as an immediate reality. The only question was how soon it could be reached and how best it could be transferred to Indian hands. “The political deadlock in India today,” observed the Secretary of State for India on January 28, 1942, “is concerned ostensibly with the transfer of power from British to Indian hands. In reality it is mainly concerned with the far more difficult issue of what Indian hands, what Indian Government or Governments, are capable to taking over without bringing about general anarchy or even civil war.”⁴⁶

The process of devolution of authority indeed brought two inter-related but significant issues to the fore : the timing of the transfer of power and the distribution of power among the Indians, particularly the Hindus and the Muslims, the two leading communities

and political adversaries in the Indian political life. There was no way one could avoid these issues. They were in fact integral to the very system of representative government introduced by the British in India. As David Page put it :

“The working of the electoral system forced the Raj to the wall. Imperialism and democracy were incompatible bedfellows. . . . In the days of autocracy this was their strength. In the days of electoral politics, it became their undoing. With each stage of devolution, Indian was set against Indian, caste against caste, community against community.”⁴⁷

No wonder, the devolution of British authority in India acted as a prop to Hindu-Muslim antagonism right from the start. “The fact is,” wrote Valentine Chirol, “the more we delegate our authority in India to the natives of India on the principles which we associate with self-government, the more we must necessarily in practice delegate it to the Hindus, who form the majority, however much we may try to protect the rights and interests of the Mohammaden minority.”⁴⁸ The more the process of this devolution proceeded and the prospects of British withdrawal became imminent, the more the fears and conflicts of interests between the Muslims and Hindus increased. Unlike the case of 1909 Act, when the absence of devolution of authority acted as a spur to Hindu-Muslim unity, as exemplified by the 1916 Pact between the League and the Congress, the working of the reforms of 1919 strained relations between the two communities. The Muslims found themselves pushed to the periphery of the system. There arose the issues of the distribution of seats in the legislative councils and municipal bodies, and the proportion of representation in government jobs. Thus the decades of the twenties saw not only a series of bloody Hindu-Muslim riots but an increasing polarization of their interests. Muslims and Hindus vied with each other for scarce ‘loaves and fishes.’ Those who watched these developments could not fail to see that a struggle for power had begun. “So long as authority was firmly established in British hands,

and self-government was not thought of," noted the Indian Statutory Commission of 1930, "Hindu-Muslim rivalry was confined within a narrower field. . . . But coming of the Reforms and the anticipation of what may follow them have given new point to Hindu-Muslim competition. . . . The true cause . . . is the struggle for political power and for the opportunity which political power confers."⁴⁹

As the point of devolution came closer under the Act of 1935, and the prospects of Indian power at the centre of the political system increased, Hindu-Muslim struggle was further intensified. The prospects of Hindu centre not only moved the Muslims to a greater realization of their political interests and demands, but, also, aroused their continuous fear of Hindu dominance. While desiring to throw off the British authority they were not willing to give in to a Hindu-dominated polity. "Although the Muslims," wrote Wayne Wilcox, "hated the British for offences past and present, they had little desires to trade British for Hindu rule. The implications of a unified democratic India included majority rule, dooming the Muslims, therefore, as a permanent three-to-one minority."⁵⁰ The experience of the Congress rule in the provinces in 1937-39, in spite of the federal government of the 1935 Act, made it all the more difficult for the Muslims to evade the truth that Hindus would be the masters of future India. Indeed, the Congress rule, clearly :

" . . . foreshadowed a permanent Hindu government ruling over the minorities and demonstrated the unworkability of parliamentary rule, the constitutional safeguards for minorities being fragile. The Muslims felt that the remedy of minority troubles did not lie within a federal framework, because the advantages offered by provincial autonomy would be negated if the central government was placed, as it was bound to be under Hindu domination."⁵¹

This was the herald of a crisis in which the Muslims having lost 'power' to the English were now confronted with the possibility of losing it 'permanently' to the Hindus.⁵² Constitutional safeguards could neither protect nor promote their interests. The Muslims

indeed saw no security in a system which permitted absolute political and constitutional power to a community which was "inspired by ideals, religious and political, diametrically opposed to its own"⁵³ and which, for all practical purposes, had turned the Congress into "an instrument for the revival of Hinduism" in the country.⁵⁴

The major stress of Indian politics so far had been on self-government and freedom for India. But now that the devolution of British authority in India brought in sight the imminent freedom of India, the fabric of Indian unity was completely torn as under. The "dualities" of "advancing towards national freedom and unity"⁵⁵ were no more two mutually antagonistic principles in theory, they had become the concrete facts of Indian life. While the prospects of British withdrawal from India satisfied the Muslims, the affliction of having to remain at the mercy of the Hindu majority, agitated their minds and heightened their fears of the future. With the British gone, they reckoned, nothing would stand between the absolute authority of the Hindus and their subjugation by them. A feeling of insecurity and helplessness had indeed come to seize the Indian Muslims.

REFERENCES

1. B.R. Ambedkar, *Pakistan or Partition of India*, Bombay : 1946, p. 30.
2. British system of representative government, in fact, argued Coupland, had brought to the fore "majority rule," with Hindus, "always in power and the Muslims never." Reginald Coupland, *Report on the Constitutional Problem in India, Part-I. The Indian Problem, 1833-1935*, London : 1968, p. 33.
3. The role, according to Sharif al-Mujahid, was almost "inexplicable, unless explained in terms of terrible lack of political prescience and foresight." Sharif al-Mujahid, *Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah : Studies in Interpretation*, Karachi : 1981, pp. 167-68.
4. See, for instance, Wayne Wilcox, "Wellsprings of Pakistan," in Lawrence Ziring, et al., *Pakistan : The Long View*, Durham : 1977, p. 34. The

only major exception seems to be the work of R.J. Moore, *The Crisis of Indian Unity, 1917-1940*, Oxford : 1974. But then Moore is more concerned with the problem in the over-all Indian framework than the peculiar Muslim context—in terms of Muslim fears and anxieties.

5. There were at least six schemes in the air : (1) 'The confederacy of India'—by 'A Punjabi' ; (2) *The Aligarh Professor's Scheme*, by Professors Syed Zafrul Hasan and Mohammad Afzal Hussain Qadri of Aligarh ; (3) Choudhry Rahmat Ali's scheme, contained in a pamphlet, entitled, *The Millat of Islam and the Menace of 'Indiaism*, (1940) ; (4) Dr. S.A. Lateef's scheme, in his *Muslim Problem in India* ; (5) Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan's scheme, *Outlines of a Scheme of Indian Federation* ; (6) Sir Abdullah Haroon Committee's scheme, under the instruction of the Muslim League. For details on these schemes see, *The Indian Annual Register*, Calcutta : 1939 ; Sir Maurice Gwyer and A. Appadorai, (eds.), *Speeches and Documents on the Indian Constitution, 1921-47*, Bombay : 1957, Vol. II, pp. 455-62 ; Coupland, *The Indian Problem*, op.cit., pp. 203-4 ; Alhaj Mian Ahmad Shafi, *Haji Sir Abdoolah Haroon : A Biography*, Karachi : n.d, pp. 138-48 ; Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, *Evolution of Pakistan*, Lahore : 1963 ; and Y.B. Mathur, *Growth of Muslim Politics in India*, Lahore : 1980, App. II, pp. 293-329. Choudhury Khaliquzzaman also claimed having proposed in 1939 in his meeting with Lord Zetland, Secretary of State for India, the establishment of three or four federations of India, including "a federation of Muslim provinces and states in North-West India." Choudhury Khaliquzzaman, *Pathway to Pakistan*, Lahore : 1961, p. 2.

6. Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, *Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah*, Lahore : 1968, Vol. I, p. 42.

7. Ibid., p. 170.

8. Thompson and Garratt, *Rise and Fulfilment of British Rule in India*, Allahabad : 1962, p. 466. Indian army subsequently had to undergo radical transformation. The most fundamental change was "the introduction of an entirely new principle, that of balancing communities inside the army." Ibid., pp. 466-67.

9. Ibid., particularly Vol. VII, Ch. 1, "Bureaucracy in Operation," pp. 527-40.

10. Michael O' Dwyer, *India As I Knew It, 1885-1925*, London, 1925, p. 298.

11. Valentine Chirol, *The Indian Unrest*, London : 1910, p. 98. Between 1906 and 1909 over 550 political cases came up in the courts in Bengal, a British magistrate was wounded in Assam, and the Collector of Nasik was shot dead. An attempt was made upon the life of Sir Andrew Frazer, the Lieutenant

Governor of Bengal. In the Punjab, disturbances were less clearly violent. See Thompson and Garratt, *Rise and Fulfilment of British Rule of India*, pp. 579-80.

12. S. Razi Wasti, *Lord Minto and the Indian Nationalist Movement, 1905-10*, London : 1965, p. 96. For Bengal Regulation III of 1818 see *Bengal Code*, 5th ed., Vol. I, 1939, pp. 157-61, cited in N. Mansergh and E.W.R. Lumby, (eds.), *Constitutional Relations Between Britain and India : Transfer of Power*, London : 1971, Vol. II, p. 452.

13. Annie Besant, *The Future of Indian Politics*, London : 1922, p. 243 ; and Dwyer, *India As I Knew It*, pp. 285-98.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 243.

15. Reginald Coupland, *India : A Re-Statement*, London : 1945, p. 118. "The love for arbitrary power" was also clearly evident in British operations against the so-called Indian "revolutionaries" working from outside India. See, in particular, Soban Singh Josh, *Hindustan Gadar Party : A Short History*, New Delhi : 1979, Two Volumes ; Rafique Afzal, "A Glimpse of the Life and Thoughts of Maulana Ubaidullah Sindhi," *Journal of Research Society of Pakistan*, Vol. XII, No. 4, 1975, pp. 1-14 ; and Dwyer, *India As I Knew It*, pp. 185-88.

16. Dwyer, *India As I Knew It*, p. 307.

17. *Ibid.*, pp. 307-8.

18. D.A. Low, "The Government of India, and the first non-cooperation movement, 1920-22," *Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. XXV, No. 2, February 1966, pp. 241-59.

19. R.C. Dutt, *India Today and Tomorrow*, London : 1955, p. 51.

20. D.A. Low, "'Civilian Martial Law' : The Government of India and the Civil Disobedience Movement, 1930-34," *Congress and the Raj : Facets of the Indian Struggle, 1917-47*, London : 1977, pp. 165-198.

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22. For a detailed discussion on the violence committed and various ordinances promulgated for the purpose, especially Revolutionary Movement Ordinance, *Ibid.*, pp. 151-79.

23. Jawaharlal Nehru : *An Autobiography*, London : 1958, p. 435.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 262.

25. Robert L. Hardgrave, *India, Government and Politics in a Developing Nation*, Harcourt : 1970, p. 24.

26. Mujahid, *Studies in Interpretation*, pp. 46-47.

27. M. Rafique Afzal, *Selected Speeches and Statements of the Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, 1911-34 and 1947-48*, Lahore : 1976, pp. 112-13.
28. Coupland, *A Re-Statement*, p. 11.
29. Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, Vol. I, pp. 877-79.
30. R.J. Moore, "The Problem of Freedom with Unity : London's India Policy, 1917-47," D.A. Low, (ed.), *Congress and the Raj*, p. 390.
31. John Gallagher and Anil Seal, "Britain and Indian Between the Wars," Christopher Baker, Gordon Johnson and Anil Seal, *Power, Profit and Politics*, Cambridge University Press, 1981, p. 413.
32. Ibid., p. 389.
33. K.P.S., Menon, *Many Worlds : An Autobiography*, London : 1965 ; Leonard Mosley, *The Last Days of the British Raj*, London : 1961 ; Penderal Moon, *Divide and Quit*, London : 1964 ; Richard Symonds, *The Making of Pakistan*, London : 1950 ; and Francis Williams, *A Prime Minister Remembers : The War and Post-War Memoirs of the Rt. Hon. Earl Attley*, London : 1961.
34. Collins and Lapierre, *Mounbatten and the Partition of India*, Delhi : 1982, Vol. I, p. ? Besides the British officials and the police in many parts of India were affected with communalism and were no longer to be relied on for firm action against their own community. Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, Vol. VIII, p. 202 ; and Vol. IX, p. 128.
35. Churchill to Roosevelt, March 4, 1942 in Francis L. Loewenheim, et al., eds., *Roosevelt and Churchill : Their Secret War Time Correspondence*, London : 1975, p. 183. Ibid., p. 231.
36. President Roosevelt in his note to Churchill on March 10, 1942, did not hesitate to "suggest the setting up of what might be called a temporary government in India . . . to be recognized as a temporary Dominion government . . ." Ibid., p. 191. Stalin too was worried about India. The first meeting between Roosevelt and Stalin exclusively focussed on France and India. Ibid., p. 396. Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, Vol. I, p. 410.
37. Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, Vol. VI, pp. 699-701 ; Vol. VIII, p. 455.
38. H.N. Brailsford, *Subject India*, Bombay : 1946, p. 28.
39. Hutchins, *India's Revolution*, p. 143.
40. Afzal, *Selected Speeches and Statements*, p. 116.
41. Coupland, *Indian Problem, 1833-1935*, pp. 143-46.
42. Brailsford, *Subject India*, pp. 47-48.
43. Ahmad, *Speeches and Writings*, Vol. I, pp. 12-13.
44. 'Essayez' : *The Memoirs of Lawrence*, London : 1956, p. 277. That the British were not reconciled to the loss of India as late as September 20, 1946, was

clear from the following note from Pethick-Lawrence, the then Secretary of State, to Attlee, the Prime Minister of England: "The loss of India would greatly weaken the general position and prestige of the British Commonwealth in the world. Our ability to support and assist Australia and New Zealand in time of need and to maintain our position in Burma, Malaya and the Far East generally would be substantially weakened." Mansergh, *Transfer of Power*, Vol. VIII, p. 551.

45. David Page, *Prelude to Partition*, Delhi : 1982, p. 263.

46. Mansergh, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 81.

47. Page, op. cit., p. 264.

48. Chirol, *India : Old and New*, London : 1921, pp. 128, 293. Coupland, *The Indian Problem, 1833-1935*, p. 75.

49. *Report of the Indian Statutory Commission*, London : H.M.'s. Stationery Office, 1930, Vol. I, pp. 29-30.

50. Wayne Wilcox, *Pakistan : The Consolidation of a Nation*, New York : 1963, p. 20.

51. Abdul Hamid, *Muslim Separatism in India*, Lahore : 1967, p. 218. Adul Kalam Azad, *India Wins Freedom*, Calcutta : 1959, p. 21 ; Cantwell Smith, *Modern Islam in India*, London : 1946, p. 264 ; I.H. Qureshi, *The Muslim Community of the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent*, Mouton : 1962, p. 336 ; and Coupland, *A Re-Statement*, pp. 174-76 ; Moore, *The Crisis of Indian Unity*, p. 307 ; Beni Prasad, *Hindu-Muslim Questions*, London : 1946, p. 74.

52. C. H. Philips, "Introduction," C.H. Philips and Mary Doreen Wainright, (eds.), *The Partition of India : Policies and Perspectives, 1935-1947*, London : 1970, p. 27.

53. Waheed-uz-Zaman, *Towards Pakistan*, Lahore : 1978, p. 210.

54. Ahmad, *Speeches and Writings*, Vol. I, p. 77.

55. Moore, *The Crisis of Indian Unity*, p. 313, Moore, in fact, talks of three dualities. "The first duality was between the Raj and its aspirant successor, the parallel government of the Indian National Congress. The Congress claimed to represent all India and sought parity of status with the Raj. The accommodation of this duality meant finding a constitution that conceded the essence of the Congress claim whilst the necessary degree of British authority remained. The second duality was between Hindu India and Muslim India, . . . In this case the accommodation must preserve the separate interests and identity of the Muslim communities within a nation that was bound to be predominantly Hindu. The third duality was between British India and the Indian states. . . ." Ibid.

The Military Rule and its Impact on Socio-Economic and Political Change in the Third World

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Introduction

We can discern two distinct views about the possible impact of military rule on socio-economic and political change in the Third World countries. Some Scholars have argued that the military rule is most likely to result in economic growth, modernization of social and economic structures and equitable distribution of scarce economic values and opportunities in the society. These scholars have described the military as a progressive and modernizing force and characterized it as the most important agent of development. This view became quite popular in the 1950s and early 1960s. Other analysts argue that military intervention in politics tends to inhibit socio-economic and political change in the society. These analysts have described the military essentially as a conservative or even reactionary force which defends assiduously the status and interests of the entrenched elite groups. These scholars treat the military as a poor force for the purpose of development. The view held by the latter seems, to my mind, often right rather than wrong. In this section, I shall examine and critically assess some of the assumptions held firmly by the former. I shall argue that most of those assumptions are not supported by empirical evidence and consequently are in need of revision. I shall propose that there are certain socio-political conditions which are likely to help the military to achieve

developmental goals, but these conditions, such as the homogeneous population in a society, cohesive leadership and a developmental ideology in the armed forces, absence of rivalry among the military and so on, are seldom present in the Third World countries.

Developmental Goals

Development implies a process of qualitative change in the society.¹ A high degree of national integration and political stability, a self-sustaining economy with a reasonably high per capita income, a lively concern for popular welfare manifest in the social welfare programmes designed to effect a more equitable distribution of economic values and opportunities, a high level of political participation, an effective and orderly process of decision-making in the policy are some of its characteristic features. Indeed, these are the most important developmental goals which the developing countries are seeking to achieve.

A. Is the Military a Modernizing Force ?

Many scholars have treated the military as a progressive force in the developing countries, and that has been the dominant theme throughout the 1950s and early 1960s. Marion J. Levy, Jr., for instance, has stated that the military as an organization has efficiently combined "maximum rates of modernization with maximum levels of stability and control."² When they take over political role they tend to foster those qualities in the society and thus lead it towards modernization and development. Lucian Pye has suggested that modernization of the organization and weaponry of the military make them conscious of the need for modernization of the society as well. In his own words, "called upon to perform roles basic to advanced societies, the more politically conscious officers can hardly avoid being aware of the need for substantial changes in their own societies."³ Manfred Halpern has advanced a similar argument in connection with the armed forces in the Middle East and North Africa. He has written : "The more the army was modernized, the more its composition, organization, spirit, capabilities and purpose constituted a radical criticism of the existing political system."⁴ Halpern has

also argued that the military can act as an effective agent of socio-economic change because of their close connections with "the new middle class," which is not only committed to bring about a structural change in the society with a view to broadening the scope for itself but also sufficiently self-conscious and capable of remoulding the society. He has termed the Middle Eastern armies as instruments of the new middle class, which have "showed an acute awareness of the chronic ills of their countries" and have been transformed "from an instrument of repression in its own interests or that of kings into the vanguard of nationalism and social reform."⁵

With regard to the armed forces in Latin America John J. Jonnson has expressed similar opinion. The Latin American armed forces have "identified themselves with industrialization." The technical-managerial skills of the military personnel have made them the bearers of modernity and in fact they have accepted the shift in political power from the "land holding elite" to the "new urban alliances."⁶ Analyzing the social background of the officer corps in the non-western societies, Edward Shils has pointed out that the military officers in such societies are generally recruited from lower middle class families of traders, craftsmen and small farmers and as such, "they are aware of the distance separating them from the rich and the political elite."⁷ When these officers exercise political power they are likely to favour equitable distribution of scarce economic resources. In the same vein, Guy Pauker has spoken of the officer corps of South East Asia and has stated that they "are not the product of social classes with feudal traditions" and in no way seem to be "the natural allies of feudal or other vested interests. Their natural propensities are progressive."⁸

Some scholars have also asserted that a country's military establishment itself has some modernizing effects. The military considerations, for instance, have prompted the building of roads and highways, other communication networks, and even some defence-related industries. Moreover, the technical and managerial skills that are learnt in the armed services may be applied to civilian

pursuits after the officers leave the military services; even the organizational techniques of the armed services may have spilled over effects upon organizational structures in the society at large.⁹

Thus we have seen that a large number of scholars have argued that military intervention in politics in the Third World countries is likely to be progressive in nature inducing modernization and development. The arguments of these scholars have been predicated on the following assumptions: first, in most of the Third World countries, political institutions are either miserably ineffective, weak and fragmented or practically non-existent, and thus not capable of mobilizing people and sustaining social change; second, the military is a rationally based organization with unified command structure, relatively modern orientation, sophisticated technological requirements and nationalistic bias; third, this organization provides some of the few available channels for social mobility in these countries and attracts talents and expertise which can be used for bringing about socio-economic changes; fourth, military technology is not radically different from the technology that characterizes modernization; fifth, the class background of the officer corps itself is a motivating factor for undertaking developmental efforts, and these officers are conscious of the need for bringing about changes in their society and are capable of doing it.

B. Counter-Arguments

Other analysts have however challenged some of the assumptions or at least the conclusion emerging from these assumptions, though most of them agree in principle that the armed forces as organizations are more well-knit and cohesive, the officer corps are imbued with modernizing orientations and possess more of the technical-managerial expertise, and their social backgrounds are far from feudal or semi-feudal moorings. These analysts argue, first of all, that the military, instead of effecting structural change, becomes interested in preserving the *status quo* and maintaining order in the society since it represents a well-ordered and disciplined organization.¹⁰ Secondly, these analysts suggest that the armed forces have enough organizational

resources and skills to displace civilian regimes, but these resources and skills are not good enough for developmental purposes ; rather these resources and skills prove dysfunctional in a situation where political forces are at work.¹¹ Thirdly, the military, they argue, are likely to be concerned more with the maintenance and enhancement of their corporate interest, even when these interests would go against the greater interest of the society.¹² The military regimes, for instance, have been found to enhance defence budgets even if that meant less expenditure on civilian, non-defence sectors. Fourthly, the military elites, as the representatives of the middle class, are not likely to undertake programmes that might help mobilize the lower classes, because that might create "additional contenders for power and additional demands on resources, which would constitute a threat to both the middle class and their representatives, the officer corps."¹³ Eric A. Nordlinger has suggested that "the military regimes are most likely to display conservative tendencies because of 'the officers' determined pursuance of their corporate interests in combination with their deeply inculcated military values that assign over-riding importance to the preservation of a particular type of political stability, and the officers' attachments to their middle-class interests and identities."¹⁴

In short, the military is often the most effective organization in the Third World countries, but its organizational resources and skills are not adequate for bringing about socio-economic changes ; moreover, the military elites are more interested in protecting and enhancing their corporate interests, and as the representatives of the middle-class they tend to preserve social order and *status quo* rather than to bring about social change.

Analysis

The main thrust of arguments put forward by the latter group of analysts refers to the fact that the military, when they occupy the highest seats of government, are not likely to be motivated by the objectives of socio-economic and political change and economic development, though in almost all cases they make such pronouncements while taking over political role. This is due mainly to two

reasons. First, the military, which constitute "the most powerful trade union" in the country, are concerned primarily with the maintenance and increase of their corporate interests, and in societies, which are plagued with scarce economic resources, their corporate interest generally centres around wealth and other economic privileges. In the words of Nordlinger, "as is true of most Unions the military act to maintain or increase their wealth and prerogatives even when these values conflict with the aspirations and interests of larger segments within the society."¹⁵ In such societies more funds devoted to the armed forces would inevitably mean less funds for economic activities and still lesser for such sectors as education, health, social services and other welfare measures.

It is also found that the military-dominated regimes almost invariably increase budgetary allocations for defence purposes. We have seen how in Latin America, Africa and the Middle East, with sizeable proportion of governmental expenditure already incurred for defence purposes, these expenditures were increased further whenever the military took over. Analyzing the impact of military rule on governmental output and economic activities in Latin America, Schmitter has shown that during the period 1950–1967 the mean level of defence expenditure was 9.3 per cent of the total budget in the countries where the military were not involved, 14.1 per cent in the countries where the military elites became involved intermittently and 18.5 per cent in those countries which were military-dominated.¹⁶ Not only that, the military dominated countries also experienced 14 per cent increase in defence expenditures on an average during the period 1960–1965, while the corresponding figure for the 'intermittent' regimes was 3.3 per cent, and it was 2.8 per cent in those countries where the military remained non-involved.

Analyzing the aggregate data for 74 Third World countries during 1957–1962, Irma Adelman and Cynthia Morris also came out with some revealing facts. According to them, the average percentage of GNP spent on defence purposes in 18 of 74 states was 3.6, and these states were partly or fully dominated by the military. The corresponding figure in 36 of those 74 states where the military performed

only professional functions was only 1.9 percent. In other words, the proportion of GNP spent on defence purposes was almost twice as large in countries that were military dominated than it was in countries where the military performed their assigned jobs.¹⁷ All these facts indicate that the military are more interested in preserving and enlarging their corporate interests and they pursue this goal more often by neglecting economic development in a society.

Social and economic change in a society is likely to improve the lot of the lower classes. The military however tend to view these classes as "a real or potential threat to their corporate interests," and as such they are not likely to initiate any economic programme that might directly benefit these disadvantaged classes. According to Nordlinger, the perceptions of the military against these classes become coloured for three reasons. First, politically mobilized lower classes may pose as an additional contender for political power ; second, these classes may demand a reduction in the unproductive expenditures on the armed forces and diversion of more resources to productive sectors. Third, politically mobilized peasantry and urban working classes may demand a larger share of the national pie.¹⁸

The cases of Guatemalan Coups of 1954 and 1963 and the 1963 Coup of the Dominican Republic indicate clearly the cognitive way of the military elite in such efforts and their reluctance to initiate socio-economic programmes designed to mobilize the lower classes. The Guatemalan military undertook reform-oriented measures after the 1944 coup and attempted to mobilize the disadvantaged groups in the society, but they turned against these groups after the 1954 and 1963 coups. Edwin Lieuwen has graphically described the attitude of the Guatemalan military rulers in the following lines :

"The present army leadership has turned its back on the revolution it made in 1944. It got its fingers badly burned by involvement in the upsetting process of fundamental social change and reform. The revolutionary programme, the civilian leadership, the workers and peasants, not to mention the communists, all turned out to be threat to the very existence of the armed forces."¹⁹

The September Coup of 1963 in the Dominican Republic was sparked by President Juan Bosch's encouragement of the peasantry and urban working classes. This is however not to say that the military will not, under any circumstances, undertake any measure for the socio-economic changes; but they are likely to do it if they feel that such measures will not affect their corporate interest.

Secondly, the nature of value system of the armed forces "the normative attachments to order, dignity and hierarchy"—also deters them from undertaking programmes of socio-economic change in the society. This value system quickens their sensitivity towards political stability and *status quo*, and generates a type of distrust towards change and flexibility. This value system also generates in them a kind of anti-political orientation. Even the highly politicized army tends to view politics as an erratic and divisive exercise. Politics, which is in fact a kind of "regulated conflict, competition and compromise," is taken by them as "the apolitical politics of consensus, acquiescence and government by fiat." Consequently, political stability which the military prefer is nothing more than apolitical stability. This stability, in the words of Feld, is nothing but "the stability of a vacuum, a state undisturbed by the erratic movements of partisan bodies."²⁰ The military may go in for a system of democracy, but that democracy would be something like Ayub Khan's apolitical basic democracy, to be guided and controlled by the 'Patriarchs.' The military may usher in a new social movement but that movement would be something like Ne Win's 'national political movement' where no dissenting voice is allowed. This world view of the military is responsible for their reluctance to institute any programme of social and economic change in the society, and under the dead weight of such a vision no meaningful socio-economic change takes place in a society under military rule.

Another aspect of military rule that circumscribes socio-economic development in the society is connected closely with the middle class background of the military elite. Drawn largely from the middle class background, socialized deeply to the middle class ethos through schooling, association and training, tied to the members of the same

class through a wide network of interlocking relationships through birth, marriage, property and other interests and sharing the middle class status aspirations, the military officers in most of the Third World countries are deeply wedded to the middle class interests. This has been pointed out by such scholars as Manfred Halpern, J.J. Johnson, Guy Pauker, Jose Nun and so on. Naturally, a largely autonomous officer corps, at least when in power, is not expected to undertake programmes that might affect the middle class interests especially the economic privileges and political power.²¹ The class, interests of the military, coupled with their corporate interests and value system, become indeed a great stumbling block for initiating policies and programmes of socio-economic and political change in the Third World countries.

This has been corroborated by many studies. In a cross-national aggregate study of all independent countries in the world, except the socialist ones, with a population more than one million, and within the time span of 1951—70, R.D. McKinlay and A.S. Cohan have come to the same conclusion.²² In their own words, “a military regime does not have a pronounced effect on economic performance when MR (military regimes) are compared with CRM (Civilian Rule in countries that experienced military regimes), and that there is no pronounced effect on economic performance produced by military regimes when both MR and CRM are compared with CR 900—(low income countries which experienced only civilian rule).²³

Analyzing the cross-national data of 74 non-western and non-socialist countries, picked up from such four geographical regions as Latin America, the Middle East and North Africa, Tropical Africa and Asia, within the time frame of 1957—62, Eric A. Nordlinger has shown almost zero-order co-relations between the political role of the military and socio-economic change in the society.²⁴ Another analyst of repute, R.W. Jackman, has indicated by analyzing data of 77 independent countries during the period 1960—70 that military rule, irrespective of the level of economic prosperity or geographical location, has not been able to initiate programmes and policies for appreciable socio-economic change in the Third World countries.²⁵

Leaving aside these general studies which have focussed mainly on broad-based trends of developmental goals, if we concentrate on such different dimensions of socio-economic and political development as national integration, industrialization and economic growth, political participation and so on, we also arrive at the inescapable conclusion that the military cannot work as an effective agent of development.

National Integration

National integration refers to the process of transformation of 'primordial sentiments' into 'civil sentiments,' creation of a national identity out of, and transcending parochial identities and building a nation out of so many sub-national groups.²⁶ This is, in the words of Braibanti, "an overarching purpose which gives form, cohesion and direction to all public actions within a sensed community"—the "architectonics."²⁷ In some cases, territorial boundaries of the new states cut across various ethnic, cultural and linguistic groups, and these states have many sub-national groups within. These groups are both horizontal, i.e., ethnic, religious, linguistic, and vertical, i.e., class, caste and so on. The loyalty of the majority of people in these societies is to the immediate units, and not to the wider unit, the state. So, the prime need in most of the new states is to bring about national integration and build a national community.

The theorists of development claim that the military elite is more qualified to promote national integration in the Third World countries for a number of reasons. First, the military officers are broadly recruited across different ethnic groups and regions and are therefore, more national.²⁸ Secondly, these officers have more or less been recruited from the middle class background.²⁹ Third, the military officers have a more uniform training than other groups. The shared experiences of common schooling serve as a uniting bond among them and their parochial ties are superseded by a loyalty to the national community through "training in citizenship."³⁰ Lastly, the military as a group is less factious and more cohesive than other

from the middle and lower middle classes, it is risky to draw inferences about their zeal for developmental activities merely from their socio-economic background, ignoring their corporate interests and value system. They may be more interested in gaining access to the privileged positions in society and may not be interested in effecting a fundamental change in the existing class inequities. The military elites, coming from the middle class background, may oppose the traditional elites in their societies, but they do not support the lower class interest. The Guatemalan Coups of 1954 and 1963 and the Sept-Coup of 1963 in the Dominican Republic, which have already been referred to, are suggestive. The refusal of Jvan Bosch to accede to the demand of the military for \$ 6 million precipitated his downfall. On the otherside, the armed forces in Venezuela in the post-Jimenez period allowed Betan Court to assume office only after they had been assured that rising oil revenues would be spent on development purposes without any decrease in expenditures on defence.³⁸ These facts suggest that the corporate interest of the military is more important to them than the national interest.

The assumption that the shared experiences derived from common schooling, training and acculturation in the military academies will promote national integration seems to be questionable. One can argue with great force that factionalism and separatist tendencies in the Indonesian Army derive in part from lack of common schooling of the officers. The conflict between the officers trained in the pre-independence period by the Dutch and those trained by the Japanese may be accounted for in terms of common schooling, common values and tradition. In Nigeria, however, common schooling and common values were not enough to prevent factionalism and subsequent civil war, though both Ojukuwa and Gowan and their compatriots were trained in the British tradition in the same academy. The civil war that rocked Nigeria suggests that in a heterogeneous society ethnic ties are too strong to be overcome by common schooling and common tradition.

This is not to suggest that common schooling and the shared experiences thus derived make no contribution toward the development

of cohesion among the military officers. This played a vital role in cementing the bond among them and avoiding factional strifes in the Pakistan Army during the early years of Ayub regime. The military officers in Pakistan however had much more than this. The hostility towards political parties and the belief that the soldiers were superior to civilian politicians sustained their unity and cohesion to a great extent.³⁹ It seems that the shared experience and common schooling of the military officers may promote national integration, provided such factors as a relatively homogeneous population, a common ideology, a common social purpose are present in a society. Egypt under Nasser and his compatriots is a case to the point.

The impact of military training on the ordinary soldiers in terms of citizenship training is also debatable. The mode of recruitment, as it has been already pointed out, differs from country to country, and it may differ in the same country over time. In some cases, the ordinary soldiers are recruited broadly across ethnic and regional lines, but in many cases they represent certain regions or ethnic groups. Even where recruitment is made across ethnic or regional lines, soldiers are dispersed in various or they work for units which are organized along regional or ethnic lines. This process of 'segregation' serves to increase parochial attachments among the soldiers. In Indonesia, the parochial feelings are still quite strong.

In some countries, however, citizenship training has been fairly successful in enhancing a sense of national identity. The cases of Turkish and Korean armed forces are illustrative.⁴⁰ In these countries recruitment is made on national basis. The recruits in these countries serve for a period of eighteen months to two years. During this period, they are taught how to read and write and also how to handle and operate heavy equipments and other modern weapons. On release from the military service they can improve their skills and become upwardly mobile and thus act as purveyors of modern ideas and techniques, besides carrying a sense of national identity. So, if one accepts the proposition that military training fosters a sense of national identity, one has to qualify it with certain conditions.

First, the armed forces of Turkey and Korea are conscript forces. Since the military service is for a limited period of time, it facilitates the diffusion of modern ideas because their ideas and skills become easily available to the society. In career armed forces, however, the rate of diffusion is more limited. Secondly, in these states the population is relatively homogeneous. As a result, these states do not have the problems of ethnic rivalries, which are very chronic in many Third World countries. Third, since these two states have common frontiers with the communist states, the threat, real or imagined, of armed invasion, especially during the Cold War Period, helped consolidate the feelings of national solidarity. Such favourable conditions are seldom present in other developing countries. Consequently, the presumed capacity of the military to promote national integration through citizenship training needs to be qualified.

The theorists of development emphasize the relative absence of factionalism in the armed forces. The implication is that freedom from factionalism makes the military a more effective tool of integration. This assumption of superiority of the military over the political parties in terms of factionalism was one of the professed justification of the 1958 Coup in Pakistan.⁴¹ But the proponents of the superiority argument overlook two weak points in this argument. First, even if the military possess the qualities of cohesiveness, discipline and freedom from factionalism, they may not be able to retain these in a non-military context. When they become policy-makers, the military officers may find themselves caught up in an environment of factionalism and intrigues. The Algerian Coup by Boumedienne is illustrative of the erosion of cohesion in a non-military context.⁴² Secondly, even if the qualities of cohesiveness and unity persist in a non-military context, the military elite may not be able to handle political problems, since effective handling of political problems requires political skills such as the power of bargaining and negotiation.

In sum, it is not right to assume that the military elite is capable of promoting national integration. Some military elites such as those

in Egypt, Korea and Turkey appear to have been fairly successful. Their experiences suggest that military elites can do it where the population is fairly homogeneous and where these elites are bound by common ties of culture, language, religion and cohesive leadership. Other military regimes are less successful. Nigeria had been able to prevent the secession of Biafra, but the struggle to make the Biafrans Nigerian is still on. The experience of some other countries suggests that if the military elites aim at the promotion of national integration in a heterogeneous social setting they must avoid being identified with any particular region or ethnic group or for that matter any narrow social class at the expense of other segments of society.

Political Stability

Some analysts have advocated that the military rule is congenial to political stability, since the armed forces constitute an institution which is broadly national, more or less faction-free and thus integrative. Compared to the armed forces, the political parties have most often been projected as divisive, regional, class-biased and sectarian. That is why some analysts argue that party rule can not ensure political stability in the Third World countries. The military, on the other hand, represent a national consensus, and are capable of exercising political power for a reasonable period of time. This argument however suffers from certain inadequacies and thus needs to be qualified.

Political stability in a society means two things : a low frequency in the formation and displacement of government, and a general ability of the government to maintain control over the society. It is true that countries like Brazil, Egypt, South Korea have been able to maintain a high degree of stability under military rule, but other regimes have been less fortunate in terms of frequency of coups and challenges from insurgency movements. Syria, Iraq, Sudan and some other countries belong to this category. Pakistan under Ayub Khan and Bangladesh under Zia and Ershad are also cited as successful cases of Political stability.

Political stability stems from a broadbased consensus among the politically relevant groups in the society and from an ideological unity that tends to bind all the regional, ethnic, religious and other groups within the framework of national interest. Political parties sometimes fail to achieve this, because these are organized on regional or religious or class bases, and articulate interests and demands which are not national. But the political stability, which the military tend to foster, is superficial on two counts : first, the kind of political stability the military achieve is nothing more than an "apolitical calm"—"the stability of a vacuum."⁴³ They manage to do it by political fiat, and it works only for a period. When political activities get started these plunge the whole political system into an inferno of uncertainty, anarchy and senselessness. Ayub maintained this apolitical calm in Pakistan for a period of 10 years, but its results have ultimately been damaging for Pakistan. Second, the military conceive of political stability in negative terms of suppression of actual and potential conflict groups in the society,⁴⁴ but real political stability dawns on society only when conflicts are regulated, and not suppressed. The military in fact cannot achieve this ; what they can do is to keep the conflicts burning under ashes, only to be out at a later stage with renewed vigour.

Even if we assume that the military, once in power, learn to handle the game, they can not ensure political stability because instability may emerge from their own ranks through coups or attempted coups. One of the factors for political instability in countries like Sudan, Syria, Iraq and so on is the lack of cohesion among the military officers. This is due partly to ethnic rivalry, ideological cleavages, lack of common socio-economic background and partly to generation gap and conflict between the younger and older officers. Syria provides an excellent example of the lack of cohesion among the military officers because of ethnic conflict and ideological cleavages, although bulk of the officers have been recruited from the middle and lower middle class background. The rivalry between the officers belonging to the Alawi Sect, the non-Arab Kurds

and Druz group became quite intense in the 1950s. Most of the officers have come from minority groups and they have provided the bulk of the Syrian armed forces. The conflict was exacerbated by the Pro-Nasser faction which favoured union with Egypt, while the Ba-athists were in favour of an independent socialist Syria. That explains why Syria was confronted with recurrent coups and counter coups throughout the post-war period until the 1960s.

Iraq and Sudan have similarly been troubled by recurrent coups. These states have experienced political instability by insurgency movements. The insurgencies cropped up mainly because of the discontent of the substantial ethnic groups such as the Kurds in Iraq and black population in Southern Sudan. Despite heavy expenditures incurred for suppressing the movements, the military officers have not been able to bring things under control. Iraqi military regime reached a settlement with the Kurds only in 1966 by assuring autonomy and providing more representation to the Kurds in the national cabinet. The insurgencies, that tied down three quarters of the Sudanese armed forces in the 1960s, have been brought under control by promising greater autonomy to the black Sudanese in the late 1970s.

Unlike Syria, Iraq and Sudan, Brazil since 1964 and Egypt since 1952 experienced a high degree of political stability. That had been possible because of greater cohesion among the officer corps in these countries. In Brazil, the military officers are united by a common socio-economic background since most of them have been drawn from the landowning oligarchy. They are further cemented by a conservative and expressly rightist ideology. In Egypt, on the other hand, the military officers are predominantly from the middle and lower middle class background. They had been united by anti-monarchical sentiments at the beginning. Arab Socialism and anti-Zionism have become a great unifying force these days. Unlike Iraq, Sudan and Syria, Egypt, Brazil and states like South Korea have remained free from insurgency movements and thus have enjoyed political stability. This is due partly to the homogeneous nature of population and partly

to the absence of ethnic and regional conflicts. The armed forces also are more or less homogeneous.

In view of the above, the assumption that the military rule promotes political stability needs further scrutiny. The military rule can promote political stability only when the military leaders maintain a high level of cohesiveness, and do not face any challenge in the form of insurgency movements either from the rival ethnic groups or other socio-cultural formations in the society. political stability is more likely to be achieved in societies where population is more homogeneous and class interests are less conflicting, and at the same time where the military rule is less demanding, more responsible and liberal.

Economic Growth and Industrialization

Some scholars have assumed that the military rule can promote the twin goals of industrialization and economic growth. Their assumption rests on the belief that the military officers occupy a strategic position in society and from that vantage position they get the better perspective of the need for industrialization and economic growth. Lucian Pye says: "The civil bureaucracy, for example, can and indeed has to deal with its domestic problems with little regard for what other bureaucracies in other countries are doing. The soldier is constantly called upon to look abroad and to compare his organization with foreign ones. He thus has a greater awareness of international standards and a greater sensitivity to weakness in his own society."⁴⁵ This sensitivity motivates them to undertake programmes of economic growth and industrialization. Eric A. Nordlinger has also stated that "the military often place a high value upon industrialization, both for its symbolic indication of military might and its presumed guarantee of national self-sufficiency in the event of an improbable war."⁴⁶

Whether the soldiers are in fact more conscious of the need for economic growth than the politicians and whether they go for industrialization more readily than others is a debatable question. Nevertheless, it may be said that the military elites often place a high value on economic growth and industrialization because these

symbolize modernization on the one hand and enhance their defence capability, on the other. More importantly, they tend to enhance their corporate interests. The records of economic performance of the military elites are not conclusive however. In Iraq, economic growth actually declined and in Sudan the economy remained stagnant for the greater part of the military rule in the 1960s.⁴⁷ Their poor performance can be explained in part by the fact that they remained pre-occupied for quite a long time with the attempts to crush the insurgency movements which strained their resources.

Egypt, Pakistan and Korea were more fortunate in this respect. They were able to achieve high growth rates which were quite respectable and which exceeded those of the civilian regimes. In the case of Egypt, GNP became more than threefold during the period 1952—1972. Per capita income grew three times in the same period from £ 42 to £ 116 despite population growth and a large diversion of national resources to defence purposes. The expenditure on defence and security reasons, for instance, ranged between 8.8 per cent and 11.3 per cent of the GNP.⁴⁸ In Pakistan, too, per capita income rose from Rs. 318 in 1959-60 to Rs. 410 in 1969-70.⁴⁹ Growth rate averaged 6 per cent per annum during that period while it was 2.9 per cent in the civilian period—1950-51 to 1957-58.⁵⁰ Industrial output doubled its share and constituted almost a quarter of GNP in 1969-70. Pakistan achieved 7 per cent per annum in export earnings, and manufactured exports accounted for over 60 per cent of merchandise exports in 1969-70.⁵¹

Korea's economic growth rate has been the most spectacular. Per capita income increased from \$ 85 in 1960-61 to \$ 220 in 1969-70. The growth rate in 1968 was 13.3 per cent and it shot up to 15.5 per cent in 1969.⁵² Korean success, of course, is due partly to the low level of expenditure on defence, which was not more than 20 per cent of the national budget on an average, and partly to the presence of American troops, which contributed an estimated amount of \$ 250,000,000 to, the Korean economy every year and high level of American military assistance which averaged \$ 150,000,000 per annum.⁵³ Even the economic growth in Pakistan was due partly to American liberal assistance and

other assistance from foreign donors. Pakistan received aid from different sources to the tune of \$ 7.04 billion during the period 1952-53 to 1969-70.⁵⁴

The experiences of these states indicate in general that the military elites are more likely to promote substantial economic growth where they are able to maintain a modest level of defence expenditure so as to make more of national resources available for development purposes. This is more likely to happen if and when the regimes can avoid military competition with neighbours and arrange for largescale foreign assistance for development purposes.

One may add, in this connection, that even where the military elites are concerned with economic growth, they tend to emphasize sectors which are traditionally linked with defence purposes such as transport and communication, electricity and so on. Development in these sectors leads as a matter of course to the building of infrastructure which, in turn, may lead to development in other sectors. But such sectors as agriculture, health, social welfare tend to be neglected under military rule. In Egypt, for instance, the regime established a wide assortment of factories for the production of consumer goods such as transistor radios, television sets, refrigerators and even a plant for the assembly of automobiles, but it paid less attention to the production of goods required by the peasants such as insecticides, fertilizers and other agricultural implements.⁵⁵ In Pakistan, too, socio-economic development in terms of the expansion of health services, education, labour welfare consistently lagged behind.⁵⁶ Eric Nordlinger opines that whatever they do gets support from the military's corporate interest. In his own words, "at a minimum, industrializing efforts detract from the oftentimes more desired and desirable objectives of increased agricultural productivity, land reform, educational expansion and the provision of social and medical services which are unrelated to the military corporate interests."⁵⁷

Distribution

Some analysts have proposed that military rule is capable not

only of promoting economic growth and industrialization but also of effecting an equitable distribution in the society. Their proposition rests on the belief that the military elites treat the members of the armed forces with greater equality than any other elite groups, and the military training generates greater feelings of equality among the rank and file. Lucian Pye, for instance, regards the military as a social sector which values achievement criteria and decries ascriptive values.⁵⁸ Edward Shils asserts that equalitarian principle is ingrained in the process of recruitment, and he suggests that in the non-Western societies the military officers are generally recruited from the middle and lower-middle classes. That is why they are more sensitive to the social distance between them and the wealthy and the influential. Thus he implies that they may be more favourably disposed towards the redistribution of wealth and removal of privileges.⁵⁹

The empirical evidence however does not prove this. The Latin American experience suggests that military officers' attachment to the norms of order, stability, dignity and hierarchy makes them more sensitive to the maintenance of *status quo*." Any divergence from the *status quo*," Nordlinger argues, is more likely to contain "the potential for unweildy change," and the military officers are more likely to play safe.⁶⁰ They are, therefore, not likely to be motivated by the popular goals of social and economic reform.

In Pakistan, economic growth was accompanied by largescale inequalities both in class and regional terms. The businessmen, industrialists, landlords and wealthy professionals such as the civil servants, military officers, doctors and engineers became in fact the chief beneficiaries of the process of growth. Mahbubul Huq, the former Chief Economist of Pakistan, pointed out in 1968 that 20 families controlled 66 per cent of the total industrial assets, 70 per cent of the total insurance funds and 80 per cent of the bank assets.⁶¹ In a study Lawrence J. White observed that 43 important families and groups controlled 98 listed non-financial companies with total assets of Rs. 5,166 million or 53.1 per cent of the total assets of the non-financial firms.⁶² Of the Private Pakistani firms, 4 leading families controlled

over a quarter of the assets, 10 leading families controlled just under half of the assets and all 43 families and groups controlled just under three-quarters of all assets.⁶³ These were also the families which operated in partnership with the most vigorous foreign firms.⁶⁴

Simultaneously, economic disparity between the two Wings of Pakistan continued to widen. The per capita income in West Pakistan increased from Rs. 338 in 1949-50 to Rs. 367 in 1959-60 and to Rs. 533 in 1969-70, whereas in East Pakistan per capita income declined from Rs. 287 in 1949-50 to Rs. 277 in 1959-60 and rose to Rs. 331 in 1969-70.⁶⁵ On the whole, the benefits of economic growth accrued to a small minority of entrepreneurs who were given maximum incentive to maximize their profits and to maintain high levels of investment, and to the landlords and surplus farmers who prospered with the aid of heavy subsidies. The industrial workers, subsistence farmers and the landless peasants who constituted the bulk of population in Pakistan were the forgotten people.

The land reform programme initiated by the military in Pakistan also revealed their low commitment to equitable distribution. The land reform legislation did not amount to social revolution and in fact the entire system of feudal relationships remained intact. The ceiling of irrigated land was 500 acres, and for unirrigated land it was 1000 acres. A bare 1.6 per cent of the cultivable land was distributed to the landless peasants in West Pakistan.⁶⁶ A Land Revenue Commission was set up in East Pakistan and its recommendations finally led to an amendment of the East Bengal Estate Acquisition and Tenancy Act 1950, raising the ceiling of ownership of land from 33 acres to 120 acres.⁶⁷

In Egypt the land reform was more successful. About 2,000 large landlords were expropriated in 1952, though all were compensated except the royal family. By the end of 1955 lands were distributed to 69,000 landless families. In July 1961, new decree further reduced the ceiling of landholding from 200 acres to 100 acres.⁶⁸ The Egyptian

military rulers also pursued a more radical policy towards private enterprise. The most efficient and large private enterprises were nationalized. The regime also invested heavily in social welfare sectors such as health, labour, education and so on. In education they attained great success. In 1952 about 35 per cent of the children between the ages of six and twelve were in schools. In 1967, almost 80 per cent of the children of that age group were attending schools.⁶⁹

On the whole, the Egyptian military officers pursued policies which were more egalitarian than those of Pakistan. The reasons for the difference raise interesting questions. A possible explanation, if one were to follow Edward Shils, may be found in the socio-economic background of the military rulers in the two countries. Egyptian rulers came predominantly from the middle and lower middle classes and they were conscious of the social distance between them and the traditional upper classes.

This line of argument is not, however, wholly convincing. Socio-economic background fails to explain why the military intervened in politics in 1958 though the political elite also came from the similar background. It also fails to explain why Castro, the son of a wealthy landowner, would pursue policies that undermined the interests of the class he belonged to. The difference, it seems, lies not so much in the socio-economic background of reformers but rather in their social philosophy. Nasser's was more egalitarian than Ayub's, which was out and out an elitist. Thus, it may be generalized that policies aiming at greater equality are more likely to be carried out by the military elites if they are animated by an egalitarian philosophy. The assumption that the military elites can promote social equality is, therefore, not self-evident. It needs to take into account the type of social philosophy the military have been pursuing.

Political Participation and Institution Building

Development becomes meaningful only in the context of popular participation. The theorists of development however agree that the

military elites are but a poor force for the promotion of popular participation. They do not favour the operation of competitive political parties or autonomous interest groups. Military regimes are by definition, purely temporary. While taking over, the military promise that they would hand over power to the civilians as early as possible, though they are never explicit how they will do it and when they will do it.

Various explanations have been put forward by the theorists to analyze the inability of the military in this respect. Morris Janowitz, a shrewd analyst, suggests that it is due to their "anti-political orientation" which they acquire from their "technocratic way of thinking."⁷⁰ As soldiers they tend to think that any problem is amenable to a direct and simple solution. In fact, "there is a tendency in all armies to simplify a problem to its barest essentials and avoid lengthy or complicated processes of thought or analysis."⁷¹ Once they identify the problems in simplified form, they tend to handle these problems like hard-technocrats, or like iron surgeons, and most often these iron surgeons end up operating in the wrong places. They are repulsed by the idea of temporization, bargaining and negotiation which work wonders in the hands of the politicians.

Bienen has argued that the reluctance of the military elites to extend popular participation in the system arises from what he calls 'passion for control.' This passion may even transcend their commitment to development.⁷² The suggestions of Janowitz and Bienen are, to my mind, more often, right, but I think there are three more reasons why the military feel reluctant to encourage substantive political participation in the system. The first arises from a general distrust of the civilian politicians who, the military elite thinks, constitute a threat to their corporate interest. The military officers also believe that politicians are no better than 'Scalawags.' That is why they always want to restrict the free flow of political activities, and thus to restrict popular participation. The second reason for the military's reluctance to extend substantive popular participation is their elitist view of politics. They believe that the masses have a

limited knowledge of politics, particularly in countries where the level of literacy is low, and thus they can be led astray by 'self-seeking' politicians. To avoid such a tragedy, the masses should only be allowed to participate in politics only at "the level of their mental horizons and intellectual calibre" and they should be subjected, in electoral exercises, to "only such questions as they can understand in the light of their own personal knowledge without external prompting".⁷³ Such a view of politics is well exemplified in Ayub Khan's Basic Democracies where people were allowed to participate only at the lower tier of the system without the prompting of any political party. The third reason is associated with a type of inferiority complex the military suffer from. They feel that the politicians are expert in agitational politics. If popular participation is ensured the politicians would monopolize the stage by creating a furore on useless matters and overwhelm the military.

While the military tend to avoid popular participation in the political system, their performance at the level of institution building is very poor. Though the Basic Democracies were highly praised by the western scholars, and its author, Ayub Khan, was commended as coming close "to filling the role of a Solon or Lycurgus or a Great Legislator on the platonic or Rousseauian model,"⁷⁴ the system of Basic Democracies could not work as a viable institution. Designed primarily as an institution for controlled popular participation, it provoked sharp reactions among the people, and ultimately, it was liquidated in a mass upheaval in 1969. Even the Gram Sarkar (Village Government) introduced by General Zia in Bangladesh could not evolve as a workable system.

Even the more popular military leader like Nasser failed to develop workable political institutions in Egypt though he tried several times to mobilize the people through new institutions. In the words of Ruth First, "each of these movements in turn went from torpor to paralysis, intrinsically unable to stir vitality in villages, factories and neighbourhood communities."⁷⁵ Other

analysts also point out clearly that the role of the military in political development, conceived mainly in terms of popular participation and building of legitimate political institutions, has been disappointing.⁷⁶

Administration

While the analysts tend to view the role of the military marginal in terms of popular participation and institution building, they are optimistic about the military's role in efficient administration. This optimism rests on two premises. First, the military training and military life is a fertile breeding ground for administrative and managerial skills. Second, by virtue of training, a military officer becomes morally superior and less corruptible than a civilian. The exercise of command in an organization based on hierarchy, unquestioning compliance and execution of orders facilitates more effective exercise of authority in other organizational context.⁷⁷ The barrack life inculcates the values of puritan ascetism and a disdain for conspicuous consumption, and these are re-enforced by the isolation of the military life from those of other segments of society.⁷⁸ The theorists further assume that socialization and acculturation in the military academies generates patriotism, dedication to public service and other moral values. For all these, some analysts argue, the military can bring in efficiency, honesty, dedication and discipline in administration.

Such assumptions cannot however be accepted without scrutiny. In most countries barrack life is less ascetic than it is assumed. The rank and file may be confined to the barracks, but the officers are allowed to live apart, as in Indonesia. Consequently, the values, if any, with which they are indoctrinated, may be dissipated. In Burma and Indonesia, for instance, the military have not had impressive records in administration. In Egypt, on the other hand, their performance has been quite impressive. According to some observers, the civilian politicians were surprised by the regime's efficiency.⁷⁹

Conclusion

Thus we see that one can take exception to almost every assumption postulated by the analysts in respect of the role of the military. Their thesis suffers from a number of major weaknesses. First, their assumptions have most often no empirical validity, though they may sound logical. The assumption that the military can promote national integration because the recruits are drawn from all segments of society seems quite plausible, but the empirical evidence indicates that in most of the developing countries the recruits are not drawn across broad ethnic and social lines. Similarly, the assumptions on citizenship training, common schooling and freedom from factionalism have no empirical validity.

The second weakness of these assumptions refers to what Willner has termed as the "Projective fallacy." It is really wrong to attribute the characteristics of the military of the Western Industrialized states to the military elites of the Third World countries. A third weakness stems from an over-emphasis on the internal characteristics of the military and a general omission of the external constraints which put limits on the capabilities of the military. The military training, for instance, make the officers conscious of the weakness of their society, and they may be motivated to modernize, but they may lack resources and skills to do that. Even where there are resources, the military officers may be pre-occupied with problems of defence and may not be able to divert resources for economic development, or they may be more interested in their status and position in the society.

In short, it may be said that development by the military is not something that can be taken for granted. Whether the military rule will lead to development depends on a combination of factors. Among these, a cohesive military leadership, a developmental ideology, a homogeneous population and the absence of external constraints are the most important. In the Third World countries, unfortunately, this combination of factors is a rarity.

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Experience of Development Planning in Pakistan

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By planning we mean a method of organising and utilising the available resources of a country for the purpose of fulfilling certain ends. In other words, it can be said that planning implies a conscious and deliberate effort for the exploitation of the economic resources of the country to attain certain objectives.

In the case of Pakistan the resources that can be available for development in the prevailing circumstances were assessed and then the targets were fixed. However, choosing the second approach did not mean absence of sacrifice, since it assumed that the government and the people put forth their maximum effort. Nor did the adoption of the latter approach mean that there was no place for an assessment of requirements. In fact, the plan was formulated through a process of successive approximations by means of a comparison of resources available and of claims upon these resources.

Development Planning in Pakistan

Planning in Pakistan has a history of its own. The process of development planning in Pakistan started with the launching of a Six-Year Development Programme (1951-57) which was prepared under the Colombo Plan to prepare the country for future advancement. But it ran into difficulties in the wake of the Korean War and came to an end two years before its envisaged completion date. The First Five-Year Plan was launched as a first step towards systematic

planning in the country. The First Plan (1955-60) did not get enough political support. The Second Five-Year Plan (1960-65) was an effort to boost the creation of economic infrastructure in the country. This plan was an apparent success in terms of the traditional growth rate criterion, but bequeathed a legacy of problems with which this nation is still grappling. The Third Plan (1965-70) also aimed at accelerating the growth achieved during the previous two plans. But it was affected by interruption of aid flow and the war of 1965. However, during these fifteen years the basic strategy of economic planning wedded primarily to income growth. The distributive aspect was not attended properly. During this period national income did grow but accompanied by inequalities in income and resultant social tensions. The Fourth Plan (1970-75) was prepared by a regime which was there, by its own declarations, only for an interim period, pending transfer of power to the elected representatives of the people. The Fourth Plan, therefore, gave social justice its long due place in the economic planning of the country. The plan had to be abandoned because of political change and separation of the former East Pakistan in the post 1971 situation. That Plan had been prepared in a different historical and geographical context. With the break-up of Pakistan, its conceptual framework and major dimensions altered beyond recognition. The country then had to resort to ad hoc planning on yearly basis for seven years (1971-78).

While the impact of economic planning on the whole has been considerable, the development strategy followed upto 1971, tended to revolve round the traditional growth indicators of G.N.P., exports, savings, and investment. This pattern of planning did not adequately reflect the needs and aspirations of the people and particularly fell short in setting goals of distributive justice. Hence, the long term impact of investment in social sectors and improvement in the living conditions of the people at large was not properly pursued.

When the elected government assumed office in December, 1971 the country was faced with an economic crisis of massive proportions. At the heart of this crisis was the discontent of masses with the

economic process which tended to build up a small privileged class at their expense. It was reflected in the state of serious tension arising from a lack of regional and social balance in development. This tension had heightened to a point where progress along traditional lines was not possible even. Investment had come down to a level where it was not significantly above what was required for replacement of old, worn-out capital stock. Critical bottlenecks in key sectors, like power and transport, and disturbed industrial relations had not only neutralised the previous gains but also get into motion a dangerous backward slide which if left unchecked would have had disastrous consequences for country's long term economic viability. In seeking to overcome this crisis, which was massive in proportions and deep in its basic causes, the government used the instrumentality of annual plans to introduce policies designed to produce quick and immediate impact. However, even before reaching the stage where the first annual plan could be launched a series of economic reforms were carried out to change the basic character of the economy. Reforms were a necessary prelude to economic recovery. The first phase of reforms was completed within a short period of less than six months from January to May, 1972.

Reforms in the field of agriculture, labour relations, industry, health, education were, therefore, designed to bring about important structural changes in the economy. The government assumed greater responsibility for direct management of a wide range of economic activities. The reforms in the industrial sector were meant to have a greater public sector participation in the economic development of the country and to broaden the base of industrial ownership. The labour reforms sought to guarantee to the workers their fundamental rights and provide greater security of service, representation in management and a number of financial benefits. The land reforms were aimed at protecting the interests of the tillers of soil and modernizing agricultural sector. The reforms in financial, banking and insurance sectors were designed to ensure utilisation of country's resources towards greater economic development with social justice. The reforms in the social sectors, like health and education, were

aimed at extending the basic facilities of health and education to the largest number of people.

The government, in the field of development planning adopted number of policies and development programmes which though not spelt out within the expressed framework of a five year plan, were highly relevant to the fundamentals of the new socio-economic order. Annual Plans were prepared and implemented which sought to (a) improve living standards ; (b) improve public services ; (c) effect better income distribution and employment ; (d) bring about rapid progress and a economic integration of under-developed regions of the country, and (e) achieve self-sufficiency through import substitution and strengthening of productive sectors.

The period of seventies was, however, characterised by developments in world economy, which have caused a major upheaval in the non-oil-producing developing countries. The rising tide of world inflation, followed by a successful attempt by oil exporting countries to obtain a fairer oil price resulted in a major recession in the industrial west. These events placed an intolerable burden on the developing countries. In the case of Pakistan, the impact of world economic crisis was magnified by a series of climatic and natural factors such as the floods of 1973 and a severe water shortage in 1974. In this connection it should be remembered that Pakistan's economy is extremely vulnerable to international factors, depending as it does substantially on foreign trade. Pakistan's exports at nearly one billion dollars in 1974-75 constitute 10 per cent of the G.D.P and imports account for more than 20 per cent of total goods and services produced in the country. Thus one-third of the goods were directly affected, while a much larger proportion was influenced indirectly. The level of exports as well as prices which Pakistan could get for those exports in the world markets had obviously suffered. On the other hand, for a virtually inflexible demand for essential items like wheat, fertilizer, edible oil and petroleum and oil products, Pakistan had paid manifold high prices. The combined loss on account of high prices of imports and low level of export prices had

been roughly 800 to 900 million dollars in one year. The resources were thus reduced while the task of increasing investment became more urgent. Price pressures were felt through out the economy. The government had to carry out the defensive operation against the onslaught of those adverse terms of trade while keeping its offensive going against stagnation in the economy. Obviously, it was not enough to make any appreciable impact on the life of the common man.

In the economic history of Pakistan, the four years from 1972 to 1975 were crucial when the national economy remained exposed to adverse domestic and international factors. The depressed level of private investment, slackening agricultural and industrial production resulting in low economic growth, accompanied by inflation, and recession abroad, had posed serious challenges for the policy makers.

COMPARATIVE STUDY OF PLANS

Scientific planning in Pakistan began with the launching of a Six-Year National Development Plan (1951-57) in 1951 as a part of the cooperative effort under the Colombo Plan for South-East Asia. The main purpose of the plan was to prepare the economy for future development. An amount of Rs. 3,000 million was spent during the first years of its implementation as compared to the plan allocation of Rs. 2,600 million. The plan had to be suspended two years before its completion term because of adverse repercussions of the Korean War. Although the industrial sector made noticeable advancement in these years, the agricultural sector was unable to keep pace with it and the overall rate of growth of the economy was, therefore, negligible. In the opinion of the Planning Board,¹ "The Six-Year Plan was prepared in the absence of much essential information and many basic statistics. So it could not be based on a proper assessment of the national resources—human, physical and financial."

First Five Year Plan (1955-60)

The launching of the First Five-Year Plan marked an era of systematic planning in the country. The plan aimed at preparing

the ground for rapid growth by building up the infrastructure and productive potential of the economy. The size of the plan was Rs. 10,800 million, out of which Rs. 7,500 million for the development in the public sector and Rs. 3,300 million in the private sector. Large allocation for the public sector was aimed at strengthening the basic infrastructure which was inadequate to meet the requirements of the future industrial development. The actual development expenditure during the plan period however, stood at Rs. 10,590 million. Of this Rs. 6,930 million were spent in the public sector and Rs. 3,660 million in the private sector.

The objectives of the plan could not be realised due to the delay in the approval of the plan by the Economic and Social Council until 15th April, 1957. The period of the plan was terminated on 30th June, 1960. The national income rose by 11 per cent as compared to the plan's target of 15 per cent. The increase of per-capita income was 1.6 per cent as compared to the plan's projection of 7 per cent. Agriculture being the key sector of the economy lagged behind the industrial sector continuously. In the industrial sector consumer industries prospered at the cost of basic units. The failure in the farming sector raised the food imports while consumer manufacturing also increased the import bill.

The main causes for the shortfall in the implementation of the plan included the unexpected rise in non-development expenditure, considerable fall in the foreign exchange earnings and slower arrival of foreign aid during the plan. A considerable rise in the internal price level disturbed the cost calculations completely for the projects, which were included in the plan. Although most of the targets of the plan could not be achieved, yet it laid a sound base to embark upon the development path in the coming years.

Second Five Year-Plan (1960-65)

As a result of the experience of implementing the first plan necessary planning machinery was set up. The plan was, therefore, finalised well in time before the beginning of the plan period and was released in June, 1960 in its final form.

The plan initially envisaged development expenditure of Rs. 19,000 million which was revised to Rs. 23,000 million in 1961. The plan was more than a success in terms of physical and financial achievements. The actual increase in national income over the plan period was 30 per cent compared with the plan target of 24 per cent. The total development expenditure stood at Rs. 27,540 million (excluding an expenditure of Rs. 640 million on Rural Works Programme) against the plan target of Rs. 23,000 million. The mobilisation of domestic resources during the plan amounted to Rs. 18,800 million as against the target of Rs. 11,450 million. The total exports over the five-year period were roughly Rs. 13,230 million, i.e., Rs. 1,980 million more than projected in the plan.

The plan proved the capability of the economy to achieve an annual growth rate of about 6 per cent. The investment rose to 18.8 per cent in 1964-65 as compared to 8.9 per cent in 1959-60. Out of the additional income generated during the plan, the rate of savings and reinvestment rose to 20 per cent. As a result the domestic savings increased at a faster rate and reached to 11.7 per cent in 1964-65 as compared to 8.5 per cent in 1960-61. Exports increased at the rate of 7 per cent per annum over the plan period. Thus by the end of June 1965, the economy seemed balanced for a self-sustained development effort in the future.

Some of the problems which came up in the course of implementation of the plan are worth commenting upon. "A striking element of the strategy was that social justice was not built into the plan. As a matter of fact some of the policies of the plan promoted income inequalities. The maintenance of an unrealistic rate of exchange greatly subsidised the importers who were generally big industrialists and businessmen at the cost of the producers of export goods who were relatively poor farmers. Again the maintenance of low interest rate policies subsidised the rich investors and enabled them to obtain large unearned incomes. The policy of import substitution through import restrictions resulted in high prices of consumer goods and brought about a transfer of resources from the relatively

poor consumers to the rich industrialists. The various tax and other incentives for industrial investments mainly benefitted rich industrialists who had large resources to invest. The real wages of the workers declined in the case of many industries. In spite of the success of the plan in achieving and/or exceeding the plan targets in many important fields, there was great discontent amongst the masses resulting from income inequalities generated by the development strategy of the plan. This content was one of the important causes for the overthrow of President Ayub in the late sixties.”²

“Pakistan’s development programme is at present entirely dependent on foreign assistance. This need have worried the planners if foreign assistance was available in a flexible form. The difficulty is that most of the aid giving agencies are now insisting on project type assistance. This poses a possibility of a sharp conflict between planners’ and aid-givers’ ideas regarding national priorities. Since any project which is not aided has only a negligible chance of implementation, aid-givers are in an effective position to dictate national priorities. Again, since the aid-giving countries might themselves have widely divergent views about priorities, what projects are finally accepted for assistance may or may not fit into a logical whole. If one carries this argument to the extreme, one may even doubt the sanctity of national planning when the country is itself in no position to protect the relative priorities of its plan and when the foreign assistance is given on a project by project appraisal by technical teams of foreign consultants who may have no idea of the broad priorities of the country. Partly the distortions of plan priorities reflects preferences of the aid-givers. It is easier to sell big and well-engineered hydro-electric and transport projects to the aid-givers than the less spectacular and small projects in the fields of agriculture, education and social services, even though the latter are at least as essential a part of the plan as the former. In such a situation, plan priorities can be protected only if the country is able to finance a certain part of its development programme out of its own foreign exchange resources or if a sizeable proportion of foreign assistance

becomes available in the form of commodity aid and lines of credit rather than the inflexible project-type assistance. If national planning is not to become entirely an exercise in foreign salesmanship, this is a problem to which planners and aid-givers must give a lot of cool thought.”³

Third Five-Year Plan (1965-70)

The Third Plan was prepared within the framework of a twenty-year long-term Perspective Plan (1965-85) and in the light of the achievements and shortfalls of the previous two plans. But the Third Plan ran into difficulties soon after it was launched. The war with India in September, 1965 resulted in the diversion of domestic resources from development to defence. At the same time, U.S. aid to Pakistan was suspended. This was followed by drought in 1965-66 and floods in 1966-67, which affected the agriculture sector adversely. As a result, the total development expenditure declined to Rs. 42,850 million against the plan target of Rs. 52,000 million, indicating a shortfall of 17 per cent in the total programme. In the public sector the development expenditure stood at Rs. 21,595 million against the target of Rs. 30,000 million showing a shortfall of 28 per cent. In the private sector, the total expenditure amounted to Rs. 21,255 million against the target of Rs. 22,000 million showing a slight shortfall. About 53 per cent of the plan targets of the public sector expenditure was estimated to have been financed through the mobilisation of domestic resources, the total deficit financing amounted to Rs. 2,322 million during the plan period as against the plan projection of Rs. 1,500 million, largely due to the short-fall of Rs. 3,200 million in external resources.

“The plan strategy was to squeeze out more savings from the agricultural sector by providing opportunities for investment in agriculture and by the extension of banking facilities in rural areas. Greater savings were to be mobilized for the industrial sector by concentration on intermediate and capital goods industries and limiting the expansion of capacity of consumer goods increase to prevent

unplanned increase in consumption. External aid was expected to finance 45 per cent of the plan expenditure.

“The war with India in 1965 resulted in a substantial reduction in the flow of external aid, a shortfall in public sector development expenditure and a complete distortion of the plan priorities. The allocations for the social sectors were drastically reduced. This was considered to be the necessary price to pay for the protection of economic growth. Thus some of the important objectives of the plan were abandoned.”⁴

Fourth Five-Year Plan (1970-75)

With the background of experience and achievements made during the first fifteen years of development planning and also keeping in view the socio-economic conditions prevailing in the country the Fourth Plan was formulated with an ambitious size of Rs. 75,000 million. It laid much emphasis on establishing a just society by broadening the scope of development and reducing inter and inter-regional disparities in per capita income. But the plan could not be implemented because of the war with India in 1971 and the secession of former East Pakistan.

“The strategy as stated in the objectives was strongly oriented towards the removal of income disparities and raising the income levels of lower income groups. A high rate of economic growth was considered necessary for the achievements of social and economic objectives of development. The strategy was based on reducing dependence on external aid. The plan allocations were by and large, in line with plan priorities. However, the plan targets were pitched too high and it is doubtful whether these targets would have been reached if the plan allocations had been fully utilized. But due to the upheavals during 1970-71 the implementation of the plan virtually became impossible.”⁵

Planning During 1971—78

During this period on medium-term plan was formulated and it was considered feasible to resort to ad hoc planning on annual basis.

The Annal Development Plans and Annual Plans were the main instruments of economic planning during this period. The ad hocism in planning which continued for several years lacked any medium-term perspective and restrained the growth process in the country. The nationalisation policy during that period made the private sector reluctant to invest. The bulk of the new investment programmes, therefore, were implemented through the public sector, thus increased in the volume by more than five times, i.e., from Rs. 2,948 million in 1970-71 to Rs. 16,239 million in 1976-77.

Due to inconsistency in economic policies and lack of initiative in the private sector for investment, the economy suffered serious setbacks during those six years. GNP annual growth rate was only 4.8 per cent as compared to 5.8 per cent during the Third Plan and 6.0 per cent during the Second Plan. The growth rate of agriculture and industry fell sharply to an average annual rate of 2.3 per cent and 2.8 per cent as compared to 3.4 per cent and 10.0 per cent in the Second Plan and 4.1 per cent and 7.8 per cent during Third Plan respectively.

The present regime took the control of the country in July, 1977 and initiated a large number of measures to revive the economy. As a result, the economy recorded encouraging recovery. GDP and GNP grew by 7.0 and 10.0 per cent respectively during 1977-78. The two principal commodity sectors, i.e., agriculture and manufacturing recorded a growth rate of 2.5 per cent and 9.2 per cent respectively.

The major failures and successes of the period from 1972-77 can be summarised below :

- (a) "In the circumstances the economic and social development programmes were very ambitious and their cost far exceeded the availability of domestic and foreign resources. By relying on deficit financing to meet the gap and by furthering inflation it squeezed the middle classes and they finally revolted against the regime.
- (b) Critical to the success of the strategy were high growth

rates of agriculture and industry to cushion the long gestation of public sector programmes. The failures of these sectors meant that there was little growth of output from 1974-75 to 1976-77.

- (c) The strategy failed to generate additional employment mainly because the bulk of investment was in the capital intensive projects. The People's Work Programme, which was to provide the additional employment, was severely curtailed because its inflationary impact was considered to be too high. However, the employment situation was considerably improved by the large scale emigration of the industrial labour force to the Middle East.
- (d) Although the government policies tried to shift the terms of trade in favour of the agricultural sector through higher procurement prices, it was only partially successful in its endeavours and, by the end of the period, agriculture's terms of trade were lower than what they had been at the beginning of the period.

Agricultural Terms of Trade
1959-60=100

	1965-66	1969-70	1972-73	1973-74	1974-75	1975-76
Agricultural Price Index	117	125	164	217	257	283
Manufacturing Price Index	102	119	146	180	238	271
Terms of Trade Index	115	106	112	121	108	104

Source : IBRD., 1977, p. 43.

- (e) The government failed to establish the ideology of 'state capitalism' which it had initiated through the process of nationalization. It failed to establish a working relationship with the big monopoly houses which refused to invest

through out the period and preferred to invest abroad. Also over time, the government exceeded its original policy of nationalization and began to nationalize the industries other than those which had originally motivated the reform. This was especially true of the smaller units in the agro-based industries which hit the middle classes. The result of the lack of private investment during this period was that the economy was caught in a double squeeze. Higher workers abroad led to inflationary pressures and, with the private sector not investing, more funds were diverted towards consumption which further increased the demand pressures on the economy."

However, even after taking into account the above factors, credit must go to the government for a number of economic achievements :

- (a) First and foremost, by setting up basic industries, it rectified the imbalance in the growth of the industrial sector and laid the foundations on which a capital goods industry base could be built and whose favourable impact was felt after 1977.
- (b) It was able to protect incomes of the industrial labour force and low income earners in the public sector during a period of high inflation although whether its policies brought about significant redistribution of income in favour of the poorer classes is disputable.
- (c) It was instrumental in sending a very large number of people abroad, specially to Middle East, by making it simpler for people to go abroad. Although the remittances of these workers helped cushion the balance of payments squeeze, the very large increases were to come after 1976.
- (d) It brought about the fundamental change in the attitudes of the working class which became far more conscious of its economic rights."⁶

The Fifth Five-Year Plan (1978-83)

The Fifth Plan marked the resumption of medium-term development planning, after realizing that the short-term planning on annual basis was incapable of producing the desired goals of development. It was, therefore, decided to revert to the medium-term planning after a gap of eight years. The plan was launched in a period of serious economic difficulties : the commodity producing sectors had been stagnant, monetary expansion was rapid and inflation high, imports were rising rapidly and foreign exchange reserves were low. Nonetheless, the objectives of the plan were quite ambitious. The government realized the nature of the heavy public sector commitments without additional resources mobilization efforts. The plan, therefore, placed emphasis on completing the on-going projects, postponing commitments to costly new projects, improving efficiency of existing assets and reallocating resources, to the extent possible, the neglected areas, e.g., rural development, education and other social sectors.

The basic strategy of the plan aimed at the consolidation and improvement of overall balance of the economy and wide-spread diffusion of the fruits of growth. Plan's strategy emphasised the need of rapid economic growth to generate resources to sustain high level of consumption and investment. In addition, export volumes were to expand while import growth was to be reduced, thus improving the trade balance.

The assumptions of the plan, however, turned out to be quite optimistic. Both investment and savings particularly fell far short of plan targets. Starting from a tight initial resource position, several unforeseen events were combined to squeeze Pakistan's resources still further. In addition, major cost over-runs were experienced in several large public sector projects and the cost of fertilizers subsidies escalated more rapidly than had been expected. The shortage of resources, combined with the needs to limit budgetary deficits compelled cutback in planned investments and prevented the reallocation of public development expenditures. These shortfalls contributed to

bringing up the energy shortages, delayed progress in improving agricultural and irrigational facilities and led to sharp cutbacks in social sector programmes.

Anyhow, there are a number of noteworthy successes in the plan. While growth in national output, agriculture, industry and exports was below the plan targets, all were substantially above rates achieved during 1970-78 and very respectably compared to the experience of most of the less developed countries over the same period. The growth with increased inflows of migrants remittances, benefited the large section of population in urban and rural areas. Government improved her financial and fiscal policies. Such policies had subsided gradually the inflationary pressures. A special programme to accelerate the development of Baluchistan was initiated. A similar programme of modest nature was also started in the tribal areas of NWFP.

In brief, Pakistan's performance under the Fifth Plan has been a mixed success. Economic growth has been broad based and rapid and has conferred widespread benefits on the population. Improved policies have contributed to this success. Government's fiscal policies have lowered overall budget deficits and government bank borrowing have alleviated inflationary pressures. No progress was made in improving savings and investment performance. The achievement of rapid growth with relatively low investment rates during the period was possible because of excess capacity generated by the investments of the preceding period, neglect of replacement investments—especially in the public sector. Saving rates were not higher at the end of the plan than at the beginning. Even the modest rate of public savings achieved was at the expense of essential allocations for operations and maintenance in the economic and social sectors. Although private investment has increased at a respectable rate, its rise has not been sufficient to offset the decline in public investment rate. The failure to increase public investment together with constraints on recurrent outlays is the essential reason for shortages of public sector economic and social services.

If rapid growth is to continue and if the benefits of growth are to reach a broad spectrum of the population, it is clear that there are a number of issues that the government must take into consideration, e.g., the agricultural productivity, implementation of the incentives for greater private and public manufacturing enterprise, the infrastructure problem ; redress of its past neglect of the social sectors ; and sustaining high economic growth rates. Savings rates will need to be increased from the low levels of recent years in order to finance the necessary increase in investment. Actions are required on a number of fronts : (a) improvements in the elasticity of revenues through the introduction of a broad based consumption tax with a wide coverage of domestic production ; (b) greater cost recovery through the extension of user charges to a wider variety of public services ; (c) increased self financing by public enterprises through cost reductions and price adjustments ; and (d) continued progress in reducing budget subsidies for food and agricultural inputs.⁷

Sixth Five-Year Plan (1983-88)

The Sixth Plan prepared with the broadest possible participation, with the intent of preparing a development plan which mirrors the aspirations of the people, which is truly national in spirit and content, and is both visionary and practical. In connection with the preparation of the plan, national debates, seminars, discussions were held through out the country to publically air the issues and to seek public response to the central themes of the plan. These involved over two thousand experts in various fields directly or indirectly in the process of providing intellectual and policy inputs. The reports of the Working Groups were released in specially organised press conferences and candid discussions were held through the mass media. Meetings were also held with the members of the Majlis-e-Shoora and with the President's Advisers to discuss the plan parameters and the overall strategy of development. In short, the Plan strategy, programmes and policy proposals have emerged through a process of intensive dialogue throughout the country.

The Plan was launched with a balanced emphasis on growth, efficiency, distribution and social justice reminding the World Bank's slogan of the eighties about the Basic Necessities Approach and Physical Quality of Life Indices. Although rapid growth had been achieved the economy is confronted with the basic shortcomings which have kept the pace of progress slow in the past and may constrain the future progress. Firstly, owing to the low productivity and efficiency compared to international standards, output of commodity producing sectors was low. Secondly, the performance of the social sectors had not been satisfactory. Health services, particularly in rural areas, were disappointing. A large proportion of the school age children were unable to avail the educational opportunities. A large segment of the population was without the facility of safe drinking water, electricity, adequate housing and other civic amenities. Thirdly, the application of technology and even more the capability to adapt modern technology to our conditions had not made sufficient progress. Expenditure on research and development was negligible. Fourthly, the saving rate was also inadequate due to a very high propensity to consume, and hence investment was also inadequate. Anyhow, to make the development effort more fruitful and to overcome the shortcomings, the new set of objectives had been provided to the Sixth Five-Year Plan :

1. It was proposed to lay key emphasis on, and provide for a substantial acceleration in the programme of basic social services such as primary education, drinking water and basic health : to amount a massive effort for the provision of infrastructure in the rural areas in order to reduce the imbalance which exists in the access to social services, adequate roads, communication facilities and electricity ; and to embark upon special programmes aimed at fostering growth and development in some of the poor regions, such as Baluchistan.
2. It was proposed to introduce the safety nets and income policies which would protect the most vulnerable and poorest sections of the society.

3. The plan included both policies and special international programmes to combat the problem of malnutrition.
4. The policies and programmes of the plan had been devised in a manner which would ensure employment opportunities to all new entrants to the labour force and the opportunities for an increase in productivity for each member of the labour force.

The Sixth Plan presents the facts of history with references to their practical lessons and overall strategy for Pakistan's development. Recognising the importance of a dynamic private sector for industrial growth and limitations on public resources mobilisation, it proposes a greatly expanded role for the private sector. The insufficient investments in some types of infrastructure and social development could seriously impede the country's long term progress. It proposes major shifts in the allocation of public funds. Knowing the importance of balanced regional growth for national unity, it proposes special development plans for the less developed areas. The implementation of these highly desirable objectives will require bold policies.

Much remains to be done to translate objectives into action. A detailed annual phasing of the ADP needs to be worked out for at least the next two years. This is essential if the plan is to have sufficient operational significance. To speed up aid disbursements, the management of the external borrowing programme needs to be further strengthened. The proposed setting up of a projects division in the Planning and Development Division with a responsibility for the evaluation, processing and monitoring of projects could assist greatly in this task. Lastly, as indicated in the evaluations of different sectoral programmes, proposed policy initiatives in a large number of areas need to be spelled out in detail.

No policy changes will be more critical for the achievement of the country's objectives than those for the private sector and domestic resource mobilisation by the public sector. Unless private investment and saving rates can be increased, the country's comparatively

low overall rate of investment and saving will persist in the plan period. The issue of mobilisation of domestic resources for the public sector goes beyond that of raising the rate of public saving. In the public sector domestic resources must be mobilised not only to raise the saving rates but also to meet the large requirements for the recurring costs of public services. Moreover, a greater public saving effort than proposed in the plan will be needed to achieve the overall saving target. Without substantial and sustained efforts to mobilise domestic resources, the plan targets, especially for social development, cannot be realised.

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India's Foreign Relations with Special Reference to South Asian Countries

(July—December 1986)

MOHAMMAD SARWAR

INDIA AND ITS NEIGHBOURS

Rajiv Gandhi adopted a new style in dealing with India's neighbours other than Pakistan and China, encouraging discussion and negotiations and with the gestures of hope rather than display of imperious and arbitrary manner of his mother, even though it is virtually impossible to accept any change in India's power relationship with Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. His views on Pakistan and China do not appear significantly different from those of his mother. Despite superficial gestures and periodic high-level bilateral meetings nothing in the relationship suggests any ease in the mood of Indian rulers towards China and Pakistan.

INDO-BANGLADESH

For the smaller neighbours in the region, the Indians are masters in the game of raising expectations by making a few hopeful signs and then foot-dragging on any given issue indefinitely, till hopelessness sets in on the other side. Although it has been proved time and again but the problem-bound smaller and weaker countries like Bangladesh again had to be dragged into the trap in the hope of normalizing and solving their problems. During the period under review, in South Asia, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka were to experience this stratagey.

In the presence of the 1972 Indo-Bangladesh Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, the post Mujib-ur-Rahman phase of Indo-Bangladesh relations has had its share of bitterness and acrimony. Sharing of common river waters, refugees, border fencing, maritime boundaries, insurgency and Tin Bigha Corridor are still such unresolved disputes that can start a war of words any time on both sides. India was committed to hand over Tin Bigha Corridor to Bangladesh after an agreement between Mrs. Indira Gandhi and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in 1974. In October 1982 again during Indira-Ershad parleys in New Delhi an agreement on Tin Bigha was reached to "restoring *status quo ante* and providing the right of free and unfettered movement to Bangladeshi citizens in the leased area."¹ But the transfer of small piece of land, smaller than the size of a foot ball ground, is still an issue. The world so far has decided about 35 disputes on the waters of International rivers, but the Ganges water problem remained unresolved after 35 long years. In this state of tense relations President Hussain Mohammad Ershad of Bangladesh reached New Delhi on July 14, 1986.

President Ershad's visit to Delhi

The President of Bangladesh and the current Chairman of SAARC, on July 14 reached New Delhi on a three-day visit in an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust, allegedly created by the former President Ziaur Rahman. On this visit India only assured General Ershad of its earnest desire to work for further improvement of Indo-Bangladesh relations and to seek to resolve all remaining problems."² The two leaders also "sorted out most of the outstanding issues like the river waters, Tin Bigha Corridor, the border insurgency and maritime boundry and agreed in principle on the modalities to be adopted to resolve them to the mutual benefit of the two countries."³ India also assured that "steps would be taken to hasten the transfer of the enclave of Tin Bigha, now subject to litigation, to Bangladesh,"⁴ and accepted Bangladeshi proposal to "include Nepal in the water talks."⁵

General Ershad, on the results of this visit said, "we have

decided to remove all the irritants in our relations and became good friends, we have found out modalities to resolve all the outstanding issues between the two countries.”⁶ There were grounds for optimism in his statement but optimism had always been elusive in Indo-Bangladesh relations and history has proved how big the gap between the Indian’s promise and what they finally do, and it has been proved in the preceding period under review.

The Indians appear to be masters of raising some non-existent issues at crucial periods and side tracking the whole set of parameters set for that particular dialogue, especially when they have to concede something. On 15th July, when President Ershad was in Delhi, *the Sentinel* (Gauhati) quoting intelligence sources reported the presence of Sikh extremists in Bangladesh military camps. According to the editorial :

“ . . . external intelligence officials even claim to have documents to prove that the Sikh militants were being accommodated in secluded quarters inside army barracks in Dhaka and in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. By an order marked ‘secret’ and ‘urgent’ the GOC of the Chittagong area had reportedly been asked by the army headquarters in Dhaka to supply rations and ‘other necessities’ to the Sikhs reporting to the Chittagong Camp. . . . ”⁷

The report further tried to correlate Dhaka and Islamabad in a bid to interfere in the internal affairs of India by training the Sikh militants. The paper clearly mentioned that “these Sikh militants were regularly being taken to Pakistan after preliminary screening to be trained for infiltration into India.”⁸

Indo-Bangladesh Joint Expert Committee (JEC)

The Joint Expert Committee on river water dispute was formed in November 1985 when a two year Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed between President Ershad and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. The JEC was originally asked to submit its report before the SAARC summit to be held in Bangalore in November 1986.

During the one-year stipulated time the Committee met first time in New Delhi in January 1986 and later in April 1986 in Dhaka and lastly in July (2-4) 1986, just ten days before President Ershad's visit to India.

The matter was discussed during Ershad-Rajiv meeting and on the insistence of Bangladesh, India accepted the proposal to include Nepal in the water talks. The two governments also decided to extend the tenure of the Committee for another six months to complete the study. On the request of India and Bangladesh, Nepal agreed to participate in the talks "to promote joint endeavours to develop water resources for the benefit of all countries in the region."⁹

Indo-Bangladesh Ministerial Moot

A two-day ministerial meeting between the water resources ministers of both the countries was held in Dhaka (27-28) in August, and "decided to accord priority to the augmentation of Ganges waters and asked the Joint Committee of Experts (J.E.C.) to come out with concrete proposals before the SAARC summit in November."¹⁰ The ministers met to review the work of the J.E.C. in working out a long term scheme for the augmentation of the flow of Ganges available river water resources common to both the countries.

Indian Trade Exhibition and its Opposition

The Indo-Bangladesh Socio-Economic Commission organised a 10-day exclusive Indian Trade Fair at Dhaka, scheduled to be held from November 6. The major Dhaka newspapers and political parties started a campaign against India, alleging that "the Indian trade exhibition in Dhaka is aimed at increasing Indian dominance over Bangladesh."¹¹ The opposition to the trade fair was so strong that the Indian High Commissioner himself had to clear the position in a press conference and termed "ridiculous the allegations of a section of the local press and some political elements."¹²

The Indian trade fair witnessed a series of anti-India demonstrations organised by the leading political parties. The demonstrators

raised slogans urging Bangladeshis to boycott Indian goods and burned effigies of Indian Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi. At one stage the police had to use force to clear the fair ground of agitators.

The major Dhaka newspapers, Bangladesh Muslim League and Jatio Tabadi Party were among the main political forces which had been backing the demonstrations, while Bangladesh National Party and Awami League welcomed first ever Indian Trade Fair on Bangladeshi soil.

Tin Bigha Issue

Tin Bigha enclaves, a piece of land smaller than the size of a football ground, had been a major issue in Indo-Bangladesh relations since India and Bangladesh in the past signed two formal agreements (India-Mujib agreement 1972 and Indira-Ershad agreement 1982) and concluded five heads of state level talks, in which India always assured to take steps to hasten the transfer of the enclaves to Bangladesh.

During Ershad-Rajiv parlays in July, India again committed to handover, but only after the decision of the Calcutta high court. Under the above mentioned agreements Bangladesh, on the other hand, conceded those enclaves which she had committed to India. That is why General Ershad on his way back to home, in July, reported complaining that "we fulfilled our part of agreement long ago by giving Berubari to India. But India is yet to honour its commitment. This unhelpfull approach is condemned in Bangladesh."¹³

The Calcutta High Court on September 19, while announcing its decision on Tin Bigha asked the Union Government that "before implementing the Tin Bigha argeement with Bangladesh, it (Union Government) should amend the constitution suitably so that Berubari Union is not transfered to Bangladesh along with the other territories as contemplated by the ninth amendment of the constitution."¹⁴

At the time of the SAARC summit at Bangalore in November, the Indian Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi again assured President Ershad that "the process will be expedited to handover the corridor to Bangladesh."¹⁵ But it must be remembered that any constitutional amendment in India is subject to the two-third approval in the upper house of the Indian Parliament and the ruling Congress Party does not enjoy this mandate. So it is only a lip service to Bangladesh unless Rajya Sabha approves that amendment and facilitates the handing over of Tin Bigha on perpetual lease to Bangladesh.

INDO-SRI LANKA

During the second half of the year 1986, both Indian and Sri Lanka in their bilateral relations concentrated their efforts to find out any viable solution to the ethnic problem in Sri Lanka. The traffic of diplomats, telephonic conversations, exchange of higher level messages, both confidential and open, and allegations and appraisals—increased from both sides of the Palk Strait. The situation at the beginning of this period was at such a boiling point that not only the aggrieved ethnic communities, the mediating governments and the negotiating groups and their representatives but also the media on both sides reached a highly charged point. The Indian newspapers started leading the news items about Sri Lanka like *India must define its role in Sri Lanka Peace Talks*, *Jayewardene's Real Face*, *Back to Jaw-Jaw in Sri Lanka*; the Sri Lankan media on the other hand, while fighting on two fronts—in Sri Lanka with Tamils and outside with India—obviously charged more than its Indian counterpart, exhibited a more sharper tone for its leads like; *Show your Guts Mr. Gandhi*, *Flaws in India's Mediator Role in Sri Lanka*, *the Overzealous Mr. Gandhi*, etc., etc.

The crux behind this animosity-like situation was that in June last, when the Sri Lankan government was severely cornered by India and the Tamil militants during the process of negotiations under the mediatory role of India, it decided to find a military solution of the ethnic crisis. India reacted sharply and sent a strongly worded

message that "if it persists with its strategy of finding a military solution . . . Sri Lanka will run the risk of an indefinite postponement of resumption of negotiations with the leaders of Tamil militant groups."¹⁶

Mr. S. Thondaman's visit to New Delhi

After Mr. Jayewardene's peace package had been submitted to India, followed by clarifications sought by the Indian government, and its persuasion to the TULF leaders in Madras to participate in political parties conference (PPC) in Colombo on July 15, which proved abortive. Colombo sent Mr. S. Thondaman, Minister for Rural Industries Development, to urge New Delhi to step up its efforts to secure a settlement on the issue.

In his efforts to convince New Delhi to expedite the process along with other concerned officials he met Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, the Chairman of the Policy Advisory Committee, Mr. P. Parthasarthy, the External Affairs Minister, Mr. P. Shiv Shankar and the Minister of State for External Affairs, Mr. K.R. Narayanan.¹⁷

Following the talks between the Indian Government and five major Tamil militants groups in Madras on August 21. Mr. Dixit visited President Jayewardene on August 22 in Colombo and gave his assurance that the Tamil militants would not jeopardise the current round of talks between *TULF and the Sri Lankan Government*.¹⁸

Amidst these mediation efforts by the Indian government and bilateral negotiations between TULF and the Sri Lankan government, another round of allegations, counter-allegations, clarifications and assurances started at Harare, capital of Zimbabwe, at the time of NAM Summit. Mr. Rajiv Gandhi "castigated the Sri Lankan government for lacking political guts, killing the civilians and releasing the confidential letters,"¹⁹ and resolved that India is not too eager to continue its mediatory role if Sri Lanka is not keen to resolve the Island's ethnic issue. Indian Government also sought an

assurance of Sri Lanka's continued commitment to find a negotiated settlement to the ethnic problem in the wake of the controversy that surfaced in Harare. Mr. R. Premadasa, Sri Lankan Prime Minister, instead of getting agitated over Mr. Rajiv Gandhi's remarks said that what-ever were the reasons for Mr. Gandhi's remarks he was confident that Sri Lanka would continue to receive the Indian assistance in resolving the issue.²⁰ He reiterated his well-known position on the role of Tamil Terrorism based in Tamil Nadu : he said, "to be deaf to the threat of the terrorists living and operating from Tamil Nadu soil would endanger the government's current peace efforts ; so what is wrong in explaining that fact to the Indian Premier.?"²¹

The approach adopted by Sri Lanka shows a realism and a sense of seriousness to find a solution to the long festering ethnic issue which she acknowledged the compelling necessity of the future role of India.

Colombo's Draft

After the second round of talks between Sri Lankan Government and TULF, Colombo despatched a written draft to New Delhi and TULF leaders, pointing out differences that still remain to be resolved.

The document spelt out the details of the procedures for "electing the provincial councils, appointing governors and calling upon the leaders of the majority parties to form governments, judicial and executive powers of the provinces in respect of law and order, land settlement, division of revenue taxation and other subjects.²² The above mentioned proposals, based "largely on the division of powers prevailing in India, but subject to the over-riding provision of the Sri Lankan constitution."²³

Bangalore Summit and After

At the time of Bangalore SAARC summit Mr. Gandhi and President Jayewardene hold four rounds of special talks to further

the negotiation process on the ethnic issue. Mr. Gandhi emphasised on the Tamil demand of linking Tamil speaking areas of Northern and Eastern Provinces as their legitimate political aspirations.²⁴ While Mr. Jayewardene did not give his positive yes due to the "Practical difficulties involved, as these areas were not contiguous."²⁵ Both the leaders as a whole broadly identified the parameters within which a political solution to the ethnic problem might be found. *The Hindu* on November 20 reported that the plan agreed upon at Bangalore envisaged the division of the Eastern Province into three regions Following the division a government appointed boundary commission would consider the possibility of a merger between the Northern Province and the Tamil dominated areas of Eastern Province. On November 17 the LTTE issued a statement reiterating their position that the Northern and Eastern Provinces as a whole were indivisible.²⁶

Another round of Indo-Sri Lanka talks, concluded in Colombo on November 25, failed to bridge the gap over the Indian mooted idea of either merging or linking the proposed Tamil provinces, to which Sri Lanka proposed to split the Eastern province into three to provide for a Tamil province in the Batticaloa district, a predominantly Tamil area.

The year 1986 ended with intensive behind-the-scene efforts to encourage talks between the government of Sri Lanka and the Tamil militants. The militants' demand for the merger of the Northern and Eastern provinces and recognition of their homeland has remained an issue. India's mediatory efforts have met with little success.

INDO-NEPAL

The discriminatory spin-off of the Indo-Nepalese Treaty of 1950, trade imbalances, transit rights, water resources, India's persistent reluctance to endorse Nepal's Zone of Peace Proposal, the potentially contentious ethnic question, the growing importance of the Terai region, and growing Sino-Nepalese relations, had been and at present are main irritants in Indo-Nepal relations.

President Zail Singh's Visit

In this situation of uneasiness and split of perceptions on a host of issues, President Zail Singh of India paid a five-day visit to Nepal in mid-July. King Birendra of Nepal made no hesitation and frankly communicated, in the banquet speech, his country's grievances with India on "critical balance of payment position,"²⁷ and India's reluctance to endorse "Nepal's Zone of Peace Proposal."²⁸

Difference in Perception

There exist some noted differences of perception on several matters of mutual interest between Nepal and India—the relationship between sovereignty and security, India's economic self-sufficiency and protectionism and Nepal's quest for its economic survival in the presence of limited market, meager resources, negligible industrial base Indian trade and transit restrictions and large scale smuggling of Indian goods. The exploitation and proper sharing of water resources is also of a vital interest for Nepal. In the context of Nepal's geo-political position and its opening to the world, Nepal's Zone of Peace Proposal has become the Prime objective of its Foreign Policy.

India on the other hand refused to review the Indo-Nepal Treaty of 1950 was reluctant to involve Nepal in the Ganges water sharing talks with Bangladesh, not ready to relax restrictions on transit and trade with other countries of South Asia and not paying any heed to the Zone of Peace Proposal.

Nepal's Zone of Peace Proposal

Nepal's Zone of Peace Proposal has become the prime objective of its foreign policy and has been made part of the Nepalese constitution under Article 19 (6) as of directive principle.²⁹ The proposal was first mentioned at the Non-aligned summit at Algiers in 1973 by King Birendra himself. Then in 1975, delivering the farewell address to the assembled dignitaries on the occasions of his coronation ceremony, King Birendra elaborated on his notion of peace and expressed his desire "to Institutionalize Peace," and proposed that his country be declared a Zone of Peace.³⁰ And till mid-1987,

seventy-seven states, including all the countries in South Asia, with the exception of India and Bhutan, and all the permanent members of the UN Security Council, except the Soviet Union, have endorsed the ZOP for Nepal.

India, on the other hand a dominant neighbour, continues to resist the endorsement of the ZOP which over the last decade has become Nepal's prime obsession. It is a sufficient pointer to the gradual erosion of mutual understanding. On the question of ZOP for Nepal the Indians have always tried to project that the operational force behind the move was the strong anti-India lobby active in Kathmandu that has long been manouvering Nepal away from the traditional friendly ties and a very clever step to terminate the special relationship and erode the residual security relation with India.

The authorities in New Delhi are also of the view that the special defence and security arrangements in the Indo-Nepal ties were a constant irritation in Sino-Nepalese relationship. After the Sino-Pak understanding in the sixties, Pakistan also developed its diplomatic links with Nepal and has nourished them carefully. This so-called triangularity has enabled Nepal to drive maximum capital out of its limited investment of cultivating China's goodwill. On the part of China, and Pakistan's support to the proposal they called it "most unqualified and unstinted" in the sense both were keen to weaken the special relations between India and Nepal.

Nepal, on the other hand, showed a firm obsession on the issue and never missed any opportunity to project its proposal of ZOP. During the period under review, Nepal demonstrated its long standing demand twice to the Indian leadership. First, at President Zail Singh's visit to Kathmandu and then at the NAM summit at Harare in October in the presence of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi.

SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS

Sumdorong Valley Intrusion

Sino-Indian relations have not improved or deteriorated too much from the past position. In mid-July a new irritant appeared

along the border when India accused the Chinese of intrusions into the Kemang Division of Arunachal Pradesh. This accusation lodged at the time when members of the Indian delegation were packing for a journey to Beijing for the seventh round of talks of the Sino-Indian border problem. The Chinese, on the other hand, rejected the Indian protest by confirming that "the alleged Sumdorong Chu valley on the eastern part of the Sino-Indian border, had always been Chinese territory and is located on Chinese side of the line of actual control and the Chinese frontier personnel did not at all cross the line of actual control by a single step."³¹

Seventh Round of Border Talks

The seventh round of talks on substantive issues between the officials of both countries was held in Beijing in (21-23) July unlike the sixth round, which was held in last November (9-11) in an optimistic atmosphere in the wake of a 'very friendly' meeting between Mr. Rajiv Gandhi and Mr. Zhao Ziyang in New York."³² The Sumdorong alleged intrusion, if it is a fact, has been performed by only 40 Chinese personnel, some of whom were in uniform, who entered in Arunachal Pradesh.

India strongly protested against the intrusion to the Chinese government on July 6, stressing that the offending Chinese personnel were south of the Mc Mohan line. On July 16, a spokesman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry said that the Chinese personnel in this region were north of the "line of actual control" in the eastern sector of the border region and hence were in Chinese territory.³³

The Indian authorities including "Defence and External Affairs Ministries" and the "Prime Minister himself called it a deep penetration within our (Indian) territory" which requires handling at the highest political level.³⁴

Meanwhile the leaders of six Tibetan Organisations in exile have urged the government of India not to hold the forthcoming seventh round of talks with China and refrain from entering into any agreement on the issue of Tibet border. They argued that historically

there never existed any common border between India and China before the occupation of Tibet by the Chinese.³⁵

No miracle was expected from the border talks in this atmosphere created by the Indian authorities. They always create this kind of fuss whenever they are going to the negotiation table with any neighbour. The talks ended in Beijing on July 23 without substantial progress with a note that both sides agreed to hold talks in New Delhi in the near future.³⁶ Although the Indians were very much disappointed at the result of the dialogue but the Chinese Acting Premier, Wan Li, consoled the Indian team by saying that "it does not matter, if no agreement is reached this time, you can talk about it again next time you meet." Both the countries needed patience and perseverance to solve their only problem, the border dispute, and that both needed to live in peace and amity.³⁷

Chinese Claims on Arunachal Pradesh

As against New Delhi's claim on the Aksai Chin area Beijing has a long standing claim to 90,000 k.m. of territory along the eastern sector of Indian boundary.³⁸ Aksai Chin region (Arunachal Pradesh) annexed to China in 1950. India in October 1958 protested against Chinese sovereignty over this area. The Mc Mohan Line agreed upon between British India and KMT government in 1914 is another irritant on the Indo-China border. The Chinese claim on Sino-Indian border has repeatedly been confirmed by the Soviet Union during the last 17 years. The Great Soviet Encyclopaedia, May 1970, showed "entire Aksai Chin and NEFA as Chinese territory."³⁹ Again in 1979, MIRA (Soviet World Atlas) confirmed Aksai Chin as a part of China.⁴⁰ The 1984 Soviet maps mentioned the names of Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh as part of China exactly as per Chinese claims as well as their maps,⁴¹ but the 1985 Soviet Atlas not only confirmed "Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh but some areas of Jammu and Kashmir as Chinese claims and the boundary at this point was shown in a dotted line to indicate its disputed character."⁴²

Statehood for Arunachal Pradesh

Despite the disputed character of Arunachal Pradesh and the alleged Chinese military installations in the state, Rajiv Gandhi, for obscure reasons and against the advice of the Foreign Ministry, asked the Parliament late in 1986 to designate the northeastern border territory of Arunachal Pradesh as a full fledged Indian state.⁴³ Both the houses of Parliament passed a bill on December 8 and 9 after amending the constitution, by granting statehood to Arunachal, making it the 24th state of the country.⁴⁴ Supporting the bill in the Parliament Mr. Rajiv Gandhi called for an extra care on the debate on this bill because of the location of the state and the border issue with China.⁴⁵

On the confederation of statehood to Arunachal Pradesh the Chinese reacted sharply on December 11, describing the legislation as an attempt "to legalize an act of illegal occupation" and warned that the consequences of this might be serious." The statement described that the act of Indian government seriously violated China's territorial integrity and sovereignty and had deeply hurt the feelings of the Chinese people."⁴⁶

INDO-PAKISTAN

During the period under review a general stalemate continued in Indo-Pakistan relations. Rajiv Gandhi's proposed historic visit to Pakistan was formally put-off and meeting of the two sub-commissions of the joint ministerial commission and formal signing of an agreement for the opening of one more land border (Munabao-Khokrapar) was delayed. During November-December, we see again the war of words, and a heavy deployment of army on both sides of the border under the pretext of routine exercises. The only positive development in July had been the signing of an accord between the Director General of Indian Council of Agricultural Research and the Chairman of the Pakistan Agriculture Council. Again in December two abortive but ice-breaking initiatives to resume dialogue at Home Secretary and Foreign Secretary level, were taken by both the countries.

during his meeting with his Indian counterpart, also conveyed his country's concern on the heavy deployment of Indian troops along the Pakistani borders. Mr. Junejo also suggested the appointment of observers. Mr. Gandhi categorically turned it down saying "there is no tension on the borders and there is a direct hotline between the two countries" Director Military Operations in each GHQ and they communicated between each other in this regard", and "we cannot have any observers" as these exercises and troop movements are "for our own purposes and practices."⁴⁹

December Meetings

In pursuance of the decision reached between the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan, the two-day talks between the Pakistan Interior Secretary, Mr. S. K. Mahmood and the Indian Home Secretary, Mr. C. G. Somiah, concluded in Lahore, and it was decided to constitute a committee to reformulate the ground rules to combat narcotic trafficking, smuggling and terrorism. The 10-member committee will consist of one member from each country's Narcotic Control Board, Revenue, intelligence, Ministry of Finance Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Border Security Forces. The Committee will meet periodically in order to evolve a common strategy to undertake concerted action to counter the activities of drug traffickers and smugglers operating from either side of the land border.

In the next week two-day (27-29 December) formal talks between the delegations of Pakistan and Indian led by their Foreign Secretaries concluded in Islamabad. There has been no spectacular outcome of the Sattar-Venkateswaran talks. The immediate trust of their parleys was to break the ice and put the interrupted dialogue on a plethora of problems. The important outcome of this meeting had been that both sides again opted to talk rather than indulge in the cold war rhetoric and reduced the recent anxiety created by the curious military exercises by the Indian armed forces close to Pakistan's border.

INDO-SOVIET RELATIONS

Neither Mr. Nehru nor Mrs. Indira Gandhi was able to establish so much empathetic relationship with Moscow as Mr. Rajiv Gandhi. The Soviet Supremo Michail S. Gorbachov's four-day (25-28 November) visit to India in this respect was a major landmark in the history of Indo-Soviet bilateral relations. The visit should be viewed in the background of the failure of Reykjavik summit between Gorbachov and Reagan and against the backdrop of the Reagan administration's decision to provide sophisticated weaponry to Pakistan. The Delhi Declaration issued at the end of this visit outlining the principles for a nuclear weapon-free and non-violent world⁵⁰ was also not the outcome of three-day consultations but the result of a series of high level visits between New Delhi and Moscow prior to Mr. Gorbachov's arrival at New Delhi.

The real significance of this visit lies in the fact that India "legitimised the Soviet role in building a non-military security system for Asia--Pacific region recognized "USSR as an Asian power"⁵¹ and endorsed the Soviet position on arms control and disarmament and her opposition to the American Star Wars Programme. The Soviet leader in response gave Rajiv Gandhi the status of the leader of a world power"⁵² and reminded Pakistan of the consequences of a similar high level consultations in New Delhi in 1971 and gave Pakistan a clear message that "India could call upon the awesome resources of its time tested friend in the event of a challenge to its frontiers and independence."⁵³ This sudden status recognition of each other, changed a somewhat hesitant and different relationship into an aggressive new partnership that could have far reaching consequences for the region of South Asia as well as the international diplomacy.

Indo-Soviet Treaty

The Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation signed on August 9, 1971, provided a bombshell in the geo-politics in South Asia. Article 9 of the treaty specified the future framework

of Indo-Soviet Security interest in the region and stated that "either party subjected to an attack or threat thereof, the high contracting parties shall immediately enter into mutual consultations in order to remove such threat and take appropriate and effective measures to ensure peace and security of their countries."⁵⁴ The 1971 Indo-Pakistan conflict was the first test of the treaty and Soviet Union stood by it.

The strategic importance of this accord is an evident fact that Soviet Union has gone out of the way to assure India of its support by offering some of the latest weapons system even before these have been supplied to Warsaw Pact States, has favoured progressive indigenisation of most sophisticated equipment, and assisting in Indian Space Programme for launching setellites, exploration of upper layers of atmosphere, meteorological rockets and cosmic rays research. The 1984 Indo-Soviet Space mission proved to be the highest level of defence collaboration.

Now after 15 years of signing the treaty and a collaboration in all aspects of defence and security arrangements when Soviet leader Mr. Gorbachov needed a reassurance for the Soviet commitment for the treaty it means something more than that. Reaffirming Soviet commitment to India's security under the treaty, Mr. Gorbachov, on November 28, to the Indian Parliament, explained that the supreme meaning of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, friendship and cooperation, lies in a reciprocal commitment to act, should a complicated situation arise for one or both, such situation did arise. Both the Soviet Union and India have remained faithful to their commitments."⁵⁵ Assuring for the future course of action with the security of India, Mr. Gorbachov catagorically stated that they will not "stand idle by in case of any threat to India's unity and integrity," adding we shall not take a single step in our foreign policy that could damage India's real interest." The treaty was previously perceived by Moscow as the foundation of the Indo-Soviet relationship and India as the contribution to peace and stability in Asia and the world, but the recent visit gave the treaty a new meaning as "building security environment

in South Asia," a clear signal to Pakistan that India could call upon Soviet Union in the event of any challenge to its security.⁵⁶

Agreements Signed

At the time of this visit three major economic, technical and cultural agreements were signed.

The Economic protocol contains a comprehensive package of 1.5 billion Roubles (about Rs. 1900 crores) credit for :

1. Construction of Tehri Hydro Power Complex in Utter Pradesh with a capacity of 2400 MW ;
2. Soviet Union help to construct and modernize converter shops and hot rolling mills at Bokaro Steel Plant ;
3. Undertaking intensive and integrated onshore explorations for hydrocarbons in West Bengal ;
4. An agreement reached on major increases in trade and on high technology and research ventures.
5. Agreed to organise a festival of India in USSR and festival of Russia in India during the next year.

According to the cultural protocol, India will open a Consulate-General in Tashkent and Nakhodka in addition to the one now functioning in Odessa in the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union Consulate-Generals in Bombay, Calcutta and Madras.

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Book Reviews

**Dr. Mohammad Yunus, *Reflections on China*,
Wajidali, Lahore, 1986, pp. 323, Price Rs. 175.**

Reflections on China by Dr. Mohammad Yunus is one of the latest books on China by a Pakistani. The author was an Ambassador in that country. Diplomats in other countries make it a point to write their memoirs, but in the case of Pakistan it is rather an exception. They often piece together a narrative of events in which they were involved. Dr. Yunus is an intellectual who had been watching developments in China with keen interest. He has given an account which is based on personal knowledge and in-depth research. His study of the Chinese attitude and politics provides profound insights and valuable information.

His 3 sojourns as an Ambassador to China during 1952 to 1953, 1962 to 1966 and 1978 to 1982 were rare opportunities which he used to check the accuracy of statements on men and matters given in the narrative. He also gave chapters and verse of what he said. In this book the Chinese fear of American invasion has been accurately described. This could not materialise as China frustrated the American intentions by exposing her strategy. His claim is valid that he witnessed the great declaration made by Chu en Li in 1964 when China declared that its forces would not be sent to other states for purpose of fighting their battles. He enumerates a number of vital policy pronouncements made by the Chinese leaders during the period when he was Ambassador of Pakistan in China.

Since World War II, the most vital trends in the world politics have been discussed. The mounting tensions between China and Russia and the reduction of animosity between America and China have been vividly reported in this study.

In the first part, the discussion is devoted to the Revolution in China and the circumstances which caused this. In the second part of the book the Chinese international affairs are discussed. A number of disputes with neighbouring states which owe their origin to geographical realities have been also described. The value of the book is that the latest developments are recorded.

The third part has been devoted to some of the important internal and external aspects of the Chinese World policy, regional securities issues and the global issues of strategies. Whether the world is moving towards III World War is a vital issue that has been given full attention.

Reflections on China is a well documented study. The author had the benefit of being placed at a high diplomatic level and enjoyed the facilities to scan vast material for advancing arguments more convincingly.

Chapter VIII is devoted to *Hindi Cheeni Bhai Bhai* (Indian and Chinese are brothers). It is a vital subject as far as Pakistan is concerned. It indicates how the Indians tried to march over China in 1962 and misjudged the Chinese will.

China and Pakistan are friends in adversity. This is the subject matter of Chapter IX. This indicates how Pakistan built slowly relationship with China on firm principles. On many policy issues both countries shared community of outlook. The Chinese friendship with Pakistan was looked down upon by the Americans. This happens to be one of the biggest achievements of Pakistan that America altered its policy towards China. China and America are no longer at daggers drawn.

The book brings out a picture of China which is far different from that America had thought of soon after the revolution in China in 1949. China, in the opinion of Dr. Yunus, is a peaceful country and had contributed immensely to maintaining peace in the world.

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Shahid Javed Burki, *Pakistan : A Nation in the Making*,
Boulder and London, Oxford University Press,
Pakistan, 1986, pp. 226, Rs. 250.00.

Mr. Shahid Javed Burki, former Economic Adviser of Pakistan, Ministry of Commerce, taught at Harvard University and since 1974 has been with the World Bank, most recently as Director, International Relations Problems. Due to immense financial dependence of Pakistan upon the World Bank, Mr. Shahid Javed Burki is well informed about her economic problems.

In his recent book, *Pakistan : A Nation in the Making*, he has surveyed not only Pakistan's economic problems but political and foreign policy as well. He has dealt with the freedom movement period in detail in the 1st chapter of the book. He points out religion as the fundamental cause of Pakistan's creation. About 80 countries have obtained independence in the years following World War II, but only one other, the state of Israil, the creation for Jews of the diaspora—was established for religious reasons.

But Islam, in the opinion of Mr. Burki, failed to keep Pakistan integrated and the Eastern wing was subsequently separated to form independent Bangladesh. Since that time Pakistan has not stabilised politically and unstable frontiers pose an additional problem to aggravate the situation. This is one of the several reasons for which *A Nation in the Pakistan* has been given a sub-title to the book. Since 1947 the country has tried about half a dozen different political systems and four formal constitutions, promulgated in 1946, 1956, 1962 and 1973 respectively. The political crisis following the death of Quaid-e-Azam and misdeeds of Ghulam Mohammad and General Sikander Mirza have been discussed in Chapter II.

The regime of General Mohammad Ayub Khan, the introduction of presidential form of Government, the general elections of 1964 and Ayub's easy victory over Miss Fatima Jinnah and his subsequent exit have also been exhaustively discussed. The fundamental differences of opinion between Awami League and the Pakistan Peoples Party over the political structure brought two parties at

logger heads. The differences could not be resolved and the political situation deteriorated rapidly by March 1971. Only three months after the elections East Pakistan was prepared to secede from Pakistan. After the prolonged bitter war, Pakistani troops surrendered to the Indian army and Bengali separatists, called Mukti Bahini and Bangladesh, the erstwhile East Pakistan, emerged as an independence state.

As a consequence of defeat in East Pakistan, General Yahya Khan had to quit political power in West Pakistan and on December 1971, Mr. Z. A. Bhutto was sworn in as President and Chief Martial Law Administrator. It took Bhutto 22 months to produce the country's 3rd constitution which was introduced on August 14, 1973. That constitution was unlike the constitution of 1962, but it was like that of 1956. It was parliamentary in form, having bicameral legislature. The first election was held under the new constitution four years later on March 7, 1977. Mr. Bhutto and his Pakistan Peoples Party managed to get a land-slide victory, but the opposition cried foul play and launched a street movement against the Government. Consequently, the Army succeeded in controlling the agitation. Bhutto was removed from the office on July 5, 1977 and General Zia-ul-Haq stepped in.

General Zia-ul-Haq suspended the constitution but did not immediately assume the office of presidency. He was given a semblance of legitimacy when the Supreme Court justified the declaration of Martial Law due to extra-ordinary political developments following the 1977 elections. After six years of rule, on the eve of Pakistan's 36th birthday, General Zia announced the intention of his government to return the country once again to civilian rule according to an amended version of the 1973 constitution. The amendments were designed to achieve two objectives : to Islamise the political system and to find in that system a permanent and legitimate role for the armed forces. Chapter II tells the story of these developments.

In Chapter III, interaction between politics and economy, structural changes that have occurred in the economy since 1947, economic problems confronting Pakistan and policies that have been adopted

by the Government of General Zia within the frame-work of 6th Five-Year Plan (1983-1988) have been discussed at length. Mr. Burki maintains that Pakistan continues to be ranked among poor countries because successive governments have failed to follow a consistent set of policies for developing the country's remarkable economic potential.

According to his view, manufacturing was a politically favoured sector. It received a great deal of government attention and large amount of resources. Consequently industries developed but agriculture, the largest sector of economy, was neglected. Ayub Khan followed different objectives; agricultural output increased at the rate not common in the Third World countries. The rate of growth of GDP, nearly 7 per cent per annum, was among the highest in the world. In Bhutto era the economy was drastically restructured; industries and banks were nationalised, government also increased its presence in the sectors of Health and Education. Mr. Burki contends that the economy lost the momentum, it had picked up during the days of Ayub Khan. General Zia adopted Ayub's model of management and the economy has returned to the growth path it had followed in the 1960's.

Chapter IV deals with the problems of low level of social developments in Pakistan. Very low levels of literacy and high rates of fertility are regarded as a big hindrance in the rapid economic growth in future.

Chapter V reveals the nature of problematic frontiers which uneasy relations with most of the neighbours, e.g., Afghanistan and Russia to the north and India to the North East. Relations with Iran remained cordial until Aayat-Ullah Khumini came to power, but afterwards uncertainty prevailed as the leaders in Pakistan found their South-western neighbour somewhat unpredictable. Relations with the United States, Third World and Muslim countries have also been discussed in detail. A short concluding chapter assesses Pakistan's future prospects in all fields discussed in this book. Mr. Shahid Javed Burki thinks that the challenges facing the country are enormous; so, too, is its potential. Only time will tell whether

Pakistan will realise her potential or be overwhelmed by its problems.

The Author has rendered a great service by pinpointing its Pakistan's economic problems and making suggestions for possible solutions of these problems. Particularly, the economic challenges have been analysed in a most appropriate manner. Other than that, it is an average narrative which tells Pakistanis and other nations of the world about political, social and economic vicissitude confronted by Pakistan. Mr. Burki is very optimistic about the future of Pakistan and hopes she will progress by leaps and bounds.

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Dr. Atiur Rehman, *Political Economy of SAARC*,
The University Press Ltd., Motijheel Dhaka-2,
December 1985, pp. 99, Price. Rs. 50.

Dr. Atiur Rehman has written a brief and valuable account of the political economy of the SAARC countries. The author, who is presently contributing to a research institute in Bangladesh, has endeavoured to do justice to the subject by dividing the 99-page book into six chapters. Chapter I reveals the factors which establish the rationale for South Asian cooperation. Chapter II focuses on certain conditions which are usually thought to be meaningful for regional cooperation. The remaining chapters deal with the relations between South Asian states, especially in the context of Bangladesh.

The idea of SAARC was floated by the late President Zia-ur-Rehman of Bangladesh in May 1986. On his pursuation the summit was held at Dhaka on December 7—8, 1985, to explore possibilities of establishing a framework for regional cooperation amongst the member countries. The name of SAARC bears and demands a very close association of the members for a solid regional cooperation. Since its beginning, regular summits of SAARC have taken place besides meetings of ministerial level committees formed to look for the areas of interest.

The meeting of South Asian countries at the summit level informally decided that the heads of state and government of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation would meet once every year. In the summit meeting a draft charter was further amended to provide that the council of ministers comprising Foreign Ministers of the member countries would meet twice a year. The standing committee of the foreign secretaries would meet as and when necessary. SAARC had bright future to serve the need of one billion peoples of the region and was capable of ensuring them an improved quality of life by the attainment of its objectives.

Several world leaders have welcomed the launching of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). The SAARC is a regional organisation like other organisations already operating in the other parts of the globe viz ASEAN, R.C.D., O.A.U., E.E.C., etc.

SAARC has been moving forward gradually. It has made considerable progress and has established a number of expert groups to study the scope of regional cooperation in various fields, including agriculture, health and population activities, meteorology, postal services, arts and culture, telecommunications and transport. Some solid proposals for regional cooperation are already emerging. It is hoped that SAARC will make more rapid progress in future.

The idea of South Asian regional cooperation was first conceived by a small group of scholars from various countries of the region who decided to establish a non-government organisation, namely,

Committee on Studies on Cooperation in Development in South Asia (CSCD) with the Marga Institute of Colombo. CSCD has undertaken a large number of studies which have made a valuable contribution to an understanding of the problems of South Asian Regional Cooperation. CSCD can play an important role in promoting regional cooperation.

While talking of SAARC it should be kept in mind that barriers, both historical and emotional, shall have to be scaled and lingering suspicions and distrust shall have to yield place to a renewed spirit of understanding and goodwill. This aspect shall serve as a key to success for this newly born organisation. There are very bright chances for SAARC to flourish and gain strength, provided the 'Authorities to decide' bury their differences and work with zeal, honesty and affection to bring prosperity and peace in the region, which would be a great milestone in history.

The author has also touched upon the background events which took place in the region in connection with inter-state relations, the events like Sino-Indian conflicts, Indo-Pak wars, the Sri Lanka-Tamil problem, the case of smaller states like Nepal, Bhutan and Maldives particularly in their relations with India. The author is of the opinion that 'India' being centrally located and mainly because of its size and resources is the source of power and authority, thus underestimating the will of other autonomous states to deal with each other on equal footings.

Dr. Atiur Rehman has analysed the prospects and possibilities of SAARC nations working together for improving the living standard of a common man. The author has very rightly given credit to the pioneer of SAARC, General Zia-ur-Rehman, for initiating such a useful regional organisation. On visualising and analysing the various good and bad aspects of other regional and international groups like SEATO, CENTO, RCD and ASEAN the author is of the opinion that SAARC countries must sit together and mutually decide as to how best they can make use of their own resources and thus make their states politically and economically strong enough to stand on

their own feet.

The author has authenticated the book by giving figures in the shape of 'Tables' on trade, economy, imports and exports amongst the SAARC countries. The author has in his own way suggested beneficial ways of improvement in different areas of cooperation. The sooner these steps are taken the better fruits it would bring for the inhabitants of this region which was once known as the 'Least Developing Countries'. The areas which have been highlighted are telecommunications, meteorology, transport, shipping, tourism, agriculture, rural sector, joint ventures, market promotion of selected commodities, scientific and technological cooperation. Educational and technical cooperation and of course the last but not the least cultural cooperation. The structure and suggested shape of the organisation has also been chalked out in a very comprehensive way.

To conclude, this useful book throws ample light on the political economy of the SAARC countries. The author has really taken pains to write such a useful book which can serve as an excellent guide for the policy makers. Though it is brief yet the book possesses commendable information to write a book of this standard. This is a very valuable addition to the limited stock of literature on SAARC. The author has written very practicable suggestions for the healthy upcoming of this regional association.

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Statements

REPORT OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE

SIXTH SESSION

Dhaka, 11 August 1986

INTRODUCTION

At the invitation of the Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh the Standing Committee held its 6th Session in Dhaka on 11th August, 1986 preparatory to the first session of SAARC Council of Ministers. The meeting was presided over by Mr. Fakhruddin Ahmed, Foreign Secretary and leader of the Bangladesh Delegation.

Review of Progress of Implementation of the Integrated Programme of Action

The Committee reviewed the progress achieved in implementation of the Integrated Programme of Action (IPA) since its 5th Session held in Dhaka on 5th December 1985.

Reviewing performance in various sectors the meeting noted that while implementation in some sectors was satisfactory, progress in several others was lagging behind; activities were postponed or rescheduled due to inadequate response and non-participation in some cases. It was further noted that only one Technical Committee held its fourth meeting since the Fifth Session of the Standing Committee. The Standing Committee deliberated on the ways and means to streamline and accelerate the process of implementation. The meeting emphasized strict compliance of the operating procedures including time-limit for circulation of documents, strengthening of follow-up actions by national focal points, regular informal meetings

The Centre for South Asian Studies is grateful to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (Director SARC) for providing material on South Asian Regional Cooperation.

of the representatives of Member States, etc., established earlier by the Standing Committee. The Committee stressed the need for issuing clear directives to the concerned ministries and agencies of the respective governments to gear up implementation and called upon member governments to ensure effective participation in the activities under IPA.

The Committee reiterated that there should be a substantive shift of emphasis in the activities under the IPA in favour of more concrete and action-oriented projects and programmes and directed the Technical Committees to make concerted efforts to reflect such a shift while preparing the Calender of Activities for 1987.

Financial Arrangements

The Committee took note with appreciation of the contribution announced by Bangladesh, India, Nepal, and Pakistan for 1986-87. The contributions pledged for 1986-87 are as follows :

Bangladesh : Bangladesh Taka 7.5 million

India : Indian Rupees 12.5 million

Nepal : Nepalese Rupees 3.5 million

Pakistan : Pakistan Rupees 10 million plus Rupees 500,000/- for scholarships for 1986-87.

Maldives wished to announce its contribution at a later date. The Committee recalled that Bhutan had announced a contribution of Ngultrums 2 million for 1986-87 at its 5th Session.

The meeting urged other Member States to announce their contributions as early as possible.

With regard to proposals received from external agencies for collaboration with SAARC in various fields, the Committee agreed that such initiatives should stem from SAARC itself based upon its own determination of priorities keeping in mind the relevant provisions of the Charter.

With regard to the offer of UNICEF to assist in the convening of a SAARC Conference on South Asian Children the Committee

authorised India to host the Conference in New Delhi before the Second Summit.

Report of the Programming Committee

The Committee considered the Report of the Programming Committee contained in Conference document No. SAARC/SC. 6/4 and endorsed its recommendations with regard to the regional projects, inter-sectoral priority and the Calendar of Activities. The Committee approved the establishment of two regional projects as recommended by the Programming Committee, namely, the Regional Agricultural Information Centre and the Regional Meteorological Research Centre, to be hosted by Bangladesh and India respectively.

The meeting decided that the Programming Committee would undertake an evaluation of the short-term activities undertaken so far under the IPA.

Reports of other SAARC Meetings

With regard to the Reports of three other SAARC meetings held since the Dhaka Summit as contained in Documents No. SAARC/SC. 6/5 (i), SAARC/SC.6/5 (ii) and SAARC/SC.6/5 (iii) the Committee agreed as follows :

(i) International Economic Issues

The Committee noted with satisfaction the convening of Ministerial Meeting of SAARC Countries on International Economic Issues in Islamabad during 2—3 April 1986 and the Declaration adopted by the meeting. The Committee decided to transmit the same to the forthcoming Summit through the Council of Ministers. In this context the meeting stressed the need to adopt a concerted approach at the Harare Summit of non-aligned countries, UN General Assembly and other international and inter-governmental meetings to realise the common goals contained in the Declaration.

(ii) Women in Development

The meeting took note of the recommendations of the Shillong

Ministerial meeting on Women in Development held during 6—8 May 1986. It decided to recommend that a Technical Committee be set up with the Chairmanship of India for the initial terms. The Committee requested the Chairman of Technical Committees to give increasing emphasis on the participation of women in their respective work programme. The meeting approved the proposed initial programme of action and decided that this should form a part of a Consolidated Calender of Activities.

(iii) *The Study Group Meeting on Terrorism*

The Committee endorsed and adopted the recommendations contained in the report of the SAARC Study Group Meeting on Terrorism held in Dhaka during 12—14 June 1986 and recommended to the Council of Ministers the convening of an early meeting of a Group of Experts to report on measures of implementation, particularly to identify the offences which are to be regarded as terroristic and which, for purposes of extradition, are not to be regarded as political. The Group of Experts shall finalise their report for consideration at the next meeting of the Standing Committee and the Council of Ministers.

Proposal on SAARC Secretariat

The Committee had before it a Working Paper on the Establishment of the SAARC Secretariat by the Conference Secretariat and circulated in Document No. SAARC.6/6. Another Working Paper on Secretariat prepared by Sri Lanka contained in Conference Document No. SAARC/SC.6/6(i) was also circulated. The meeting held detailed discussions on different aspects connected with the establishment of Secretariat and decided to establish a Working Group on the Establishment of SAARC Secretariat in order to make appropriate recommendations on :

- (i) Functions of the Secretariat ;
- (ii) Organisation and Staffing of the Secretariat ;

- (iii) Funding arrangements ; and
- (iv) Draft Agreement on the Establishment of SAARC Secretariat.

The Working Group, meeting in Dhaka would complete its work by the middle of October 1986.

The meeting recommended that the Secretary General should be designated during the forth coming Summit.

The meeting recommended that the offer of His Majesty's Government of Nepal to host the Secretariat in Kathmandu be accepted. It was also agreed that the Host Country would provide necessary facilities for the Secretariat including accommodation, furnishing, utilities and other logistic support.

Provisional Agenda for the First Session of the Council of Ministers

The meeting had before it the draft provisional agenda for First Meeting of the Council of Ministers contained in Document No. SAARC/SC.6/7 and recommended the same for adoption to the Council of Ministers.

Vote of Thanks

The visiting delegates expressed their deep appreciation for guiding the work of the meeting to a successful conclusion. They also expressed their profound thanks to the Government and people of Bangladesh for making excellent arrangement for the meeting and for extending generous hospitality to them.

JOINT COMMUNIQUE ISSUED AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE FIRST SESSION OF SAARC COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

Dhaka 12—13 August, 1986

The SAARC Council of Ministers held its first session in Dhaka during 12—13 August 1986, at the invitation of the Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh. The meeting of the Council of

Ministers, under the Chairmanship of H. E. Mr. Humayun Rasheed Choudhury, the Foreign Minister and leader of Bangladesh delegation, was preceded by the first meeting of the Programming Committee and the sixth session of the Standing Committee held in Dhaka during 8—9 and 11 August 1986, respectively.

The meeting of the Council of Ministers was inaugurated by H. E. Lieutenant General Hussain Muhammad Ershad, President of the People's Republic of Bangladesh. The President in his inaugural address stressed that the foundations of SAARC have been laid and strengthened and it was only natural that SAARC should now enter into a new phase of cooperation, characterised by a determined approach to move progressively to concrete and action-oriented projects from which tangible benefits could accrue to the people of the region. The president mentioned that SAARC has to be a central theme and focus of our foreign policies. He also hoped that the First Meeting of the Council would provide useful inputs for the Bangalore Summit. The Council decided that the text of his address will form a part of conference documents.

On behalf of the Foreign Ministers, H. E. Mr. Shiv Shanker, the Minister for External Affairs of India thanked the President for his inspiring inaugural address.

The Council considered the Report of the Standing Committee. The Council commended the Standing Committee for its work and endorsed the report. The Ministry also appreciated the work of the Programming Committee.

The Council approved the Standing Committee's proposals to streamline and improve the implementation of the programmes under IPA. In this connection it urged member governments to ensure the effective participation of their respective agencies in activities under the IPA.

The Council emphasised the need for more concrete, action-oriented projects and programmes, and directed the Standing

Committee to ensure that this reflected in the Integrated Programme of Action.

The Council accepted the recommendation of the Standing Committee that a Regional Agricultural Information Centre and a Regional Meteorological Research Centre be established in Bangladesh and India respectively and directed the Standing Committee to pursue actively other regional projects now under consideration.

With regard to proposals from external agencies for collaboration with SAARC in various fields the Ministers reiterated that such initiatives should stem from SAARC itself based upon its own determination of priorities keeping in mind the relevant provisions of the Charter. The Council also endorsed the proposal to convene a SAARC Conference on South Asian Children in New Delhi in November 1986 with the assistance of the UNICEF.

The Council noted with satisfaction the convening of Ministerial Meeting of SAARC Member States on International Economic Issues in Islamabad during 2—3 April, 1986, and endorsed the Declaration adopted by the meeting. The Council decided to transmit the same to the Second SAARC Summit. In this context the Ministers decided to adopt a concerted approach at the Harare Summit of non-aligned countries, UN General Assembly and other international and inter-governmental meetings to realise the common goals contained in the Declaration.

The Council endorsed the recommendations of the Ministerial meeting on Women in Development held in Shillong, India during 6—8 May, 1986. The Ministers accepted the recommendation of the Standing Committee to establish a Technical Committee on Women in Development under the Chairmanship of India for the initial term and inclusion of the Programme of Action in the consolidated Calendar of Activities. The Council further directed the Standing Committee to ensure increasing emphasis on the participation of women in the work programme of various sectors.

The Council accepted the endorsement by the Standing Committee

of the recommendations of the Study Group on Terrorism and approved the convening of an early meeting of a Group of Experts to report on measures of implementation, particularly to identify the offences which are to be regarded as terroristic and which, for purposes of extradition, are not to be regarded as political. The Council noted that a Group of Experts shall finalise the report for consideration at the next meeting of the Standing Committee and the Council of Ministers. The Council also noted that the proposed meeting of the Study Group on Drug Trafficking and Drug Abuse, to be held in Dhaka has been scheduled for 16—18 September, 1986.

The Council endorsed the recommendations of the Standing Committee with regard to the establishment of SAARC Secretariat. It also approved the setting up of a Working Group to make appropriate recommendations on the staffing, funding, functions, and any other related matters.

Views were expressed that in keeping with the increasing importance attached to expanding and improving cooperation, areas like Education, Trade, Management of Disaster Relief, Establishment of Investment Companies focusing on agro-based and forest-based areas of activities, Improvement of Postal, Telecommunications and Air-Links, including special Tariff Rates should be gradually included in the IPS.

The Council decided to hold its second session in Bangalore, India immediately preceding the Second SAARC Summit.

On behalf of the Foreign Ministers of Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, H. E. Sahabzada Yaqub Khan, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan presented a vote of thanks and appreciation to the people and Government of Bangladesh for the meticulous arrangements made for the First Session of the Council of Ministers and for the gracious hospitality extended to the visiting delegates during their stay in the beautiful and historical city of Dhaka.

**SAARC STUDY GROUP MEETING ON
THE PROBLEM OF DRUG TRAFFICKING AND ABUSE
Dhaka, 17—18, September, 1986**

In pursuance of a decision taken by the Head of State or Government of SAARC Member States during their First Summit meeting held in Dhaka during 7—8 December, 1985, a Study Group meeting was held in Dhaka during 17—18 September, 1986 to examine the problem of drug trafficking and abuse, as it affects the region and to submit recommendations as to how best the Member States could cooperate among themselves to solve the problem.

The meeting was attended by delegates from Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Inaugurating the meeting, Mr. S.B. Chaudhuri, Secretary, Internal Resources Division, Ministry of Finance, and Chairman, National Board of Revenue, Government of Bangladesh emphasized the seriousness of the problem as it not only detracted from economic development of the countries but also contributed to the spread of crime, violence and corruption, disrupting the social structure of the community. He also under-scored the importance of cooperation and concerted action under the aegis of SAARC for prevention and complete elimination of drug trafficking and abuse in the region. The Study Group decided that the text of his address will constitute a part of the documentation of this meeting.

Mr. S. M. Akram, Member National Board of Revenue of Bangladesh and leader of the Bangladesh delegation was unanimously elected as Chairman of the meeting. The adoption of agenda was followed by general statements and discussions on the agenda items.

The meeting deplored the menace of drug trafficking and abuse and recognised that eradication of the problem was the collective responsibility of all States. It was recognised that cooperation at the international, regional and bilateral levels in this connection, was a vital necessity.

The meeting agreed that cooperation between Member States of SAARC would be essential for effective prevention, control and eventual elimination of illicit drug trafficking and abuse in South Asia, and made the following recommendations :

- (i) SAARC Member States should unequivocally condemn illicit drug trafficking as a crime against society, and deplore its pernicious effects.
- (ii) SAARC Member States should affirm that high priority be given to the fight against the illicit production, trafficking, abuse of, and demand for illicit drugs and other related offences. In this connection, the Member States of SAARC should promote cooperation among themselves as well as with other regional and multilateral organisation, specially with the United Nations and its specialised agencies. The SAARC countries should make efforts to coordinate their positions on these issues in various international fora.
- (iii) The Member States that have not yet done so, may seriously consider becoming parties to the UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 and the Protocol of 1972 amending the same convention and to the Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971. The Member States may also in the meantime make every possible efforts to comply with the provisions of these conventions.
- (iv) As part of their obligation to the UNGA resolution No. 40/122 of 13 December, 1985 the Member States should extend strong support to current high priority initiative and programmes of the United Nations, including the elaboration of a convention against illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances which considers in particular, those aspects of the problem not envisaged in existing international instruments.
- (v) Member States should extend active support to the proposed UN-sponsored International Conference on Drug Abuse and

Illicit Trafficking at the Ministerial level to be held in 1987 in Vienna as an expression of the political will of nations to combat the drug menace which is expected to generate universal action to combat the problem at the national, regional and international levels.

- (vi) Member States should increase awareness at both national and regional levels of the effects of the abuse of drugs. To this end coordinated efforts should be made for the dissemination of information through :
- organisation of regional training courses, seminars workshops and conferences on various aspects of the problem ;
 - mutual exchange of propaganda and publicity materials, Radio and Television programmes, related magazines and newspapers; and
 - production of publicity, propaganda materials and programmes for the region.
- (vii) Member States should exchange on a regular basis information on drug abuse and trafficking as well as experiences, methodologies and know-how on research and training for preventive education, treatment and rehabilitation. Member States should further ensure prompt exchange of intelligence which would facilitate effective action against drug trafficking.
- (viii) SAARC Member States should take appropriate measures at respective national levels to control effectively the production, distribution and consumption of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances with a view to limiting their supply and use exclusively to medical and scientific purposes. Efforts should be specially directed to eradication of the sources of raw materials for illicit drugs. In-depth studies at national and regional levels should be undertaken in this connection to ascertain, *inter alia*, the root causes of drug abuse on the one hand and exploring alternative ways of

livelihood for illicit producers of drugs on the other. Long-term measures should include comprehensive programme of socio-cultural and economic development. Programmes for integrated rural development should include appropriate change in farming practices including viable crop substitution measures, wherever necessary.

- (ix) Member States should take appropriate measures for updating and strengthening of drug related national laws, and as far as possible, harmonisation of their legislations pertaining to drug trafficking and abuse especially in respect of the definition of offences relating to illicit drug trafficking and penalties for such offences. Identification, confiscation and forfeiture of illegally acquired assets and denial of profits to drug traffickers should be seriously considered. Efforts should also be made to ensure expeditious disposal of drug related cases and to devise the most effective procedures of extradition.
- (x) Drug law enforcement agencies of SAARC Member States should individually and collectively cooperate and communicate more closely and promptly with inter-governmental agencies beyond the region such as the ICPO-INTERPOL and Customs Cooperation Council. Such cooperation could be linked with actions against related criminal activities.
- (xi) Measures for dealing with drug dependents including their treatment and rehabilitation should be strengthened at national level and concerted at regional level. Member States may consider, in this connection, setting up of a Regional Centre for Research and Training on Prevention, Treatment, Rehabilitation and Social Reintegration of drug dependents.
- (xii) Member States may consider establishing a Regional Laboratory with assistance from the UN Fund for Drug Abuse Control for analysing of seized drugs and for providing

training for officials in this field.

- (xiii) Member States should take appropriate action to improve communication and telecommunication for effective drug law enforcement as recommended by the two UN sponsored sub-regional meetings held in Sri Lanka in July and November, 1984.
- (xiv) To initiate early implementation of the above recommendations, a Regional Committee on Drug Abuse and Drug Trafficking be established to coordinate with identified focal points of Member States. The proposed Committee may meet at an early date to draw up a Programme of Action keeping in view the short and long term implications of the recommendations. The Committee may thereafter meet at regular intervals to monitor implementation of the above recommendations and to mutually exchange and update information on related matters.

SAARC EXPERT GROUP MEETING ON TERRORISM

Dhaka, 20—21 September, 1986

At the invitation of the Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh a SAARC Expert Group Meeting on Terrorism was held in Dhaka during 20—21 September, 1986 to report on measures of implementation of the recommendations of the Study Group Meeting on Terrorism held in Dhaka during 12—14 June, 1986. The meeting which was convened pursuant to a decision of the SAARC Council of Ministers taken during its first session held in the same venue during 12—13 August, 1986 was mandated particularly to identify offences which are to be regarded as terroristic and which for purposes of extradition, are not to be regarded as political.

The meeting was attended by delegates from Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. It was opened by Mr. S.A. Mahmood, Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh. The working sessions

began with the unanimous election of Mr. Abdul Hamid Choudhury, Joint Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh and leader of the Bangladesh delegation, as the Chairman. The adoption of the agenda was followed by discussion on the agenda items.

Recalling the resolutions of the Study Group Meeting on Terrorism as contained in document No. SAARC/SC. 6/5 (iii), the Expert Group deplored the growing menace of terrorism and reiterated that cooperation between SAARC Member States was vital if terrorism was to be prevented and eliminated from the region.

The meeting held detailed discussions on the recommendations of the Study Group meeting on Terrorism and as regards their implementation, agreed as follows :

Recommendation I

SAARC Member States should unequivocally condemn all acts, methods and practices of terrorism as criminal and deplore their impacts on life and property, socio-economic development, political stability, international peace and cooperation.

Measure : This recommendation calls for an unequivocal declaration and the Expert Group recommends that a formulation for a declaration at appropriate level might be along the following lines. "... unequivocally condemned all acts, methods and practices of terrorism as criminal, and deplored their impact on life and property, socio-economic development, political stability, regional and international peace and cooperation."

Recommendation II

SAARC Member States that have not yet done so, may consider becoming parties to the existing international conventions relating to various aspects of international terrorism in keeping with resolution 40/61 of the UNGA.

Measure : This recommendation is primarily a matter of national policy decision. The Group understood that most of the Member-States are already signatories to at least some of them. The Member-States may report to the Standing Committee on their respective position vis-a-vis the conventions.

Recommendation III

As a part of their obligation under the international law each SAARC Member-State should refrain, as per UNGA Resolution No. 2625 (XXV), from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another state or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed towards the commission of such acts, when they involve a threat or use of force.

Measure : Recognising the importance of the principles as laid down in the UNGA Resolution No. 2625 (XXV), the Expert Group was of the view that more time was needed to suggest specific measures for its implementation.

Recommendation IV

SAARC Member-States should call upon one another to take measures as may be appropriate at respective national level for the prevention and elimination of terrorism. Such measures may require independent and coordinated in-depth study of the root causes of prevailing instances of terrorism and harmonisation of domestic legislation relating to terrorism with each other and with existing international conventions.

Measure : This is a recommendation that involves implementation on a continual long-term basis. To begin with, the appropriate national departments/agencies/institutions may sponsor independent in-depth studies on the root causes and possible measures to combat and prevent terrorism and harmonisation

of domestic legislation relating to terrorism with each other and with existing international conventions.

Recommendation V

Member-States of SAARC should resolutely support and uphold recommendations of the UN Ad hoc Committee on International Terrorism as adopted by the UNGA resolution No. 34/145 of 17 December, 1979.

Measure : Recognising the importance of the principles contained in UNGA Resolution No. 34/145 of 17 December, 1979 the Group was of the view that more time was needed to suggest specific measures for its implementation.

Recommendation VI

Member-States may give consideration to the setting up of an appropriate mechanism for the identification of offences which may be regarded as terroristic and which for the purposes of extradition are not to be regarded as political.

Measure : There was an agreement on the importance of the identification of offences which may be regarded as terroristic and which for purposes of extradition are not to be regarded as political. However, after a preliminary consideration of a possible list of offences it was decided that due to its complex nature further time was required for the implementation of this recommendation.

Recommendation VII

Cooperation among concerned security agencies of Member-States could include exchange and sharing of intelligence relating to terrorism so as to prevent terrorist activities, through appropriate precautionary measures. The modalities of such cooperation can be worked out.

Recommendation VIII

Some mechanism may be considered for closer cooperation and coordination on the terrorist problem among Member-

States and also between SAARC States and other international agencies such as ICPO-INTERPOL, the UN CONGRESS on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders, etc. The modalities of such a mechanism could be worked out.

Recommendation IX

SAARC Member-States should cooperate by way of expertise. They could consult on how to improve existing protective measures against possible terrorist action. Training in the field of anti-terrorist techniques could be an area of cooperative activity. Training could also be imparted to concerned and selected personnel engaged in high-terrorist-risk occupation on how to handle crisis situations. Seminars and workshops could be held on negotiating tactics with terrorists in a crisis situation. Consultations could be held with a view to evolving a common policy on how to react to terrorist demands, the advantages and disadvantages of different positions, such as a firm and rigid no-concessions policy or a flexible approach could be discussed.

Measure : The Group agreed that respective national institutions/agencies may initiate implementation of recommendations No. VII, VIII and IX at their own levels. It was also recommended that to coordinate and monitor such implementation the Member Governments may consider establishing/identifying national focal points, which may meet at mutually agreeable venues and times to review the progress of implementation.

Recommendation X

SAARC Member-States should make persistent efforts so that the media exercises voluntary restraint in reporting on the act of terrorism. The focus should be on highlighting the immoral and criminal aspects of terrorism and in any case terrorists or terrorism should not be romanticised.

Measure : Keeping in mind the nature of the recommendation itself

the Group agreed that its implementation should be left to the respective Governments. It was suggested that the respective national departments/institutions may, to the extent possible, ensure compliance with the spirit of the recommendation.

The Expert Group was grateful to the Bangladesh delegation for its Working Paper on the basis of which the discussions took place, and for leading the proceedings to a successful conclusion. They also expressed their profound thanks to the Government and people of Bangladesh for making the excellent arrangements for the meeting and for extending warm hospitality to them.

**TEXT OF BANGALORE DECLARATION
SECOND SOUTH ASIAN ASSOCIATION
FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION SUMMIT
18, November 1986**

The President of Bangladesh the King of Bhutan, the Prime Minister of India, the President of Maldives, the King of Nepal, the Prime Minister of Pakistan and the President of Sri Lanka assembled at the Second SAARC Summit in Bangalore on 16 and 17 November 1986.

The heads of state or government reiterated their desire of promoting peace, stability, amity and progress in the region through strict adherence to the principles of the UN charter and non-alignment, particularly respect for the principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, national independence, non-use of force and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states and peaceful settlement of disputes.

The heads of state or government reaffirmed the will of their peoples and governments to work together in accordance with the SAARC charter to devise common policies and approaches for finding common solutions to the shared problems that all of them face. They

stressed that mutual trust, goodwill and understanding must animate their co-operative effort under the SAARC. Progress and prosperity in each country would redound to the benefit of others. This was what constituted the SAARC spirit.

The leaders reaffirmed that the principal goal of SAARC was to promote the welfare of the peoples of South Asia, to improve their quality of life, to accelerate economic growth, social programmes and cultural development in the region and to provide all individuals the opportunity to live in dignity and to realize their full potential.

The heads of state or government recalled that the countries of South Asia had been linked by age-old cultural, social and historical traditions. These had led to enriching interaction of ideas, values, culture and philosophies. These commonalities constituted solid foundations for regional cooperation for addressing more effectively the economic and social problems.

The heads of state or government recalled the SAARC was the most populous regional grouping in the world. The countries of the region had large, rich and varied human and natural resources. They expressed their determination to achieve the optimum utilization of these resources by intensifying their cooperation, bearing in mind the immense present and potential complementarities among their economies.

They recognized that this would require increasing exchange among their countries, on the basis of mutual benefit of ideas, experience and technology as well as of goods and services, which utilise and enhance the productive capacity of each of their countries and build their collective self-reliance.

They were convinced that the countries of South Asia which had been the cradle of human civilisation and culture could acting co-operatively and cohesively, once again play their due role in the comity of nations.

The heads of state or government reiterated the great importance of the increasing involvement of the people for ensuring the success of regional cooperation. They emphasized the need for promoting

greater contacts among the peoples of the region through such action as regular and frequent interchange of scholars, academicians, artists, authors, professionals and businessmen as well as facilitation of tourism.

The heads of state or government noted with satisfaction that considerable progress had been achieved in the implementation of the SAARC Integrated Programme of Action. They expressed their firm commitment to consolidate and streamline further the implementation of the IPA. They agreed that a progressive movement towards more concrete and action-oriented benefits from the SAARC to the peoples of the region.

The heads of state or government emphasized the importance of expanding cooperative endeavours under the SAARC. They welcomed the establishment of the technical committees on women in development, and on the prevention of the drug trafficking and drug abuse.

The heads of state or government welcomed the signing of the memorandum of understanding on the establishment of the SAARC Secretariat by the Council of Ministers and their decision to locate the Secretariat in Kathmandu and appoint ambassador Abul Ahsan of Bangladesh as the first Secretary General of SAARC. They were convinced that the establishment of the Secretariat would assist in the coordination of SAARC activities and more fruitful implementation of its programmes and projects.

The heads of state or government recognized that the meeting of the needs of all children was the principal means of human resources development. Children should therefore be given the highest priority in national planning. The heads of state or government underlined the importance of enhancing public consciousness and building a national political consensus on the rights to the children.

In this context they called for an early conclusion and adoption of the convention on the rights of the child. They subscribed to the goals of universal immunization by 1990, universal primary education, maternal and child nutrition, provision of safe drinking water and

adequate shelter before 2000. They also believed that it should be possible to ensure at the end of the century, that no child need die or be denied development, for reasons of material poverty in the family.

They directed the standing committee to undertake annual reviews of the situation of children in the SAARC countries, monitoring of programmes and exchange of experience.

The heads of state or government agreed that co-operation among the SAARC states was vital if terrorism was to be prevented and eliminated from the region. They unequivocally condemned all acts, methods and practices of terrorism as criminal and deplored their impact on life and property, socio-economic development, political stability, regional and international peace and cooperation.

They recognised the importance of the principles laid down in the UN Resolution 2625 which, among others, required that each state should refrain from organising, instigating, assisting or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in an other state or acquiescing in organised activities within its territory directed towards the commission of such acts.

The heads of state or government expressed thier concern at the crisis facing the UN system. They reiterated their deep commitment to the purposes and principles of the UN charter and thier support for and faith in it as the most important international forum for addressing issues of peace, disarmament and development and an essential instrument for bringing about justice and equity in international political and economic relations. They resolved to concert their efforts in all multilateral fora within the UN system to preserve and strengthen the organisation and to prevent erosion of its role, functions and principles.

The heads of state or government reiterated their deep commitment to the principles and objectives of the Non-Aligned Movement and underlined the historic role the movement had been playing in strengthening international peace ; promoting development, establishing equitable and just economic relations and strengthening

international cooperation in all fields.

The success of the Harare Summit of the non-aligned countries was yet another demonstration of the strength and unity of the movement and the increasing respect that it had come to command in the international community. They affirmed full support for the decisions adopted at the summit and called for their early implementation.

The leaders of the South Asian countries were convinced that an environment of peace, security and respect for international law was essential for their growth and stability. Unfortunately, this environment had become increasingly adverse for the pursuit of their cherished goals.

The international political scene was marred by strife and tension due to great power policies and practices of domination and intervention as well as the increased resort to the threat or use of force, aggression, occupation, pressure, economic coercion and interference in flagrant violation of the principles and purposes of the UN Charter. The arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, had escalated to a point where it jeopardizes the most fundamental of all human rights -- the right to live.

The heads of state or government noted with deep disappointment that the promise held out by the Reykjavik summit could not be realised. They, however, noted with satisfaction that the proposals made at the summit were still on the table. They expressed the earnest hope that the negotiations would be resumed without delay so that a decisive step could be taken towards realising the ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear weapons altogether. The heads of state or government called for the early conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty.

The heads of state or government were deeply concerned that the world economy continued to be in the throes of crisis, with particularly harsh and severe consequences for the economies and development prospects and aspirations of the developing countries. They

endorsed the declaration of the SAARC ministerial meeting on international economic issues held in Islamabad and its analysis of the exceptionally adverse external economic environment which retards the development of the South Asian and other developing countries.

These negative factors include : Depressed commodity prices, rising protectionism, global recession, lower export earnings, not outflow of financial resource from developing countries and an aggravated debt crisis.

The heads of state or government noted that the rates of growth in the developed countries had turned out to be much lower than what was earlier projected and that the projection for future growth in these countries were not all encouraging. They expressed their concern at the implications of these trends for the development prospects of the developing countries.

They welcomed the recent recognition by the developed countries that the chronic problems of massive payment imbalances, high interest rates, unstable exchange rate and high unemployment are structural in nature.

In view of global interdependence, the co-ordination of macro-economic policies, contemplated at the Tokyo summit of the seven major industrialized countries, cannot be effective in achieving sustained global economic growth unless it encompasses the developing countries.

The leaders urged that the recent retreat from multilateralism should be urgently reversed through a revival of the North-South dialogue which is responsive to the changed circumstances in the world economy. This must include a process of reform of monetary and financial system, through an international conference on money and finance for development, and urgent measures for preserving and strengthening the multilateral trading system.

In the search for revival of global growth, priority must be accorded to exploiting the vast potential for expanded production, consumption and trade which exists in the developing countries. In all

these endeavours, high priority should be accorded to supporting the development of the least developed countries, in particular, through the full and effective implementation of the substantial new programme of action for the least developed countries for the 1990s.

The heads of state or government noted with satisfaction that at the SAARC ministerial meeting on international economic issues a number of priority objectives of the SAARC countries have been identified. These include : enlarged concessional assistance, the doubling in three years of the financial flows for the development of developing countries, amelioration of official debts, trade liberalization, especially in textiles and agriculture, commodity price stabilisation, transfer of technology and special treatment for least developed SAARC countries.

The heads of state or government agreed that the SAARC members should closely and regularly consult and cooperate in relevant international economic conferences and institutions in order to promote the above mentioned objectives.

They recognized that an important opportunity in this context would be provided by UNCTAD VII.

The heads of state or government were of the view that the forthcoming new round of multilateral trade negotiations posed a challenge for their countries as well as an opportunity to accelerate their development through the expansion of their exports.

They underlined the importance of the effective implementation, with immediate effect and continuing until the formal completion of the negotiations, of the commitment to observe a standstill on protectionist measures and to roll these back under multilateral surveillance. They also expected that principles of transparency and differential and a more favourable treatment for the developing countries would be applied systematically and in concrete terms in the negotiation. They decided to concert their positions in these negotiations with a view to deriving maximum benefit from them in accordance with their national objectives and priorities.

The heads of state or government expressed their conviction that the Bangalore summit had helped in consolidating the gains of regional cooperation activities so far undertaken by SAARC while, at the same time, exploring new avenues and possibilities for such cooperation. The Bangalore summit had made a significant contribution to strengthening and streamlining the institutional basis for such cooperation.

The hands of state or government reiterated their determination and will to expand and strengthen their cooperation under SAARC. They underlined their belief that SAARC reflected a resurgence of the South Asian consciousness which had inspired the peoples of this region over several millenia.

The leaders expressed their deep conviction that South Asian Regional Cooperation would not only have a salutary effect on bilateral relations between the countries of the region, but also impart strength and stability to these relations.

The heads of state or government of Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka were deeply appreciative of the exemplary manner in which the Prime Minister of India discharged his responsibilities as chairman of the meeting.

They expressed their profound gratitude for the warm and gracious hospitality extended to them by the Government and people of India and for the excellent arrangements made for the meeting.

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Chronology of Important Events

SOUTH ASIAN REGION

July—December, 1986

BANGLADESH

- July 3* The new import and export policy for the country was announced for the fiscal year 1986-87 with an import target of Taka 5534 crore and Taka 3150 crore for exports.
- 4* The Indo-Bangladesh Joint Expert Committee on water, concluded its three day session without any result.
- 10* The session of the third Parliament of Bangladesh was inaugurated.
- 13* The Minister of State for Agriculture assured the Senate that rehabilitation of the displaced Biharis was under government's consideration.
- 16* President Hussain Mohammad Ershad concluded his three-day visit to India.
- 20* Nearly one thousand Bihari refugees demonstrated in Dhaka to press for their repatriation to Pakistan.
- Home Minister Major General (Retd.) Mohamudul Hasan declared in Parliament that no area of sovereign Bangladesh could be granted autonomy under the suspended Constitution.
- 26* President and Madam Gen. Mohammad Ershad of Bangladesh arrived in Islamabad on a three-day state visit.
- President Zia-ul-Haq of Pakistan and President Ershad of Bangladesh, in their banquet speeches, condemned foreign military intervention in Afghanistan.

The above Chronology has been prepared by Mr. Mohammad Sarwar, Senior Research Fellow of the Centre.

- July 26* Relief goods worth over Rs. 1.70 crore from Pakistan were handed over to the Bangladesh authorities in Dhaka.
- Pakistan and Bangladesh reached an agreement on a number of subjects for further promotion of bilateral relations between the two countries.
- 27 The Foreign Ministers of Bangladesh and Pakistan exchanged views on a number of bilateral, regional and international issues.
- In their meeting in Islamabad, Bangladesh's visiting Deputy Minister for Education, Zia-ud-Din Bablu and the Federal Education Minister, Nasim Ahmad Aheer, resolved to further enhance cooperation in the field of education.
- 28 President and Begum Ershad of Bangladesh left Islamabad after a three-day official visit to Pakistan.
- 29 Shaikh Hasina Wajid, chief of Awami League, criticised President Ershad for accepting Pakistan's highest national award during his state visit to Pakistan.
- 31 A committee headed by Maulana Zafar Ahmad Ansari was constituted to impress upon the President and Prime Minister, the need to pursue the case of repatriation and rehabilitation of the stranded Pakistanis in Bangladesh without any loss of time.
- August 1* Pakistan and Bangladesh signed three accords to augment bilateral trade.
- 2 Bangladesh and India wrote separately to Nepal to join Ganga water talks.
- 18 The military-backed Jatiyo Party bagged all the eight seats to the Parliament in a by-election contest and raised its strength to 208 in 330 seat house.
- 23 The Baluchistan Chief Minister and the Bangladesh Ambassador to Pakistan held talks on the release and repatriation of 290 Bangladeshi prisoners.
- 27 The President of Bangladesh appointed Major General M. Atiqur Rehman, Principal Staff Officer to the CMLA as the Chief of Army Staff and himself was to continue as the Commander-in-Chief of Bangladesh Armed Forces.

August 28 Bangladesh and Federal Republic of Germany signed an agreement for a project Aid grant of Taka 70 crore. The grant will be used for the third population and family health project over a period of five years, i.e., 1986-90.

Bangladesh and US signed an aid programme worth \$12 million for purchasing wheat through the PL-480 Programme.

- 29 The two-day Ministerial meeting between the Water Resources Minister Mr. R. Shankaran and his Bangladesh counterpart, Mr. Anisul Islam, decided to accord priority to Ganga water talks and asked the Joint Committee of experts to come out with concrete proposal before the SAARC Summit in November.

September 1 Denmark agreed to provide 245 million Danish Kroner (89.92 crore Taka) to Bangladesh during 1987, under an Agreement signed in Dhaka.

- 2 President Ershad formally took over the leadership of Jatiya Party as Chairman.
- 7 Awami League formally rejected the Presidential election schedule to take place on October 15.

The Seven-Party alliance under the leadership of Bangladesh National Party also rejected the Presidential election schedule and put forward its 10 points demands.

- 11 Bangladesh was to receive Taka 54.42 crore as British project grant to finance the bridging and institutional project.
- 14 Bangladesh entered the nuclear age with successful switching on of a 3-megawatt research reactor at Savar, twelve miles from the Capital.
- 16 Foreign Minister of Bangladesh, Mr. Humayun Rashid Chaudhary took over as President of the 41st regular session of the UN General Assembly.
- 19 A division bench of Calcutta High Court asked the Indian Government to amend the Constitution to facilitate the transfer of Teen Bigha territory to Bangladesh.
- 26 Zain Noorani arrived in Dhaka to hand over the charge of a mosque and 40 shelters, erected at Urir Char by Pakistani donations.

- October 3* Indian and Bangladeshi irrigation officials resumed negotiations over the sharing of the Ganga waters.
- 16 President H.M. Ershad won a five-year mandate, while the major opposition parties stayed off the race.
- November 14* Following the refusal of Bangladesh to extend its contract for manufacturing of passenger coaches, the annual output of the Railway Carriage Factory at Islamabad declined to about 35 per cent of its normal production.
- 18 President Ershad, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and King Birendra of Nepal met for the first time to discuss the harnessing of water resources in the region.
- 24 Mr. Saeeduzzaman, Adviser to the President of Bangladesh for Ministry of Finance, left for Dhaka after a six-day visit to Pakistan. (He had come to represent Bangladesh in the Tidewater Conference held in Islamabad).
- December 21* At a Press conference in Dhaka, the leader of nearly 250,000 stranded Pakistanis in Bangladesh, Mr. Wasim Khan, requested the UNHCR to declare stranded Pakistanis as international refugees and extend moral and material support to them.
- 29 Outgoing Ambassador of Bangladesh to Pakistan and the First Secretary-General of SAARC Secretariat, Abdul Ahsan, paid a farewell call to President Zia-ul-Haq.
- A meeting for cooperation in the agricultural field was held in Islamabad between the Chairman, Bangladesh Agricultural Research Council (BARC) Matlub-ur-Rehman, and Chairman, Pakistan Agricultural Research Council, Amir Mohammad.
- 30 In a meeting with the Executive Council of the Lahore Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the leader of the visiting Bangladesh delegation, N. H. Khan invited Pakistani investors and traders to benefit from what he called the liberal import and industrial policies of his country.

INDIA

- July 3* Responding to two identical adjournment motions sought to be moved in the National Assembly, Zain Noorani, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs said that the disturbances in

July 3 Indian Punjab were entirely indigenous. He re-affirmed Pakistan's firm commitment to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of all countries, including India.

Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi reached Mauritius on an official visit.

4 Pakistan and India signed an agreement in New Delhi, for collaboration in the field of agricultural research.

10 A Foreign Office spokesman told newsmen in Islamabad that there was no indication of Indian Premier, Rajiv Gandhi's visit to Pakistan.

A Foreign Office spokesman in Islamabad expressed regret that even after 13 days, the Indian government had not apprehended any culprit in connection with the manhandling of the Pakistan Embassy's First Secretary in New Delhi.

11 Seven Canadian Sikhs, accused of manhandling an Indian diplomat, were formally charged by the magistrate hearing the case.

According to All India Radio, the Indian government gave a detailed information to Pakistan government about its alleged involvement in terrorist activities in East Punjab.

12 Members of the National Assembly, belonging to Nizam-i-Mustafa group expressed grave concern over anti-Muslim riots in the Indian city of Ahmadabad and Bihar state.

14 All India Radio reported that the Indian BSF had killed six-persons along the India-Pakistan border. The victims were allegedly trying to infiltrate into Indian territory illegally.

16 President Ershad of Bangladesh concluded his three-day state visit to India.

17 All India Radio reported that the Indian BSF had killed a man who was allegedly trying to cross into India from Pakistan territory in Amritsar sector.

The Indian Army was instructed not to take any precipitate action against the Chinese intruders in Arunachal Pradesh.

The Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, Mr. Mikhail Kapitsa, called on the Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in New Delhi.

- July 18* Addressing the meeting of his Congress (I) Party, Indian Premier ruled out his visit to Pakistan (at that juncture) and said that it would not help matters.
- Premier Rajiv Gandhi ruled out the possibility of holding any talks with the Akali dissidents.
- 22 The Indian Home Minister, Buta Singh, said that Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi had put off his planned visit to Pakistan because, according to him, Pakistan was 'not creating an atmosphere conducive to the promotion of friendly relations.'
- The Indian BSF killed another two persons described as suspected Pakistanis, while trying to cross into Indian territory through Khem Karan near Amritsar.
- 26 Rajiv Gandhi agreed to grant statehood to Arunachal Pradesh to accelerate socio-economic development of the area.
- 28 In order to counter Sikh extremism in Indian Punjab, plans were put forward for a security zone about three miles deep, along the border with Pakistan including Rajasthan, Punjab, and held Jammu and Kashmir.
- The Yugoslav Prime Minister, Mr. Branko Mikulic held talks in New Delhi.
- 30 India and Pakistan reached an agreement in Lahore to re-open the rail route between the two countries through Khokrapar from October after about 21 years.
- According to reports, at least 18 men, alleged by the Indian Government as saboteurs from Pakistan were killed by the Indian BSF along the Indo-Pakistan border.
- The Government of Pakistan strongly protested to the Government of India against a marked increase in the violation of the line of control in occupied Jammu and Kashmir by Indian troops.
- August 11* According to All India Radio, the Indian BSF claimed to have killed 13 "miscreants coming from Pakistan" in an armed encounter along the Indo-Pak border, in East Punjab, on the night of 9 and 10 August.
- 23 China alleged that Indian Aircrafts and military personnel were repeatedly crossing the line of actual control in order to create new areas of dispute.

- August 23* *The Times of India* reported, that the Indian government had dropped the plan to create a special security belt along its border with Pakistan following objections from the moderate Sikh government in East Punjab.
- 26 India rejected the Chinese allegation that Indian troops and aircraft had intruded into Chinese territory in the eastern sector.
- 30 The authorities in the Indian Punjab reportedly killed 10 suspected Sikh extremists who were attempting to cross illegally from Pakistan into East Punjab.
- September 5* President Zia-ul-Haq, in his meeting with Premier Rajiv Gandhi, assured him that Pakistani authorities were doing every thing possible for the safety of the passengers of the hijacked plane. (Besides, matters of bilateral interest and the pace of progress in the proceedings of the current NAM Summit were also discussed).
- 9 Indian forces sealed the border areas with Pakistan in 45 East Punjab villages.
- 19 Addressing a news conference, Premier Rajiv Gandhi criticised the Pak-China Accord on nuclear cooperation as a 'threat to peace' and said that it was 'another step towards stockpiling of nuclear weapons by Pakistan.'
- 23 Talking to newsmen at the Islamabad Airport, Dr. Subramaniam Swami, former Indian MP was convinced that Pakistani leaders were sincere in their desire to improve relations with India.
- 24 India threatened to pull out the Asian Games closing ceremony if the Indian map, excluding the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir, that was shown during the opening celebrations, was again displayed.
- 26 Talking to Indian newsmen at UN, Sahabzada Yaqub Khan, Foreign Minister of Pakistan expressed regret over Indian reaction to the Pan-Am incident, specially of the Indian Press that had "virtually created a war hysteria and a 'Hate Pakistan' campaign". However, he said that Pakistan would continue to seek tensionfree relations with India from a position of dignity and self-respect.

September 27 In a clarification, the Indian authorities assured Pakistan that the construction project on River Jhelum was not in violation of the Sind Basin Agreement. (It said that the project was not of barrage but merely a control structure which could not increase the level of water in the river. It aimed only at the prevention of decrease in the water level so as to allow movements of boats, which would ultimately benefit Pakistan).

Speaking to newsmen at the UN, Indian External Minister, Shev Shanker, rejected Pakistan's contention that India's reaction to the Pan-Am hijacking was excessive and had led to a major setback in bilateral ties.

At Seoul, Pakistan's Chief-de-Mission, in a statement said that Pakistan would pull out of the remainder of the games and also boycott the closing ceremony if a new map of India, with disputed Kashmir as its integral part, was displayed.

October 1 Pakistan urged India to resolve the question of construction of a barrage over River Jhelum in held Kashmir without delay because it violated the provisions of Indus Basin Treaty to which both the governments were signatory.

Indian Ambassador in Pakistan, S.K. Singh, said that a public debate now on Indian project on the River Jhelum would be useless.

- 2 President Zia-ul-Haq and Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo expressed deep sense of shock and sorrow to the Indian Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, over the firing incident during a prayer meeting in New Delhi in which he was present.

According to All India Radio, the BSF had killed a Pakistani national in Rajasthan when he was allegedly trying to sneak into India.

- 7 Delay in the signing of an agreement to reopen rail traffic between Pakistan and India through Khokrapar-Munabao route was believed to have been caused by the hijacking of a Pan-Am Airliner at Karachi on 5 September after which the Indian authorities had reportedly stiffened their attitude towards the process of normalisation of relations.

October 8 Pakistan took strong exception to the insinuations made by the All-India Radio and some Indian officials, alleging Pakistan's involvement in the shooting incident occurred in Delhi on October 2.

- 10 Speaking in the General Assembly's legal committee, Pakistani delegate Jamshed Ahmad cited Pakistan's initiative for a no-war pact with India as a "concrete manifestation" of its commitment to the principle of non-use of force in international relations.

A spokesman of the Indian External Affairs Ministry told newsmen in New Delhi that India remained committed to improving relations with Pakistan in accordance with the Simla Agreement. (The Simla Agreement, he said, provide for non-interference in each other's internal affairs).

- 14 Dr. Mahbubul Haq, Minister for Planning and Development, while inaugurating a three-day India-Pakistan Seminar on long-term planning, said, "the future of India-Pakistan relations lies in their economic cooperation" which can then expand to other fields.

All India Radio alleged that ten "intruders from Pakistan", including a suspected terrorist, were killed in an exchange of fire with the BSF personnel in Khem Karan sector of Punjab.

- 18 Police in the Indian state of Punjab claimed that it had uncovered a gang which used to exchange classified information with "Pakistani agents" for weapons.

The Indian BSF reportedly killed another five persons along the East Punjab border with Pakistan.

November 4 India sternly warned US that if it went ahead with making early warning aircraft (AWACS) available to Pakistan, its relations with India would be seriously affected.

- 7 The Indian Minister of State for External Affairs, Natwar Singh, told Lok Sabha that relations between Pakistan and India had deteriorated in the last few months.

- 11 According to reports, India had concentrated a great number of its forces in the Punjab state adjoining Pakistan border.

- November 11 Sardar Karnail Singh Daud, Leader of the Sikh Yatress, said in Lahore that Indian people were desirous of cordial and good neighbourly relations with Pakistan.
- 13 Addressing a news conference at Karachi airport, President Zia-ul-Haq ruled out the possibility of an outbreak of hostilities between India and Pakistan following the deployment of Indian troops on the borders.
- Khaleej Times* reported that Indian Chief of Army and about 60 Generals held an important meeting outside Chandigarh, to devise a strategy to counter 'an attack' by Pakistan.
- The Pakistani participants to "India International Trade Fair 1986" left for New Delhi to attend a two-week fair.
- 15 The Consulate-General of India at Karachi announced suspension of issuance of visas for India, "only for administrative reasons", with immediate effect until further notice.
- 17 At a Press conference in Bangalore, Indian Premier, Rajiv Gandhi said (after the conclusion of SAARC Summit) that Pakistan's nuclear programme was a key determining factor in the way of normalisation of relations between India and Pakistan. '(US investment in arms for Pakistan, drug trafficking from Pakistan into India and infiltration of terrorists were other main irritants, he added).
- At a News conference in Islamabad, on his return from Bangalore, Premier Mohammad Khan Junejo said that he had no reason to doubt the assurance given to him by Premier Rajiv Gandhi that there was no concentration of Indian troops against Pakistan. (He said that troops deployment by two or three lakh men of Indian Forces was part of a routine winter exercise).
- 18 Atal Behari Vajpayee, leader of Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in the Indian Parliament, asked Indian government not to dismiss off hand, the Pakistani offer to set up a joint machinery to varify India's charge that terrorists trained and armed in Pakistan were infiltrating into Punjab for disruption and destabilization.
- 19 President Zia-ul-Haq said that Pakistan would be willing to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to prevent spread of nuclear weapons in the South Asian region, only if India agreed to do so.

November 20

The Foreign Minister of Pakistan told the National Assembly that "we are confident that time has come to pick up again the thread of the India-Pakistan dialogue". (He hoped that as a result of contacts at NAM and SAARC Summit, the bilateral parleys would once again gather momentum).

24 The Indian External Affairs Minister hoped that negative trends in India-Pakistan relations would be reversed and something positive would emerge out of the two official level meetings between the two countries scheduled for next month.

27 The Foreign Minister of Pakistan informed the National Assembly that the Indian government, in a statement on 11 November 1986 had categorically denied the report that India had amassed troops near western border for major manoeuvres. (He said the government had kept a close watch on factors that would have a direct or indirect bearing on the security of Pakistan).

30 Hindu Yatrees arrived in Lahore to perform their religious rites at an ancient Hindu temple in Raj Katas near Jhelum.

December 1

The Azad Kashmir cabinet meeting held in Muzaffarabad under the chairmanship of Premier Sardar Sikandar Hayat Khan, reviewed the situation arising from the massive concentration of the Indian troops in occupied Kashmir.

4 The President of Azad Jammu and Kashmir, said that the unprecedented concentration of Indian troops along Pakistan border demonstrated India's intention to storm Pakistan frontier.

9 Addressing MNAs at a special meeting in Islamabad, Prime Minister Junejo said that the border situation was not explosive as India had informed Pakistan that its Forces' seasonal exercises should be of no alarm to Pakistan.

11 According to fisheries sources, the Indian naval gunboats had impounded about 45 Pakistani fishing vessels and arrested their crew recently. The official sources confirmed seizure of 15 Pakistani fishing vessels and arrest of about 222 Pakistani crew-men while fishing about 150 miles South of Karachi).

India's Chief of Army Staff, General Krishna Swami Sunderji, said that India was carrying out large scale military manoeuvres near Pakistan frontier.

- December 12* Addressing military men in Ladakh, the Indian Prime Minister said that Pakistan's response to India's initiative for improving relations had been negative.
- Prime Minister Junejo said in Lahore that he was sure that there would be no aggression against Pakistan from India.
- 14 The Minister of State for Foreign Affairs reiterated that the people as well as the government of Pakistan wanted to live in peace with India.
- The six divisions of the Indian Army which were recently deployed along the Rajasthan border with Pakistan were reported to have been directed to withdraw 15 km.
- 18 The President of the Bharatiya Janata Party refuted the Indian government's accusation of Pakistan's involvement in the Punjab affairs.
- 19 Talking to newsmen on his arrival in Islamabad, the Indian Secretary of Home Affairs, C.G. Somiya, hoped that his talks with Pakistan officials would help analyse the problems between the two countries in a friendly manner.
- 20 Indo-Pakistan talks at the Home Secretaries level began in Lahore.
- 21 Indo-Pakistan delegation headed by their respective Home Secretaries decided, in their meeting in Lahore, 'to evolve a common strategy to combat narcotic trafficking and smuggling and assured that their countries would not provide any support to terrorists against each other.'
- Addressing a Press conference in Lahore, the Indian Home Secretary expressed satisfaction over his talks in Pakistan and stressed that what was important was the follow up of the agreements reached.
- 24 It was reported that the Indian Ruling Congress (I) Party urged the large Indian community in New York to go on the offensive and pressure the American Government and legislation into dropping any plans to sell AWACS to Pakistan.
- 27 The Indian Foreign Secretary, A. P. Venkateswaran and Pakistan Foreign Secretary, Abdus Sattar, held their first round of talks in Islamabad.
- 28 At a joint conference held in Islamabad, the Foreign Secretaries of India and Pakistan announced that they would

resume their dialogue on normalisation of relations between the two countries in early 1987.

Four more Pakistan fishing vessels were seized by the Indian naval boats from the Pakistan territorial waters.

- December 29* The Indian BSF reportedly killed four persons who were allegedly trying to cross into India from Pakistan side from Khem Karan Sector.
- 30 It was reported that Indian government had confiscated two Pakistani fishing vessels and convicted all its 14 crew members by awarding them prison sentences.

NEPAL

- July 4* President Hussain Mohammad Ershad of Bangladesh reached Kuthmandu on a three-day state visit to Nepal.
- 9 India granted aid of Rs. 30.6 million for Chatara Canal project in Nepal.
- 10 Nepal and Brunei-Darussalam signed an Air Service Agreement between the two countries.
- 11 The Minister of State for Finance presented 13 billion rupees budget for 1986-87 at the Rastriya Punchayat.
- 24 President Zail Singh of India reached at Kathmandu on a state visit to Nepal.

SRI LANKA

- July 2* While responding to an adjournment motion, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, dismissed as "potently absurd" the allegation levelled against Pakistan of collaboration with Israel in support of Sri Lankan Government to suppress Tamil ethnic minority.
- 7 The Eelam Revolutionary Communist Party of Sri Lanka issued a statement in India that if Sri Lanka did not accept its five-point memorandum before July 27, it would resort to planting bombs at the Colombo Airport.
- 14 The Sri Lanka Freedom Party decided not to endorse the Government's proposals on devolution of power through provincial councils and also to boycott the political parties conference.

- July 16* Indian Minister for External Affairs, Shiv Shankar, informed the Lower House of the Indian Parliament that Pakistan had supplied Sri Lanka with small arms, transport and communication requirements.
- 21* The Sri Lankan Government announced to boycott Commonwealth games in Edinburgh, Scotland.
- 22* A visiting four-member Sri Lankan delegation, held discussion with officials of Pakistan Automobile Corporation (PACO) in Karachi.
- 25* Sri Lankan Minister for Transport and Religious Affairs said in Lahore that there is scope for increased trade between Pakistan and Sri Lanka.
- September 30* A two-member delegation of Sri Lanka, led by Lt. General (Retd.) J.E.D. Berera, called on President Zia-ul-Haq and discussed matters of mutual concern.
- December 9* Governor of Sind, Lt. General (Retd.) Jahan Dad Khan, left for Sri Lanka in response to a long standing invitation of the Sri Lankan Government.

SAARC

- August 11* Speaking at a meeting of the SAARC standing committee at Dhaka, Abdul Sattar, Foreign Secretary of Pakistan stressed for the need of a permanent SAARC Secretariat and appointment of its Secretary-General for coordination and effective planning and evolution of SAARC activities.
- 12* Addressing the SAARC Foreign Ministers' Conference at Dhaka, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, called on the member-countries to evolve a common perception and outlook towards external political environment.
- 13* Presenting the vote of thanks on the conclusion of the first meeting of the SAARC Council of Ministers, Sahabzada Yaqub Khan, Pakistan Foreign Minister, maintained that the results of the first meeting fulfilled the mandate entrusted by the leaders at the historic Dhaka Summit.

- September 22* At Dhaka, discord was apparent among the senior officials of SARRC countries on the definition of terrorism and laws of extradition.
- October 25* Inaugurating a Sub-regional Workshop on Appropriate Technology and training for women of South Asia, Federal Minister for Labour and Manpower, Maqsood Ahmad Khan Leghari, said that it was a pre-requisite for every country to make adequate use of its potential for the development of total human resources.
- November 13* In the SAARC standing committee meeting in Bangalore, Pakistan endorsed the measures suggested by the expert group on terrorism and extended its full cooperation in eliminating it from the SAARC region.
- 14* Addressing a Press Conference at the SAARC media centre in Bangalore, Pakistan Foreign Secretary, Abdus Sattar, declared that his country would be very happy to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the same day India would do so.
- Speaking at the SAARC council of Ministers meeting, Pakistan Foreign Minister, Sahabzada Yaqub Khan, called on the SAARC countries to free themselves of the corrosive compulsions of power politics in order to create a happy and prosperous community shaped by mutual tolerance and respect, capable of solving their problems peacefully and rationally, with commitment to the collective well being.
- 15* Prime Minister Junejo, flew into Bangalore from Islamabad to attend the second SAARC Summit.
- 16* Addressing the second SAARC Summit, Prime Minister Junejo expressed his government's willingness to join in a meaningful dialogue to preclude possibilities of armed escalation as well as induction of nuclear weapons in South Asian region.
- 17* The Second SAARC Summit, attended by Pakistan's Prime Minister and leaders of Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, Maldives and Bangladesh ended in Bangalore, India, after adopting a declaration that called for promoting peace, stability, unity and progress in the region.
- December 23* The first scientists meeting of SAARC countries on groundnut began in New Delhi.

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January 1986; Vol. III, No. 2, July 1986.

Notes to Contributors

Manuscripts, articles, book reviews and notes or letters on themes of contemporary or historical interest, with particular reference to South Asia, will be welcomed.

Manuscript should be clearly typed on one side of the paper only, and should be double-spaced. Two copies should be submitted.

Bibliographies and footnotes should be placed at the end of the article. Footnotes should be numbered consecutively, and bibliographies should be arranged alphabetically. Foreign words should be underlined.

Bibliographical references should be complete in respect of the title of the book, the name of the author, the year and the place of publication.

Utmost care should be taken to prepare statistical data for publication. All headings, columns, rows, symbols, units of measurement, periods, political and geographical areas, and sources should be clearly stated in each statistical table, instead of giving such explanations in the text.

Tables, maps, and diagrams should be numbered and given at the end of the article, each on a separate sheet of paper. They should be clearly drawn so that they are suitable for photocopying as submitted.

Abstracts

Authors should submit abstract of their articles, not exceeding 100 words. The first page of the paper should include the title of the paper as well as the name and institutional affiliation of the author.

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